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Abstract 
 
Adolescents show a tendency to engage in risky activities, such as dangerous driving 
and unsafe sex. This has led to the suggestion that adolescents are poor decision-
makers, and are risk-seeking in general. The first two chapters of this thesis describe 
studies investigating adolescent decision-making using probabilistic decision-making 
tasks. In Chapter 2, the tendency to seek risk, and the ability to integrate probability 
and  reward  information  to  make  an  optimal  decision,  is  investigated  in  child, 
adolescent  and  adult  participants.  The  emotional  response  to  outcomes  was  also 
investigated. In Chapter 3, a computational approach is adopted to investigate the 
role  of  positive  and  negative  performance  feedback  (wins  and  losses)  in  a 
probabilistic decision-making task in adolescents and in adults. The role of social-
emotional factors in decision-making was also investigated. 
 
Adolescence  is  characterised  by  social  and  emotional  development,  as  well  as 
development  in  the  functional  brain  correlates  of  social-emotional  processing. 
Therefore, Chapters 4 to 6 focus on adolescent social-emotional processing using 
behavioural  and  functional  neuroimaging  methods.  In  Chapter  4,  results  are 
presented from a study of self-reported social and basic emotions across adolescence, 
where social emotions (e.g. embarrassment) are defined as emotions that require an 
awareness of others’ mental states (e.g. emotions, opinions, desires). In Chapter 5, 
the  neural  correlates  of  social  and  basic  emotion  processing  are  investigated  in 
adolescents  and  in  adults,  using  functional  magnetic  resonance  imaging  (fMRI). 
Finally, in Chapter 6, these fMRI data are reanalysed using a technique known as 
psycho-physiological interaction (PPI) analysis, to look at age-associated changes in 
effective connectivity. Results are discussed in the context of social cognition and 
neuroanatomical development.   4 
 
Contents 
 
List of figures 
 
List of tables 
 
Abbreviations 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Adolescence: definition 
1.2 Puberty 
1.2.1 Hormonal effects on brain and behaviour 
1.3 Behavioural and psychological characteristics of adolescence 
1.3.1 Social behaviour and self-awareness 
  1.3.2 Emotional development 
  1.3.3 Risk and decision-making  
1.4 Adolescent structural brain development 
1.4.1 Early histological studies of the developing brain: non-human studies 
1.4.2 Early histological studies of the developing human brain 
1.4.2.1 Synaptic development 
1.4.2.2 Axonal myelination 
1.4.3 Structural MRI studies of the developing human brain 
1.4.3.1 Introduction to structural MRI 
1.4.3.2 Adolescent structural MRI studies 
1.4.3.2.1 Adolescent changes in grey matter 
1.4.3.2.1.1 Implications of grey matter change 
1.4.3.2.2 Adolescent changes in white matter 
1.4.3.2.2.1 Implications of white matter change 
1.4.3.2.2.2 Other MRI measures 
1.5 Adolescent functional brain development 
  1.5.1 Introduction to functional MRI 
  1.5.2 Adolescent functional MRI studies   5 
1.5.2.1 Social cognition and the social brain 
1.5.2.2 Adolescent functional MRI studies of social cognition 
1.5.2.2.1 Face processing 
1.5.2.2.2 Mentalising 
1.5.2.2.3 Peer influence 
1.5.2.3 Decision-making and reward 
1.6 Adolescent cognitive development 
1.6.1 Social cognitive development during adolescence 
  1.6.1.1 Face processing 
  1.6.1.2 Mentalising 
  1.6.1.3 Social concepts 
  1.6.1.4 Peer influence 
1.6.2 Adolescent development of reward-based decision-making 
1.6.2.1 Performance in probabilistic decision-making tasks 
1.6.2.2 Emotional influences on decision-making 
1.7 Summary of experimental chapters 
 
Chapter 2: The development of expected value maximising, risk-seeking 
and counterfactual emotion in a probabilistic gambling task 
2.1 Introduction 
2.1.1 Adolescent development of risk-seeking  
2.1.2 Adolescent development of emotion 
2.1.3 Probabilistic gambling task 
2.1.3.1 Predicted development in expected value-maximisation 
2.1.3.2 Predicted development in the influence of risk on choice 
2.1.3.3 Predicted development of counterfactual emotion 
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Participants 
2.2.2 Procedure 
2.2.3 Data analysis 
2.2.3.1 Logit regression analysis: the effect of EV and risk on choice 
2.2.3.2 Proportion of EV and risk-maximising choices 
2.2.3.3 Other indices of performance   6 
2.2.3.4 Strength of counterfactual emotions 
2.2.3.5 Overall emotional response 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Performance 
2.3.1.1 Behavioural sensitivity to EV 
2.3.1.2 Proportion of EV-maximising choices by age group 
2.3.1.3 Correlation between age and mean winnings 
2.3.1.4 Effect of age on learning 
2.3.2 Risk-seeking 
2.3.2.1 Behavioural sensitivity to risk 
2.3.2.2 Nonlinear relationship between age and the impact of risk 
2.3.2.3 Proportion of risk-maximising choices by age group 
2.3.3 Emotional response to outcomes 
2.3.3.1 Strength of counterfactual emotion by age group 
2.3.3.2 Post hoc tests on counterfactual emotion and risk-seeking 
2.3.3.2.1 Relief vs. regret 
2.3.3.2.2 Relationship between relief and risk-seeking 
2.4 Discussion 
2.4.1 Development of rational decision-making: sensitivity to EV 
2.4.2 Developmental profile of risk-taking 
2.4.3 Development of counterfactual emotions 
2.4.4 Relationship between emotions and risk-taking 
2.5 Conclusion 
2.5.1 The next chapter 
 
Chapter  3:  Development  of  the  integration  of  social  and  utilitarian 
factors in a probabilistic decision-making task 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 Developmental studies of decision-making 
3.1.2 Developmental changes in strategy 
3.1.3 Influence of social and emotional cues 
3.1.4 The Face Decision Task 
3.1.4.1 Ideal and ecological observer models   7 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Participants 
3.2.2 Procedure 
3.2.3 Data analysis 
3.2.3.1 Ideal observer model 
3.2.3.2 Ecological observer model 
3.2.3.3 Group differences in ecological observer model parameters 
3.2.3.4 Gender differences 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Performance referenced to the ideal observer model 
3.3.2 Ecological observer model of behaviour 
3.3.3 Gender differences 
3.4 Discussion 
  3.4.1 Performance referenced to the ideal observer model 
3.4.2 Performance referenced to the ideal observer model: social bias 
3.4.3 Performance referenced to the ecological observer model: the role of 
social cues 
3.4.4  Performance  referenced  to  the  ecological  observer  model: 
Developmental differences in the role of performance feedback 
3.4.4.1  Adolescent  response  to  positive  vs.  negative  feedback  and 
behavioural strategies 
3.5 Conclusion 
3.5.1 The next chapter 
 
Chapter 4: Development of mixed social emotion understanding across 
puberty 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 Development of social emotion processing 
4.1.1.1 Social emotion development during puberty 
4.1.2 Development of the understanding of mixed emotion 
4.1.3  The  current  investigation:  mixed  emotion  during  puberty  and 
adolescence 
4.2 Methods   8 
4.2.1 Participants 
4.2.2 Procedure 
4.2.3 Data analysis 
4.3 Results 
4.4 Discussion 
4.4.1 Mixedness in social emotion 
4.4.2 Development of mixed emotion understanding 
4.4.3 Structural and functional brain development and puberty 
4.4.4 Mixedness and cognitive development 
4.5 Conclusion 
  4.5.1 The next chapter 
 
Chapter  5:  A  functional  magnetic  resonance  imaging  study  of  social 
emotion processing in adolescents and in adults 
5.1 Introduction 
  5.1.1 fMRI studies of mentalising in adults 
5.1.2 Developmental fMRI studies of mentalising 
5.1.3 Development of social emotion 
5.1.4 Predictions 
5.2 Methods 
  5.2.1 Participants 
  5.2.2 Experimental design 
    5.2.2.1 Emotion factor 
    5.2.2.2 Protagonist factor 
    5.2.2.3 Task structure 
5.2.2.4 Participants’ perceived similarity to their mothers 
  5.2.3 Data acquisition 
  5.2.4 Data analysis 
5.3 Results 
  5.3.1 Behavioural results 
    5.3.1.1 Emotion ratings 
    5.3.1.2 Perceived self–mother difference 
  5.3.2 Functional imaging results   9 
    5.3.2.1 Main effect of sentences vs. visual fixation 
5.3.2.2  Three-way  interaction  between  emotion,  protagonist,  and 
group 
5.3.2.3 Main effect of emotion in each group 
5.3.2.4 Interactions between group and emotion 
5.3.2.5 Main effect of protagonist in each group 
5.3.2.6 Interactions between protagonist and group 
5.3.2.7 Interactions between emotion and protagonist 
5.4 Discussion 
  5.4.1 FMRI correlates of social emotion processing in both groups 
5.4.1.1 Anterior rostral MPFC 
5.4.1.2 Posterior superior temporal sulcus/ temporo-parietal junction 
  5.4.2 Group differences in the fMRI correlates of social emotion processing 
5.4.2.1 Anterior rostral MPFC 
5.4.2.2 Anterior temporal cortex 
5.4.2.3 Interpretation of group differences 
  5.4.3 FMRI correlates of self/other processing 
  5.4.4 Role of the arMPFC in social cognitive development 
5.5 Conclusion 
  5.5.1 The next chapter 
 
Chapter 6: Effective connectivity during social emotion processing in 
adolescents and in adults 
6.1 Introduction 
  6.1.1 PPI analysis 
  6.1.2 Mentalising system connectivity 
  6.1.3 Age group differences in connectivity 
6.2 Methods 
  6.2.1 Participants, experimental design and data acquisition 
  6.2.2 PPI analysis 
    6.2.2.1 Definition of physiological source and PPI target regions 
    6.2.2.2 Group level PPI analysis 
6.3 Results   10 
  6.2.1 Psychophysiological interaction across participants 
  6.3.2 Psychophysiological interactions within each age group separately 
  6.3.3 Interaction between the arMPFC-emotion PPI and age group 
6.4 Discussion  
  6.4.1 Effective connectivity within the mentalising system 
  6.4.2 Adolescent vs. adult effective connectivity 
  6.4.3 Implications for the development of mentalising 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
Chapter 7: Discussion 
7.1 Summary of findings  
7.1.1  Development  of  expected  value  maximising,  risk-seeking  and 
counterfactual emotion 
7.1.2 Development of the integration of social and utilitarian cues  
7.1.3 Development of mixed social emotion understanding across puberty 
7.1.4 Social emotion processing in adolescents and in adults 
7.1.5 Effective connectivity during social emotion 
7.2 Outstanding issues and future directions 
7.2.1 Reasons behind adolescent risk-taking in decision-making tasks 
7.2.2 Adopting a computational approach to investigate factors influencing 
adolescent (social) decision-making 
7.2.3  The  measurement  of  puberty  stage  for  use  in  adolescent  cognitive 
development and cognitive neuroscience research 
7.2.5 Age group differences in functional brain activity: what do they mean? 
7.2.6 Future directions using a multimodal approach to the development of 
social  cognition  and  its  neural  basis:  fffective  connectivity,  structural  and 
diffusion neuroimaging, behavioural testing 
7.3 Wider implications 
  7.3.1 Education 
  7.3.2 Psychiatric disorders 
    7.3.1 Disorders of incentive processing 
    7.3.2 Social anxiety disorder 
7.4 Overall summary   11 
 
References 
 
Appendices 
Appendix 2.1  Gambling task parameter structure 
Appendix 3.1  Pattern across blocks of percent correct is similar between groups 
Appendix 4.1 Physical development questionnaire 
Appendix 4.2 Scenarios used in the emotion questionnaire 
Appendix 5.1 Sentences used in the scanner 
Appendix 5.2 Pilot questionnaire 
Appendix 5.3 Regression analysis: brain regions for which activity to other > self 
correlates with perceived dissimilarity of (m)other to self    12 
List of figures 
 
Figure 1.1   The onset of gonadarche 
Figure 1.2   Fast dendritic outgrowth shortly after birth 
Figure 1.3   Development of synaptic density 
Figure 1.4   Development of grey matter density across the cortical surface 
Figure 1.5   Region-specific trajectories of grey matter change 
Figure 1.6   Age-related increases in white matter volume 
Figure 1.7   The social brain 
Figure 1.8   Adolescent fMRI studies of mentalising 
Figure 1.9   Adolescent development of mentalising 
Figure 1.10   Adolescent development of the influence of peers on risk-taking 
 
Figure 2.1   The probabilistic gambling task 
Figure 2.2   Mean winnings across the task 
Figure 2.3   Proportion of risky choices made by each age group 
Figure 2.4   Counterfactual emotion 
 
Figure 3.1   The Face Decision Task 
Figure 3.2   Probability of choosing each face as a function of the evidence 
Figure 3.3   Parameters of the ecological observer model 
 
Figure 4.1   Example of a task scenario 
Figure 4.2   Scoring of responses 
Figure 4.3   Mean mixed emotion score for social and basic emotion scenarios in 
each puberty group 
 
Figure 5.1   Structure of the experiment 
Figure 5.2   Three way interaction between emotion, protagonist and group in left 
TPJ 
Figure 5.3   Main effect of social emotion in each group 
Figure 5.4   Interaction between group (adult > adolescent) and emotion  
Figure 5.4   Interaction between group (adolescent > adult) and emotion    13 
Figure 5.6   Interaction between emotion and protagonist in each age group 
Figure 5.7   arMPFC shows greater activity in adolescents relative to adults during 
mentalising tasks 
 
Figure 6.1   Graphical  depiction  of  a  fictitious  psychophysiological  interaction 
(PPI) 
Figure 6.2   PPI results across participants 
Figure 6.3   Interaction  between  group,  emotion  and  arMPFC  signal  in  left 
pSTS/TPJ  
 
Figure 7.1   The onset of many psychiatric disorders occurs during adolescence   14 
List of tables 
 
Table 2.1   Participant choice behaviour as a function of decision variables 
 
Table 3.1   Contingency table showing the choices made by participants vs. ideal 
observer 
 
Table 4.1   Experimenter-defined emotions and example task scenarios 
 
Table 5.1   Mean and standard deviation of the emotion ratings 
Table 5.2   Regions of activation for the main effects of emotion and protagonist, 
and two- and three-way interactions with group 
 
Table 6.1   PPI results across participants 
Table 6.2   (a)  PPI  results  within  each  age  group  separately;  (b)  Group  PPI 
differences   15 
Abbreviations 
 
ACC    Anterior cingulate cortex 
AI    Anterior insula 
ANOVA  Analysis of variance 
arMPFC  Anterior rostral medial prefrontal cortex 
ATC    Anterior temporal cortex 
BA    Brodmann area 
BOLD   Blood oxygenation level-dependent 
CCT    Columbia Card Task 
CSF    Cerebro-spinal fluid 
DLPFC  Dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex 
DTI    Diffusion-tensor imaging 
EV    Expected value 
FA    Fractional anisotropy 
fMRI    functional magnetic resonance imaging 
FSH    Follicle-stimulating hormone 
FSIQ    Full-scale intelligence quotient 
GnRH   Gonadotropin-releasing hormone 
IFG    Inferior frontal gyrus 
IGT    Iowa Gambling Task 
IPS    Intra-parietal sulcus 
LH    Luteinising hormone 
MA    Mid-adolescent 
MNI    Montreal Neurological Institute 
MPFC   Medial prefrontal cortex 
MR    Magnetic resonance 
MRI    Magnetic resonance imaging 
MTR    Myelin transfer ratio 
OFC    Orbitofrontal cortex 
PDS    Petersen Development Scale 
PFC    Prefrontal cortex 
PPI    Psycho-physiological interaction   16 
PSMD   Perceived self-mother difference 
pSTS    Posterior superior temporal sulcus 
RPI    Resistance to peer influence 
SAD    Social anxiety disorder 
STS    Superior temporal sulcus 
SVC    Small volume correction 
TPJ    Temporo-parietal junction 
VBM    Voxel-based morphometry 
VOI    Volume of interest 
WASI   Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence  
WCST   Wisconsin Card Sort Task   
YA    Young adolescent   17 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
Adolescence: behaviour, cognition and the brain  
 
This  chapter  will  first  define  adolescence,  and  will  then  summarise  findings  in 
adolescence research from a range of interconnected fields: endocrinology, including 
the effects of puberty hormones on adolescent development; adolescent psychology and 
behaviour,  including  social  behaviour,  emotional  development  and  decision-making; 
structural brain development during adolescence, including histological findings and 
the  volumetric  changes  shown  in  human  MRI  studies;  adolescent  functional 
neuroimaging, with a particular focus on the functional magnetic resonance imaging 
correlates  of  social  cognition  and  decision-making;  and  adolescent  cognitive 
development,  including  development  within  the  domains  of  social  cognition  and 
decision-making. Finally, subsequent experimental chapters will be briefly introduced.  
 
1.1 Adolescence: definition 
 
Adolescence is the period of physical, cognitive and psychosocial maturation between 
childhood  and  adulthood  (Lerner  &  Steinberg,  2004;  Sisk  &  Foster,  2004).  The 
beginning of adolescence occurs around the onset of puberty (mean age 11 in females, 
12 in males). Therefore, adolescence is marked by dramatic changes in hormone levels 
and physical appearance. As a result, and in combination with environmental factors 
and hormonally-independent biological influences, an individual enters a profoundly 
altered  social  and  interpersonal  environment.  Finally,  adolescence  is  marked  by 
protracted changes in the structure and function of the brain. 
   18 
The end of adolescence is said to occur when an individual has attained a stable adult 
role (Lerner & Steinberg, 2004). Therefore, whereas the beginning of adolescence is 
loosely anchored to the biological events of puberty, the endpoint of adolescence is 
defined according culturally-variable psychosocial and economic criteria (Gluckman & 
Hanson, 2006). Many use the age of attainment of legal majority as a convenient marker 
for the endpoint of adolescence (Spear, 2000). Elsewhere, it has been argued that in 
developed  nations  and  at  the  present  point  in  history,  a  stable  economic  and 
psychosocial adult role is not attained until the early or mid-twenties (Baumrind, 1987). 
However in practice, this period of ‘extended’ adolescence tends to be referred to as 
young  adulthood  or  youth  (e.g.  Gardner  &  Steinberg,  2005;  Arnett,  2000).  For  the 
purposes of this thesis, adolescence is defined as the period between the mean age of 
puberty onset (11-12 years) and 18 years of age.  
 
1.2 Puberty 
 
Early adolescence is characterised by the transition through puberty, which is defined as 
the biological process resulting in the attainment of reproductive competence (Sisk & 
Foster,  2004).  Puberty  comprises  three  hormonally-driven  events:  gonadarche, 
adrenarche  and  activation  of  the  growth  axis  (for  a  review,  see  Dorn  et  al.  2006). 
Gonadarche,  or  activation  of  the  hypothalamic-pituitary-gonadal  axis,  is  initiated 
between age 8-14 years in females, and 9-15 in males in response to increased release of 
gonadotropin-releasing hormone (GnRH) from the hypothalamus, which is detected by 
the pituitary gland (Susman & Rogol, 2004; Dorn et al., 2006; see Figure 1.1). The 
pituitary  gland  responds  with  the  production  of  hormones  that  are  detected  by  the 
gonads (ovaries, testes; Susman & Rogol, 2004; Spear, 2000). The gonads respond by 
producing eggs or sperm, as well as gonadal steroids or ‘sex hormones’: oestrogen in 
females, testosterone in males; progesterone is released by the corpus luteum following 
ovulation in females. The sex hormones trigger changes in the reproductive organs and 
stimulate the appearance of secondary sexual characteristics (Susman & Rogol, 2004).  
 
Adrenache, or activation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis, is initiated earlier 
than gonadarche, from age 6-9 in females and a year later in males (Grumbach & Styne, 
2003; Dorn et al., 2006). At the onset of adrenarche, adrenal androgens (weaker forms   19 
of gonadal testosterone) begin to rise, and this contributes to changes in pubic hair and 
body odour. The mechanism for the initiation of adrenarche is unknown, although there 
is evidence for a role of adrenocorticotropic hormone (Weber et al., 1997). Finally, 
activation of the growth axis occurs during puberty, resulting in a shift from night-time 
to constant 24-hour release of growth hormone (Dorn et al., 2006). This leads to a linear 
growth spurt at around age 12 in girls and age 14 in boys, as well as changes in body 
size and composition (Marshall & Tanner, 1969, 1970; Reiter & Rosenfeld, 2003).  
 
Figure 1.1 Gonadarche, which is a component of puberty. Gonadotropin-releasing hormone (GnRH) 
release from the hypothalamus triggers the start of gonadarche. GnRH is detected by the pituitary gland, 
which responds by secreting luteinising hormone (LH) and follicle-stimulating hormone (FSH). LH and 
FSH are detected by the gonads (testes or ovaries), which respond by producing sperm and egg cells and 
the  gonadal  steroid  hormones  testosterone  and  oestrogen,  which  trigger  the  development  of  some 
secondary sexual characteristics. Figure from www.kallmans.org 
   20 
1.2.1 Hormonal effects on brain and behaviour 
Sex hormones influence the physical appearance of the body, but they also affect the 
brain  and  subsequent  behaviour.  These  effects  are  hypothesised  to  occur  via  two 
mechanisms: organisation and activation (Phoenix et al., 1959; Sisk & Foster, 2004; 
Schulz et al., 2009). Organisational effects occur pre- and peri-natally, with waves of 
testosterone masculinising and defeminising neural circuits in males, and the absence of 
testosterone  resulting  in  a  female  neural  phenotype.  Activational  effects  occur  at 
puberty,  with  gonadal  hormones  including  testosterone  acting  on  dormant  neural 
circuits to elicit adult reproductive behaviours in context. A recent modernisation of this 
dichotomy holds that the hormonal events of puberty exert organisational as well as 
activational effects (Schulz et al. 2009). It has recently been proposed that the pubertal 
wave of gonadal hormones gives rise to a second period of structural reorganisation in 
the brain (Sisk & Foster, 2004). 
 
Animal  studies  indicate  that  gonadal  steroid  hormones  exert  three  main  effects  on 
behaviour at puberty via specific brain structures. The first effect is the facilitation of 
directly  reproductive  behaviours,  which  occurs  mainly  via  the  hypothalamus  (e.g. 
Putnam  et  al.,  2005).  The  second  effect  of  gonadal  hormones  on  behaviour  is  via 
reorganisation  of  sensory  and  association  regions  of  the  brain,  including  the  visual 
cortex (Nunez et al., 2002), amygdala and hippocampus (Romeo & Sisk, 2001; Hebbard 
et al., 2003). This is thought to influence behaviour by altering sensory associations, e.g. 
the smell or sight of an adult female, with consequences for an animal’s response to 
potential  sexual  partners  or  competitors  (Sisk  &  Foster,  2004).  The  third  effect  of 
gonadal  hormones  occurs  via  reward-related  brain  structures,  such  as  the  nucleus 
accumbens  and  dopaminergic  pathways  to  the  prefrontal  cortex.  These  effects  are 
necessary if the animal is to seek out reproductive opportunities. For example, in the 
rodent nucleus accumbens, pubertal increases in testosterone remodel neural circuits to 
elicit an increase in pleasure-seeking behaviours including sexual behaviour (Sato et al., 
2008). Researchers have begun to investigate the effects of puberty hormones on the 
human brain and behaviour (e.g. Vermeersch et al., 2008). This research draws on a 
wealth of human psychology research on adolescence, which will be summarized in the 
next section.  
   21 
1.3 Behavioural and psychological characteristics of 
adolescence 
 
1.3.1 Social behaviour and self-awareness 
The  onset  of  human  adolescence  marks  a  change  in  patterns  of  social  behaviour. 
Individuals begin to spend less time with their families, and spend more time both with 
friends  and  by  themselves  (Larson  &  Richards,  1991).  During  the  time  spent  with 
friends, adolescents share their worries, secrets and ambitions more than they did as 
children  (Laible  et  al.,  2004).  This  intimacy  in  friendships  also  has  negative 
consequences,  as  it  allows  for  a  greater  incidence  and  influence  of  psychological 
bullying, including social exclusion (Parker et al., 2006).   
 
Peer relationships become more complex and hierarchical during adolescence (Brown, 
2004). The transition from adolescence to adulthood sees a continuation in hierarchical 
relationships, but a decrease in the amount of time spent with friends and acquaintances 
and a resurgence in the amount of time spend with family (Cartensen, 1992).  
 
The adolescent years mark a change in social and self-awareness. It has long been held 
that the onset of adolescence marks an increase in self-consciousness, and indeed the 
self-conscious emotion embarrassment has been labelled ‘the adolescent emotion par 
excellence’  (Harré,  1990).  There  is  limited  empirical  evidence  to  corroborate  this 
notion, at least with regards the frequency and intensity of self-conscious emotions per 
se. However, social psychology self- and other-report studies indicate that from early 
adolescence, individuals become more aware that other people are making judgments 
about them, and they place a higher value on these judgments (Harter, 1990; Vartanian, 
2000). This is particularly true for judgments elicited from peers. Adolescents are more 
likely than children to compare themselves with others, especially peers (Simmons et 
al., 1973; Elkind, 1967; Elkind & Bower, 1979; Parker et al., 2006). 
 
It has been suggested that the developmental increase in social and self-awareness is due 
to  developing  proficiency  in  social  perspective-taking  (Lapsley,  1993).  Others  have 
suggested  that  it  may  be  a  response  to  the  interpersonal  realities  of  adolescent  life: 
adolescents  have  been  estimated  to  spend  almost  a  third  of  their  day  with  peers   22 
(Csikszentmihalyi  et  al.,  1977),  so  peer  acceptance  and  reputation  are  powerful 
determinants of self-esteem and happiness (O’Brien, & Bierman, 1988; Sebastian et al., 
2009).  
 
1.3.2 Emotional development 
Adolescence is said to be a time of emotional turbulence, or ‘storm and stress’ (Hall, 
1904). Empirical studies show some support for this notion, although the degree of 
turbulence  appears  to  be  modulated  by  cultural  variables  (Arnett,  1999).  Self-report 
studies  conducted  in  North  America  have  shown  that  the  average  emotional  state 
becomes less positive between late childhood and early adolescence, as well as more 
labile; these trajectories stabilise in middle and late adolescence (Larson & Richards, 
1991, 1994; Larson et al., 2002). Elsewhere, it has been shown that inner turmoil, as 
represented by feelings of misery and self-depreciation, is frequent in 14-15 year olds 
(Rutter et al., 1976). However, these findings may be influenced by self-report bias, and 
not all studies report heightened emotional lability and negativity during adolescence 
(e.g. Silk et al., 2003). 
 
Adolescence  is  an  important  period  for  the  refinement  of  emotional  self-regulation 
abilities. Poor emotion self-regulation during adolescence is associated with increased 
risk for depressive symptoms (Silk et al., 2003), and indeed, pathological emotional 
turmoil, such as occurs in clinical depression, increases in prevalence from adolescence 
onset (Davey et al., 2008). Emotion regulation in a social context in particular becomes 
more sophisticated during the adolescent years. Relative to children, adolescents show a 
heightened awareness of the interpersonal consequences of expressing certain emotions 
to parents and to peers (Zeman & Garber, 1996; Zeman et al. 2006). 
 
1.3.3 Risk and decision-making  
Another aspect of typical adolescent psychology and behaviour is the tendency to seek 
out and engage in risky activities (e.g. Eaton et al., 2007; Steinberg, 2008; Geier & 
Luna,  2009).  These  activities  include  dangerous  driving,  unsafe  sex,  tobacco  and 
alcohol use, poor dietary habits and physical inactivity. The increase in risky activities 
between  childhood  and  late  adolescence  partially  accounts  for  the  so-called  ‘health 
paradox’  of  adolescence,  whereby  a  peak  in  lifetime  physical  health  is  nevertheless   23 
accompanied  by  high  morbidity  and  mortality.  In  the  United  States,  morbidity  and 
mortality rates increase by 200% between mid-childhood and late adolescence (Resnick 
et al., 1997; Ozer et al., 2004), and a recent epidemiological survey in the United States 
found  that  72%  of  all  deaths  among  10-24  year-olds  were  a  result  of  accidents, 
homicides and suicides (Eaton et al. 2007).  
 
The  high  percentage  of  adolescent  harm  resulting  from  risky  activities  is  of  course 
partially  a  result  of  low  illness  (e.g.  heart  disease,  infant  illness),  and  also  because 
adolescence marks an increase in access to certain risky activities (e.g. driving). This 
increased access occurs at an age when risk-estimation abilities may still be immature 
(see  Boyer,  2006).  This  may  be  due  to  cognitive-developmental  factors,  or  to 
developing expertise and experience. Another contributing factor may be the increase in 
self-reported  sensation-seeking  that  is  seen  at  the  onset  of  adolescence  (Steinberg, 
Albert et al., 2008). It has been suggested that sensation-seeking is an important trait to 
possess  in  the  transition  to  an  adult  role,  as  it  will  motivate  exploration  and 
independence from parents (Spear, 2000).  
 
Social  and  emotional  factors  play  a  pivotal  role  in  adolescent  risky  decisions. 
Heightened  emotionality (reviewed in section 1.3.2), in combination  with sensation-
seeking and an increase in the importance of peer reputation (section 1.3.1) contribute to 
a  distinctively  social  context  for  adolescent  risk-taking  (e.g.  Steinberg,  2008).  For 
example, whereas most adults who commit crimes do so alone, most adolescent crime 
occurs in the presence of peers (Zimring, 1998). Other potentially risky activities, such 
as  alcohol  and  substance  use  and  sex,  are  strongly  influenced  by  perceived  peer 
engagement in these activities (e.g. Chassin et al., 2004).  
 
Engagement  in  risky  activities  is  a  key  psycho-behavioural  characteristic  of  the 
adolescent period, as are the social and emotional changes which occur during this time. 
In the next section, another defining characteristic of adolescence will be covered: The 
continuing development of the brain. 
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1.4 Adolescent structural brain development 
 
In the first year of life, the brain undergoes rapid increases in volume, and changes in 
structure and composition. Until relatively recently, it was widely held that this brain 
development only occurred during early childhood. However, a small number of studies 
published in the 1960s and 70s using post mortem brain samples (Yakovlev & Lecours, 
1967;  Huttenlocher,  1979)  suggested  that  parts  of  the  brain  continue  to  develop 
throughout  childhood  and  into  adolescence.  More  recently,  the  advent  of  magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI) and techniques such as diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) has 
supported this notion, by showing continuing development of grey and white matter 
throughout the second decade of life (and beyond). The following sections will first 
describe early histological studies of the developing brain, then evidence from MRI 
studies showing continuing development of the brain during the adolescent years. 
 
1.4.1 Early histological studies of the developing brain: non-human animal studies 
Early histological experiments carried out using non-human animals (mainly rodents 
and  primates)  showed  that  early  in  development,  during  the  equivalent  of  human 
infancy and early childhood, cortical neurons undergo substantial dendritic outgrowth 
(see Figure 1.2) and the formation of new synapses (synaptogenesis; Rakic et al. 1986; 
Bourgeois et al. 1994; Petanjek et al., 2008). This is followed by a period of synaptic 
pruning,  in  which  many  of  the  existing  synaptic  connections  are  eliminated.  Thus, 
synaptic density shortly after birth greatly exceeds that in adulthood (for example, Rakic 
et al. (1986) showed a 2:1 ratio of synaptic density in  young child vs. adult rhesus 
macques). Another process which has been shown to occur in the developing brain is 
the substantial increase in absolute and proportional myelin content, as axonal fibres 
become  progressively  ensheathed  in  layers  of  insulating  myelin  (Wells  &  Dittmer, 
1967; Norton & Poduslo, 1973; Waxman, 2004). 
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Figure 1.2 Fast dendritic outgrowth shortly after birth, which is accompanied by synaptogenesis. The 
drawing below from Conel (1939-1967) shows pyramidal neurons and their dendrites, which participate 
in synaptic connections, in human frontal cortex from newborn to six months old. On the basis of this 
dendritic outgrowth, one would expect major synaptogenesis to occur postnatally, as indeed has been 
demonstrated (Huttenlocher et al., 1979, 1983, 1997; Petanjek et al., 2008). 
 
 
 
1.4.2 Early histological studies of the developing human brain 
1.4.2.1 Synaptic development 
In the 1970s, research on post mortem human samples revealed that some areas of the 
brain, in particular the frontal cortex, undergo cycles of synaptogenesis and pruning 
well beyond early childhood. Studies by Huttenlocher et al. compared synaptic density 
in visual cortex and the middle frontal gyrus in post mortem human brains between the 
ages of zero to 27 years (Huttenlocher et al. 1979, 1983, 1997). Results showed that the 
number of synapses in visual cortex peaked at around one year after birth, after which 
there was a gradual decline into middle childhood when synaptic density stabilised to 
adult  levels.  In  contrast,  in  the  frontal  cortex,  synaptic  density  reached  a  peak 
substantially  later,  increasing  throughout  early  childhood  and  up  to  the  age  of  five. 
Furthermore, synaptic density in the frontal lobe showed an extended profile of decline,   26 
stabilising to adult levels only towards the end of adolescence (see Figure 1.3). These 
observations were interpreted to suggest that certain regions of the brain, including parts 
of the frontal cortex, do not complete their cycle of synaptogenesis and pruning until 
well into adolescence.  
 
Figure 1.3 Development of synaptic density in sensory and frontal brain regions.  Graph shows mean 
synaptic density in the primary auditory cortex (red circles), the primary visual cortex (blue circles) and 
the prefrontal cortex (middle frontal gyrus; blue crosses) in post mortem human brains. The x-axis shows 
conceptual age in days, from 200 days post-conception to 10,000 days post-conception (approximately 27 
years: the period of adolescence is indicated by a horizontal bar). Synaptic density increases in all three 
regions during early childhood, and is followed by a period of decreasing synaptic density. This sequence 
occurs later in the frontal cortex. From Blakemore (2008). 
 
 
 
 
1.4.2.2 Axonal myelination 
Another  significant  neurodevelopmental  event  that  occurs  in  adolescence  is  axonal 
myelination. In utero, the human brain contains a small proportion of myelinated fibres. 
Within the first year of life, the proportion of cerebral myelin increases dramatically,   27 
which contributes to the rapid increase in total cerebral volume during the first year of 
life.  It  has  been  demonstrated  that  axons  in  certain  brain  regions  continue  to  be 
myelinated throughout childhood and adolescence, albeit at a slower rate (Yakovlev & 
Lecours,  1967;  Benes  et  al.,  1989,  1994).  Myelination  increases  axonal  conduction 
speed (Waxman, 2004), which not only ‘speeds up’ neural processing but also allows 
for greater temporal precision in information encoding (Paus et al., 1999). 
 
1.4.3 Structural MRI studies of the developing human brain 
Until recently, the structure of the human brain could be studied only after death. The 
advent  of  non-invasive  brain  imaging  techniques,  in  particular  magnetic  resonance 
imaging (MRI), has enabled investigation of the development of the living human brain.  
 
1.4.3.1 Introduction to structural MRI 
Structural  MRI  uses  static  and  radiofrequency  magnetic  fields  to  visualise  different 
tissue types in the brain (e.g. grey matter, white matter and cerebro-spinal fluid (CSF)), 
by  measuring  differences  in  proton  content.  Techniques  such  as  voxel-based 
morphometry (VBM) are then used to quantify and compare the amount of each tissue 
type in MR-images from groups of experimental participants which differ on a variable 
of interest (e.g. age). These structural MRI measurement techniques generally proceed 
in the following manner:  
 
First, the MR-images are registered to standard stereotaxic space, in order to remove 
gross differences in brain shape and to superimpose on the image a three-dimensional 
grid of voxels (Ashburner & Friston, 2000). Next, an automated computer algorithm 
segments  the  MR-images  into  grey  matter,  white  matter,  CSF  and  three  other 
background tissue types, by classifying each voxel according to its predominant tissue 
type.  The  images  are  then  smoothed  to  reduce  the  impact  of  noise  from  the 
normalisation and tissue classification steps.  
 
At this point, grey and white matter ‘density’ (concentration) can be calculated across a 
brain region of interest: the whole brain, the cortex, a particular lobe or a circumscribed 
structure (e.g. the amygdala). The density of a tissue type in a smoothed MR-image is 
its relative proportion in normalised volume (Ashburner & Friston, 2000). Alternatively,   28 
absolute grey and white matter volumes can be calculated by multiplying the ‘density’ 
of each tissue by the relative voxel volume, that is, using the parameters that describe 
how the raw MR-image was deformed into standard space (Ashburner & Friston, 2000; 
Paus, 2005). Grey matter thickness can be calculated in a similar manner (Gogtay et al., 
2004). Finally, the density, volume or thickness of brain tissues of interest, within brain 
structures of interest, can be statistically compared across participant groups (Friston et 
al., 1994a; Ashburner & Friston, 2000). 
 
1.4.3.2 Adolescent structural MRI studies 
In the past decade, a number of structural MRI  studies have shown changes  across 
adolescence  in  the  tissue  composition  of  the  brain.  These  changes,  which  will  be 
described  in  some  detail  the  following  sections,  are  hypothesised  to  reflect  the 
histological  changes  described  in  section  1.4.2.  In  brief,  two  main  age-associated 
changes have been described: firstly, cortical grey matter volume and density change in 
a non-linear and region-specific manner; and secondly, white matter volume and density 
increase linearly across the brain. Evidence from additional MRI techniques suggests 
concurrent  changes  in  white  matter  macromolecular  structure  and  integrity;  this 
evidence will be briefly described in the final part of this section.  
 
1.4.3.2.1 Adolescent changes in grey matter 
Structural MRI studies have shown that grey matter volume changes during childhood 
and adolescence in a region-specific and predominantly non-linear manner. One of the 
first studies to provide evidence for this finding was a partially longitudinal study, in 
which a large sample of participants at a range of ages were scanned on at least two 
time-points, approximately two years apart (Giedd et al. 1999a; see also Sowell et al. 
1999; Gogtay et al. 2004; Shaw et al., 2008). These and subsequent structural MRI 
studies have shown that grey matter volume and density  across much  of the cortex 
follows  an  inverted  U-shaped  pattern  of  development,  initially  increasing  during 
childhood before attaining a peak in volume and density (the age at peak volume and 
density differs between brain regions). This peak is followed by a gradual decrease in 
volume and density, before stabilising to an adult level. In general, peak volumes are 
attained at younger ages in primary sensorimotor regions as well as in polar cortex, and 
at older ages in secondary and association cortex: this pattern can be seen in Figure 1.4.    29 
Figure 1.4 Development of grey matter density across the cortical surface, as revealed with MRI. 
Figure shows the dynamic sequence of grey matter maturation across the cortical surface, between the 
ages of five (left) and 20 (right). The side bar indicates grey matter density. It can be seen that regions 
including temporal and frontal association cortex undergo protracted changes in grey matter density up to 
the age of 20, whereas regions such as the occipital pole and somatosensory cortex stabilise early. From 
Gogtay et al. (2004). 
 
 
 
 
The  next  figure  (Figure  1.5)  illustrates  region-specific  trajectories  of  grey  matter 
change.  In  the  frontal  and  parietal  lobes,  grey  matter  density  follows  an  inverted-U 
shaped trajectory with its peak at around puberty onset (age 11 in girls and 12 in boys; 
Figure 1.5, top). In the temporal lobe, grey matter density peaks at on average 16-17 
years of age (Giedd et al., 1999a; Figure 1.5, bottom left). In contrast, grey matter 
density in the occipital lobe does not show the same pubertal or adolescent peak (see 
Figure 1.5, bottom right; note that Shaw et al., (2008) reported peak occipital grey 
matter at around age eight). 
 
Within each lobe, particular sub-regions have their own developmental patterns of grey 
matter change. For example in the frontal lobe, precentral grey matter peaks prior to   30 
adolescence, whereas dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and parts of the medial 
prefrontal cortex (MPFC) attain peak grey matter volume later: at around puberty onset 
or later (Gogtay et al., 2004; Shaw et al. 2008). In the temporal lobe, middle and inferior 
regions attain peak grey matter density relatively earlier (age 11-12) than superior and 
insular temporal cortex (ages 14 and 18 respectively; Shaw et al., 2008). Therefore, 
adolescence is characterised by grey matter thinning across much of prefrontal cortex 
and parts of the temporal cortex; certain parts of the temporal cortex undergo extended 
grey matter thinning during late adolescence and into early adulthood.  
 
Figure  1.5  Region-specific  trajectories  of  grey  matter  change.  Graphs  show  regional  changes  in 
cortical grey matter ‘volume’ (relative volume or density: see section 1.4.3.1) in the frontal, parietal, 
temporal and occipital lobes (predicted size with 95% confidence intervals) in 243 MR scans acquired 
cross-sectionally and longitudinally from 89 males (blue) and 56 females (red) aged 4 to 22 years. Arrows 
indicate peaks of the curves. From Giedd et al. (1999a). 
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1.4.3.2.1.1 Implications of adolescent grey matter change 
Grey matter is composed of the cell bodies, dendrites and axons of neurons, as well as 
glial cells and capillaries. In light of the histological findings of Huttenlocher et al. 
(described  in  section  1.4.2.1),  it  has  been  suggested  that  the  inverted-U  shaped 
developmental trajectory of grey matter volume seen in MR scans is due to dendritic 
outgrowth and synaptogenesis, followed by synaptic pruning (e.g. Giedd et al., 1999a). 
This implies that puberty onset is marked by an exuberance of synaptic connections in 
prefrontal and parietal cortices, and that the period of adolescence is characterised by 
prefrontal and parietal synaptic pruning, with the same pattern occurring slightly later in 
parts of the temporal lobe.  
 
Therefore, changes in grey matter shown in structural MRI studies are hypothesised to 
reflect  cellular  changes  that  impact  on  neural  function.  It  has  been  suggested  that 
synaptic  proliferation  in  the  prefrontal  cortex  around  the  onset  of  puberty  leads  to 
‘noisy’ neural processing, and subsequent synaptic pruning results in more finely-tuned 
and efficient circuits (Durston et al., 2006). 
 
There is indirect evidence in support of this hypothesis. The time-course of synaptic 
pruning  in  frontal  cortex  appears  to  coincide  with  increases,  up  to  age  12,  in  the 
coherence of event-related potentials between frontal and posterior brain regions, and 
between  the  frontal  lobes  (Thatcher,  1992).  It  has  been  suggested  that  the  two  are 
causally related (Kaiser & Gruzelier, 1996; Barry et al., 2004). A similar argument has 
been made for regional changes in the pattern of functional metabolic/vascular response, 
as measured in functional MRI (‘diffuse-to-focal’ pattern, cf. Durston et al., 2006; see 
Thomason  et  al.,  2005).  However,  direct  evidence  using  invasive  methods  in  non-
human animals has not supported the notion that adolescent changes in synaptic density 
necessarily  lead  to  altered  functionality  of  neural  circuits.  A  recent  primate 
electrophysiology study showed that the pruning of excitatory synapses in dorsolateral 
prefrontal  cortex  during  adolescence  has  little  functional  impact,  since  the  synapses 
which undergo pruning are functionally immature and make a minimal contribution to 
neural circuits (Gonzalez-Burgos et al., 2008). More research is needed to resolve this 
controversial and unresolved issue. 
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Recently, it has been argued that the loss of grey matter during adolescence might not 
be due to synaptic pruning. Instead, it has been suggested that the apparent grey matter 
loss  is  a  result  of  intracortical  myelination  (Paus  et  al.,  2008).  Since  grey  matter 
contains both myelinated and unmyelinated axons, intracortical myelination could give 
rise to a progressive ‘whitening’ of grey matter tissue. Therefore it has been argued that 
with increasing age, there will be an increase in the amount of cortical ‘grey’ matter (i.e. 
cortical laminae I-VI) that is classified as white matter on MR scans. The following 
section  will  discuss  MRI  findings  showing  age-related  increases  in  white  matter 
volume. 
 
1.4.3.2.2 Adolescent changes in white matter 
Although the steepest increases in white matter volume occur shortly after birth, white 
matter  volume  and  density  continue  to  increase  during  childhood,  adolescence  and 
indeed  into  the  twenties  (Paus  et  al.,  1999;  Giedd  et  al.,  1999b).  In  contrast  to  the 
regionally specific, inverted-U shaped trajectories of grey matter change, increases in 
white matter volume and density are reported to occur linearly across the brain during 
childhood  and  adolescence  (e.g.  Giedd  et  al.,  1999b;  Figure  1.6a).  For  example,  a 
cross-sectional MRI study in 4-17 year olds showed linear age-related increases in white 
matter density within corticospinal and thalamocortical tracts, and in the left arcuate 
fasciculus, which links frontal and temporal cortical regions involved in speech (Paus et 
al., 1999; Figure 1.6b).  
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Figure 1.6 Age-related increases in white matter volume. Graph (a), left, shows linear increase in 
white matter density across the whole brain (from Giedd et al., 1999a). (b) Top right figure shows regions 
of the left arcuate fasciculus for which white matter density has been shown to increase linearly with age 
(graph, bottom right; from Paus et al., 1999). 
 
 
 
 
1.4.3.2.4 Implications of adolescent white matter change  
White  matter  is  composed  of  neuronal  axons,  many  of  which  are  ensheathed  in  an 
insulating layer of myelin. In light of the histological findings showing an increase in 
axonal myelination across development (see section 1.4.2.2), it has been suggested that 
age-related  increases  in  white  matter  volume  during  childhood  and  adolescence 
correspond  to  progressive  axonal  myelination,  and/or  increases  in  axonal  calibre 
(diameter). These changes would both be expected to result in increases in the speed and 
efficiency of neural processing (e.g. Waxman, 2004).  
 
1.4.3.2.2.2 Other MRI measures of white matter change 
Diffusion-tensor  imaging  (DTI)  has  been  used  to  support  findings  from  structural 
(volumetric)  MRI  studies  showing  age-related  development  in  cortical  white  matter 
during adolescence. In DTI, a commonly-used measure is fractional anisotropy (FA), 
which is the extent to which the diffusion of water molecules in the brain is anisotropic 
(not  equal  in  all  directions).  Higher  FA  values  are  thought  to  reflect  increasing 
organization of white matter tracts (due to processes including myelination), since water   34 
molecules  will  tend  to  diffuse  in  parallel  with  the  tracts.  Increased  FA  during 
adolescence,  followed  by  a  levelling-off  into  adulthood,  have  been  observed  within 
several white matter tracts, including the body of the corpus callosum and descending 
motor pathways (Giorgio et al., 2008). Higher values of FA in the frontal lobes have 
also been observed in older versus younger adolescents (Barnea-Goraly et al., 2005).  
 
Another technique which has been used is the myelin transfer ratio (MTR) in MRI. The 
MTR  provides  information  on  the  macromolecular  content  (e.g.  myelin  content)  of 
white matter tissue. Studies that have measured the MTR in structural MR-images have 
shown  age-related  decreases  in  MTR  during  childhood  and  adolescence  (Paus, 
Keshavan  &  Giedd,  2008).  This  has  been  suggested  to  reflect  increases  in  axonal 
calibre, since the larger the calibre, the fewer axons will fit into the same unit of imaged 
volume, resulting in a relative decrease in the amount of myelin.  
 
Therefore,  while  some  evidence  suggests  that  age-related  increases  in  white  matter 
volume/density  shown  in  structural  MR-images  may  represent  myelination,  other 
evidence suggests that these changes are due to increasing axonal calibre. Both changes 
would be hypothesised to result in altered functionality of the neural circuitry, as do the 
changes that result in age differences in grey matter volume and density. The following 
section will describe evidence for functional brain development during adolescence.  
 
1.5 Adolescent functional brain development  
 
Adolescent  neuroanatomical  development  is  hypothesised  to  result  in  altered 
functionality  of  neural  circuits,  as  are  some  of  the  hormonal  changes  of  puberty. 
Alterations  in  behaviour  and  in  the  environment  during  adolescence  are  also 
hypothesised to be linked to changes in brain function. Therefore in the last decade, 
research  has  been  conducted  to  investigate  age-related  changes  in  functional  brain 
activity  across  adolescence.  Techniques  that  have  been  used  include  electro-
encephalography and functional MRI (fMRI). The following section will focus on fMRI 
studies only, in the interests of relevance and brevity. 
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1.5.1 Introduction to functional MRI 
FMRI is an MRI technique in which images of the brain are acquired very rapidly (one 
volume every 1-4 seconds) while a participant is performing a series of cognitive tasks. 
The impact of local increases in blood flow on the measured proton alignment response 
to a radiofrequency magnetic field, known as the blood oxygenation level-dependent 
(BOLD)  response,  is  then  compared  between  cognitive  tasks.  Differences  in  BOLD 
response between cognitive tasks are thought to be a consequence of performing the 
cognitive tasks. 
 
The BOLD response is thought to be generated by local increases in neuronal activity, 
resulting in a local energy demand. This energy demand is predominantly met by a local 
increase  in  blood  flow  (Attwell  &  Iadecola,  2002),  which  following  an  initial  dip, 
causes a rise in the proportion of oxygenated vs. deoxygenated haemoglobin molecules 
present locally. This causes a change in the magnetic resonance of vascular protons, 
which  is  detected  as  the  BOLD  signal.  Broadly,  distinct  cognitive  tasks  are 
accompanied  by  distinct  spatial  patterns  of  BOLD  signal  change.  This  finding  is 
interpreted  within  the  theoretical  framework  of  functional  specialisation:  if  a  given 
cognitive  task  is  accompanied  by  BOLD  signal  change  (‘activation’)  within  a 
circumscribed  set  of  brain  regions,  this  set  of  brain  regions  is  hypothesised  to  be 
causally or coincidentally (neuronally) active during the cognitive task (for discussion, 
see section 7.2.5). 
 
1.5.2 Adolescent functional MRI studies 
Recent  fMRI  studies  have  been  conducted  comparing  adolescents  with  adults,  and 
sometimes  younger  children.  These  studies  often  use  cognitive  tasks  that  rely  on 
anatomically late-maturing brain regions, such as the prefrontal and temporal cortex, as 
it  is  hypothesised  that  neuroanatomical  development  will  result  in  altered  neuronal 
processing  and/or  the  metabolic/haemodynamic  response  (see  sections  1.4;  7.2.5). 
Similarly,  recent  adolescent  fMRI  studies  have  investigated  the  fMRI  correlates  of 
cognitive  tasks  that  are  relevant  to  typically  ‘adolescent’  behaviours  and  traits  (e.g. 
social behaviours and risk; see section 1.3), as altered proficiency or a change in the 
cognitive strategy taken to accomplish these tasks is hypothesised to be accompanied by 
changes in neuronal processing (e.g. the set of brain regions that are recruited; level of   36 
activity within the same set of brain regions), resulting in changes in regional BOLD 
response.  In  the  following  sections,  findings  from  adolescent  fMRI  studies  will  be 
described,  with  a  focus  on  studies  that  investigate  social  cognition  and  decision-
making,  as  these  are  particularly  relevant  to  adolescent  behavioural  characteristics 
(section 1.3). 
 
1.5.2.1 Social cognition and the social brain 
Social cognition refers to the collection of mental processes required to interact with 
social agents. In humans, these processes include identifying social agents, evaluating 
their mental states (e.g. intentions, beliefs and desires), understanding and predicting 
their actions, and engaging with them (Frith & Frith, 2007). These mental processes are 
said to rely on a collection of brain regions known as the ‘social brain’ (Brothers, 1990; 
Frith, 2007; Frith & Frith, 2007; see Figure 1.7). 
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Figure 1.7 The social brain. Regions that are involved in social cognition include the anterior rostral 
medial prefrontal cortex (arMPFC) and temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), which are implicated in mental 
state processing; the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), active during observation of faces and 
biological motion; the anterior temporal cortex (ATC), which represents semantic social information; and 
the amygdala, which attaches value to social stimuli. Other regions of the social brain include the inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG), the intraparietal sulcus (IPS), the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the anterior 
insula (AI). Modified, from Blakemore (2008). 
 
 
 
Over the past two decades, research has begun to shed light on how these social brain 
regions contribute to human social abilities. Briefly, and according to Frith (2007), the 
suggested roles of some of these brain regions in social cognition are as follows (the 
review is not exhaustive):  
 
The amygdala is responsible for attaching value (positive/negative, approach/avoid) to 
objects,  and  this  includes  social  objects.  Thus,  the  amygdala  plays  a  role  in  social 
cognition  by  attaching  value  to  facial  expressions  (e.g.  happy  =  positive,  angry  = 
negative; Le Doux, 2000), as well as to individual social agents and classes of social 
agents (Winston et al., 2002). Thus, the amygdala is thought to play a role in implicit 
social prejudices, or automatic social judgments (Winston et al., 2002; Frith & Frith, 
2007).    38 
 
Another  component  of  the  social  brain  is  the  anterior  temporal  cortex  (ATC)  or 
temporal  poles.  This  brain  region  is  thought  to  be  a  multimodal  convergence  zone, 
where highly processed information about complex social (and non-social) stimuli at the 
‘end’  of  the  ventral  visual  stream  is  integrated  with  emotional  signals  from  the 
orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala  (see  Olson et al., 2007).  Zahn et  al. (2007) have 
shown  evidence  that  the  ATC  is  active  during  the  representation  of  abstract  social 
semantic concepts (e.g. brave, stingy), and studies in individuals with fronto-temporal 
dementia have shown deficits in the knowledge of social scripts (e.g. ‘what happens in a 
restaurant’). Thus, it has been suggested that the ATC represents semantic information 
relevant to specific social encounters. 
 
The posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) is often reported to be active in social 
tasks. This brain region is generally responsive to complex movements (Kawawaki et 
al., 2006), including biological movements of the eyes, face and hands (e.g. Perrett et 
al., 1982; Haxby et al., 2000). The pSTS is more active when predictions based on these 
movements are in error than when they  are  correct (Pelphrey et al., 2004a, 2004b). 
Therefore, this brain region may play a role in decoding social gestures and signals, and 
using these to form predictions of action or intent.  
 
The temporo-parietal junction (TPJ),which is often active during the same tasks as the 
pSTS, has been shown to respond to spatial perspective information (Aichhorn et al., 
2006). This is needed to understanding the epistemic states of social agents based on 
what  they  can  and  cannot  see.  This  knowledge  forms  a  part  of  theory  of  mind,  or 
‘mentalising’, which is the ability to attribute mental states to social agents. There is 
some debate over the role of the TPJ in social tasks. While some have suggested a 
central role for the TPJ in representing mental states, i.e. a role that is not limited to 
visual perspective information (Saxe & Wexler, 2005), others have suggested that the 
TPJ  is  generally  responsive  to  attentional  reorienting,  whether  this  reorienting  is 
between mental state information, or other non-social information (Mitchell, 2007).  
 
Another region of the social brain is the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), specifically 
the anterior rostral MPFC (arMPFC, Brodmann area (BA) 10; also referred to as dorso-  39 
medial prefrontal cortex). This brain region is thought to track and represent mental 
states, including the emotional, motivational and epistemic mental states of self and 
other  (Amodio  &  Frith,  2006;  Gilbert  et  al.,  2006).  More  specifically,  it  has  been 
suggested  (e.g.  Frith,  2007)  that  the  arMPFC  is  crucial  in  representing  the  sorts  of 
mental states that are needed for communicative interactions, i.e. second-order mental 
representations. These are representations of another individual’s mental representation 
of  your  mental  representation.  To  clarify  using  two  examples,  second  order  mental 
representations are used when (i) a teacher attempts to judge whether a student has 
understood an instruction, or (ii) a liar tries to judge whether their victim realises they 
have been lied to. A number of studies have shown evidence for a role of arMPFC in 
this function: for example, Hampton et al. (2008) reported that activity within arMPFC 
tracks the expected actions of an opponent in response to one’s own actions during the 
game of ‘work or shirk’. In this game, a participant must decide on each trial whether or 
not to ‘shirk’ (a form of cheating) based on the likelihood that they will be discovered 
by an inspector who inspects infrequently. 
 
Functional  MRI  studies  of  social  cognition  in  adolescence  have  shown  age  group 
differences in activity within many of the brain regions noted above. Some of these 
studies will now be described, with a focus on face processing, mentalising and peer 
influence, as these are domains that have been the focus of developmental fMRI studies 
conducted to date.  
 
1.5.2.2 Adolescent functional MRI studies of social cognition 
1.5.2.2.1 Face processing 
A  number  of  developmental  fMRI  have  investigated  the  neural  correlates  of  face 
processing, and these have focused on facial emotion processing. Some of these studies 
have  shown  greater  activity  in  parts  of  the  prefrontal  cortex  during  emotional  face 
processing tasks, in adolescents relative to children and/or adults. For example, in a 
study  conducted  by  Yurgelun-Todd  and  Killgore  (2006)  in  which  participants  aged 
eight to 15 years old passively viewed fearful faces, it was found that activity within a 
number of lateral and superior prefrontal regions (bilaterally for girls, right sided for 
boys)  showed  a  positive  correlation  with  age.  In  Monk  et  al.  (2003),  children  and 
adolescents (aged nine to 17 years), but not adults (aged 25-36), activated regions of the   40 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and left orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) during the passive 
viewing of fearful relative to neutral faces.  
 
1.5.2.2.2 Mentalising 
A number of developmental fMRI studies have investigated age group differences in the 
neural correlates of mentalising. As defined above, mentalising is the ability to attribute 
mental states to social agents, and a large number of studies in adults have shown that 
mentalising  relies  upon  a  subset  of  social  brain  regions  known  as  the  ‘mentalising 
network’
1, or mentalising system, comprising arMPFC, pSTS/TPJ and ATC (Frith & 
Frith, 2003). Recently, several fMRI studies have shown that functional activity within 
the mentalising system differs between adolescence and adulthood (see Figure 1.8). 
Specifically, these studies have shown greater activity in the arMPFC in adolescents 
than  in  adults  during  social  cognition  relative  to  control  tasks.  Conversely,  activity 
within certain posterior components (e.g. in the temporal cortex) shows the opposite 
developmental pattern (Blakemore, 2008).  
 
For example, in Blakemore et al. (2007), adolescents (aged 12-18) and adults (aged 22-
38) were scanned with fMRI while they read sentences about causal intentions (e.g. 
“You want to go to the cinema. Do you look in the newspaper?”), relative to sentences 
featuring unintentional physical causality events (e.g. “It has been raining all night. Is 
the  ground  warm?”).  Results  showed  that  part  of  arMPFC  was  more  active  in 
adolescents than in adults during intentional vs. physical causality (Figure 1.8, blue 
dots),  whereas  the  adult  group  showed  more  activity  than  did  adolescents  within  a 
region of right STS in this comparison. A similar age-associated shift in brain activity 
was found in Wang et al. (2006). When children and adolescents (aged 9-14) and adults 
(aged  23-33)  judged  whether  a  series  of  communications  were  sincere  or  ironic 
(sarcastic), children and adolescents showed stronger activation of the arMPFC than did 
adults (Figure 1.8, green dots). Adults activated more posterior brain regions, including 
the superior temporal and fusiform gyri, more. The results from these and other studies 
                                                 
1 A network is defined as a set of brain regions that demonstrate functional 
integration despite spatial separation. Due to the lack studies to date that have 
investigated functional integration (e.g. functional/ effective connectivity) between 
arMPFC, pSTS/TPJ and ATC during mentalising tasks (although see Chapter 5), 
they will here be collectively referred to as the ‘mentalising system’.   41 
(which will be described in more detail in Chapter 5) suggest that the neural strategy 
for mentalising shifts between adolescence and adulthood, with activity moving from 
anterior (arMPFC) to posterior (e.g. temporal) regions with age.  
 
Figure 1.8 Adolescent fMRI studies of mentalising show an age-related decrease in activity within 
anterior rostral medial prefrontal cortex (arMPFC). The yellow shaded area indicates the anterior rostral 
section of MPFC that is activated in studies of mentalising (Amodio & Frith, 2006). The coloured dots 
indicate voxels in which altered activity is observed between late childhood and adulthood (green: Wang 
et al., 2006; blue: Blakemore et al., 2007; yellow: Pfeifer et al., 2007; grey: Pfeifer et al. 2009), or across 
adolescence (red: Moriguchi et al. 2007), during social-cognition tasks. See Chapter 5 for details of 
studies. 
 
 
 
 
1.5.2.2.3 Peer influence 
A recent fMRI study investigated the neural correlates of resistance to peer influence. In 
this study, Grosbras et al. (2007) investigated the relationship between brain activity 
during  passive  viewing  angry  facial  expressions  and  angry  hand  gestures,  and  a 
behavioural  measure  of  the  ability  to  resist  peer  influence  (RPI),  in  ten-year  old   42 
children. This social psychology measure of RPI has previously been shown to correlate 
with age across childhood and adolescence (Steinberg & Monahan, 2007).  
 
Results from this fMRI study showed that children characterised by low RPI showed 
greater activity during observation of angry gestures within motor and decision/control-
related brain regions (right dorsal premotor cortex, left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex). 
However, children characterised by high RPI showed stronger correlations in activity 
(functional  connectivity)  between  brain  regions  underlying  action  perception  (e.g. 
biological motion regions in STS) and decision making (e.g. lateral prefrontal cortex, 
premotor cortex). Given the reported susceptibility to peer influence of adolescents, it 
would be interesting if a follow-up fMRI study were conducted in children older than 
10.  The  authors  conducted  a  structural  MRI  study  in  12-18-year  olds,  showing  that 
inter-regional correlations in cortical thickness within lateral prefrontal and premotor 
cortex increased with RPI independently of age (Paus et al., 2008).  
 
This  review  of  the  developmental  fMRI  literature  on  social  cognition  is  clearly  not 
exhaustive. A tentative generalization based on these studies is that across development, 
or  with  increasing  proficiency,  there  is  a  decrease  in  task-relevant  activity  within 
prefrontal cortex.  
 
1.5.2.3 Adolescent fMRI studies of decision-making and reward 
A number of recent developmental fMRI studies have investigated brain activity during 
tasks in which decisions are made in order to gain a reward. These have included tasks 
in which decisions result in certain rewards (e.g. delayed-response tasks) and tasks in 
which  decisions  result  in  uncertain  rewards  (e.g.  the  Iowa  Gambling  Task,  IGT). 
Functional brain activity during these tasks has been reported from decision, expectation 
and outcome phases of the tasks. Thus, it is a challenge to generalise across studies. All 
tasks, however, share a requirement for the integration and control of behaviour and 
emotion (i.e. reward-based emotions; Rolls, 2005), and recruit regions of the prefrontal 
cortex (PFC) involved in decision-making, cognitive control and emotion, as well as 
subcortical  reward-responsive  structures  such  as  the  ventral  striatum  (including  the 
nucleus accumbens) and amygdala.  
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A commonly-reported finding in these studies is that adolescents show more ‘diffuse’ 
activity within task-related regions of PFC than do adults (e.g. Galvan et al., 2006; 
discussed  in  Durston  et  al.,  2006).  In  this  usage,  the  term  ‘diffuse’  refers  to  a 
qualitatively-judged difference in the pattern of suprathreshold BOLD-signal change, 
comprising a larger volume of BOLD-signal change in adolescent groups, but smaller 
test statistic values at peak voxels within the activated PFC volume. As such, this does 
not constitute a statistical description of developmental differences in activity and is not 
considered to be a valid description in the current thesis.  
 
Many  studies  report  weaker  adolescent  relative  to  adult  activity  within  task-related 
regions of PFC during decision-making tasks (e.g. Eshel et al. 2007; van Leijenhorst et 
al. 2006; Bjork et al., 2007). However, this finding is reported in very different regions 
of PFC, including orbito-frontal, anterior cingulate and dorso-lateral PFC, and therefore 
is a challenge to interpret. 
 
Elsewhere, it has been reported that adolescents show weaker activity within the nucleus 
accumbens during decision and anticipation phases of reward-based decision-making 
tasks, and stronger activity in this structure relative to adults during outcome phases of 
the same tasks (e.g. Ernst et al., 2005; for reviews, see Geier & Luna, 2009 and Casey et 
al. 2008; although disparate findings are reported in Bjork et al., 2004). The amygdala 
has been reported to show weaker activity in adolescents relative to adults, during both 
anticipation and consummation phases of these tasks (Geier & Luna, 2009). 
 
In summary, a number of developmental fMRI studies of reward-based decision-making 
have shown age-related increases in activity within various PFC sub-regions. Relative to 
adults, adolescents show weaker activity within the nucleus accumbens during decision-
making and anticipation of risky or certain rewards, but a stronger response to reward 
outcome and consummation (Geier & Luna, 2009). It is suggested that these changes in 
functional  brain  activity  might  reflect,  or  be  responsible  for,  adolescent  real-life 
engagement in risky activities (e.g. Steinberg, 2008; Casey et al., 2008). This may be 
mediated via changes in the cognitive abilities that underlie decision-making. The next 
section will summarise adolescent cognitive development, in the domains of decision-
making and social cognition.    44 
1.6 Cognitive development 
 
1.6.1 Social cognitive development during adolescence 
1.6.1.1 Face processing 
Some  of  the  earliest  empirical  studies  on  adolescent  social  cognitive  development 
focussed  on  face  processing.  For  example,  Carey  et  al.  (1980)  showed  that,  while 
performance  in  a  facial  identity  recognition  task  improved  steadily  during  the  first 
decade of life, this was followed by a brief dip in performance at approximately age 12. 
It was later suggested that this decline was due to puberty, rather than age per se, as a 
study by Diamond et al. (1983) showed that females at mid-puberty performed worse 
those at pre- or post-puberty when the groups were matched for age.  
 
More  recently,  evidence  for  a  pubertal  dip  in  facial  emotion  (rather  than  identity) 
processing was also shown (McGivern et al., 2002). In this study, male and female 
participants aged 10 to 17 performed a match-to-sample task, in which the task was to 
match faces showing emotional expressions to emotion words. An increase in reaction 
time of around 10–20% was shown at age 10-11 years in females, and 11-12 in males, 
which then declined during adolescence to reach pre-puberty levels only at age 16-17. 
Since  the  age  of  the  male  and  female  performance  dip  coincides  with  the  sexually 
dimorphic age of puberty onset, these results were interpreted to suggest that the dip in 
performance was related to puberty. Future studies are needed to provide evidence for 
this suggestion.  
 
Further studies should also investigate whether the results of Carey et al., Diamond et 
al. and McGivern et al. are specific to face processing, or due to a domain-general effect 
of adolescent cognitive development. For example, a study by Itier and Taylor (2004) 
showed  evidence  that  continuing  development  during  adolescence  of  facial  identity 
recognition in an N-back task may be due to improved working memory processing 
capacity.  In  this  task,  faces  were  presented  sequentially  on  a  computer  screen,  and 
participants were asked to press a button when they saw a face that had previously been 
shown (either with an intervening face, i.e. 1-back, or with no intervening face, i.e. 0-
back).  Faces  were  presented  either  in  an  upright  configuration  (thought  to  recruit   45 
specialist neuro-cognitive face-processing systems), or in an inverted or reverse contrast 
configuration  (thought  to  recruit  domain-general  systems  for  object  recognition). 
Improvements  were  seen  across  the  age  range  (from  age  8  to  16)  in  recognition 
accuracy  for  all  face  configurations,  and  not  just  for  the  upright,  true-contrast  face 
configuration,  and  therefore  this  could  be  explained  by  a  general  improvement  in 
working  memory  processing  capacity.  Whether  similar  domain-general  explanations 
underlie developmental findings on facial emotion recognition, however, remains to be 
investigated. 
 
In  summary,  studies  of  face  processing  show  continuing  development  during 
adolescence  in  both  facial  emotion  processing  and  facial  identity  recognition.  This 
development may be at least in part due to developing executive functions, and some 
have suggested a link with puberty. 
 
1.6.1.2 Mentalising 
Mentalising, the ability to attribute mental states to agents, is a key social cognitive 
ability. The development of mentalising up to age five has been studied extensively and 
is well characterised (e.g. Frith & Frith, 2003), but until recently, very little was known 
about the development of mentalising beyond early childhood. This can be attributed to 
a lack of suitable paradigms: generally, in order to create a mentalising task that does 
not  elicit  ceiling  performance  in  children  aged  five  and  older,  the  linguistic  and 
executive  demands  of  the  task  must  be  increased.  This  renders  any  age-associated 
improvement  in  performance  difficult  to  attribute  solely  to  improved  mentalising 
ability.  
 
However, based on recent fMRI findings showing age differences across adolescence in 
functional  brain  activity  during  mentalising  tasks,  and  in  view  of  the  increasing 
complexity and importance to the self of social relationships during adolescence, it has 
recently  been  hypothesised  that  aspects  of  mentalising  will  show  continuing 
development  during  adolescence  (e.g.  Blakemore  &  Choudhury,  2006).  Tecent 
mentalising studies have supported this hypothesis.  
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A study by Choudhury et al. (2006) investigated the development during adolescence of 
emotional perspective-taking, which is the ability to infer the feelings of others or ‘step 
into their shoes’, and is a component of mentalising. In this study, 107 participants, 
divided into child (mean age 9 years), adolescent (mean age 13 years) and adult (mean 
age 24 years) groups, were tested using an emotional perspective-taking task. In this 
task, the participant imagined either how s/he, or how a third person, would feel in 
various  situations,  and  reaction  times  were  measured.  The  results  showed  that  the 
difference  in  reaction  time  for  taking  one’s  own  compared  with  another  person’s 
perspective  decreased  with  age.  This  was  interpreted  as  indicating  an  age-related 
increase in the efficiency of emotional perspective-taking across adolescence.  
 
More recently, a novel online mentalising task (Keysar et al., 2003) has been used to 
show continuing development during adolescence of the ability to take another person’s 
visual perspective (Dumontheil et al., 2009). In this study, 177 female participants aged 
seven to 28 years performed a task in which they were instructed to sequentially move 
objects between a set of shelves arranged in a grid, as instructed by a ‘Director’ (see 
Figure 1.9a). The Director could see the contents of only some of the shelves (those 
which  were  not  occluded  on  the  side  nearest  to  the  Director).  Therefore,  correct 
interpretation of the Director’s instructions required participants to take into account 
what the director could and could not see – his visual perspective. In a control condition, 
participants were instructed to ignore objects in shelves that had a grey background. 
Thus this condition was similar to the Director condition in terms of the goal of the task, 
except that it relied on following a rule that was not couched in terms of an agent’s 
visual perspective. However, the Director condition also involves the need to work out 
someone else’s intentions (which object the Director wants the participant to move) and 
take  their  perspective  in  an  online  communicative  situation.  Results  showed  that 
performance  in  both  visual  perspective  and  rule-based  trials  increased  throughout 
childhood and adolescence. However, there was continuing development between late 
adolescence and adulthood only on performance in visual perspective (Director) trials 
(see  Figure  1.9b).  These  results  indicate  that  the  online  use  of  mental  state  (visual 
perspective) information continues to develop during adolescence in females
2. Whether 
                                                 
2 This result has now been replicated in a large cohort of male participants (I. 
Dumontheil, personal communication).   47 
this  development  is  due  to  the  development  of specifically  social  cognitive  abilities 
requires further investigation; the authors suggest that age-associated improvements task 
performance are due to a developmental interaction between improving executive and 
social abilities. 
 
Figure 1.9 Adolescent development of online mentalising. Development during adolescence of the use 
of visual perspective information: (a) In the Director task, participants are instructed to move objects 
between  shelves.  A  trial  is  shown  from  the  Experimental  (visual  perspective)  condition,  in  which 
participants  must  take  into  account  the  visual  perspective  of  a  Director  who  cannot  see  objects  in 
occluded shelves. In the trial shown here, the correct response is to move the blue (target) truck and 
ignore the red (distracter) truck. (b) Results from the Director task show continuing development between 
the late adolescent and adult groups in performance on visual perspective trials (light blue), but no further 
developments in performance on rule-based trials (light green) or in other control trials (dark blue, light 
green). For more details, see Dumontheil et al. 2009. 
 
 
 
1.6.1.3 Social concepts 
Another important aspect of social cognition is the understanding of social concepts or 
principles, including fairness and reciprocity. Behavioural economic studies in children 
show an emerging awareness of social principles during early and middle childhood 
(Fehr  et  al.,  2008),  and  during  adolescence,  a  refinement  in  their  use  in  social 
interactions.  For  example,  in  a  recent  study  by  Güroğlu  et  al.  (2009a),  child  and 
adolescent participants played an economic game known as the Ultimatum Game. This   48 
game assesses the tendency of participants to act on the principle of fairness (moral 
outrage). In this game, participants can make decisions to forego money, in order to 
punish unfair behaviour (low offers of money from the other player). Results in Güroğlu 
et al. showed that, between the ages of nine and 18 years, there was an increase in the 
tendency for fair offers to be strategically modulated by the perceived ability of a social 
partner to reject the offer. A similarly protracted development in the social context-
dependent tendency to reciprocate (a specific form of fairness) has been demonstrated 
during adolescence in the Trust Game, which assesses the degree to which participants 
respond fairly to fair offers of money (Güroğlu et al., 2009b).  
 
Further studies should investigate the role of domain-general abilities in age-associated 
development  in  performance  on  these  tasks.  For  example,  the  ability  to  understand 
abstract concepts (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958) may underlie the ability to act on social 
principles of trust and fairness. Development in the ability to respond to feedback (e.g. 
Byrnes et al., 1999; Crone & van der Molen, 2004), whether this feedback is social or 
non-social, may underlie age-related improvements in performance in economic games. 
 
1.6.1.4 Peer influence 
The  ability  to  act  in  accordance  with  social  principles  is  important  for  social 
interactions, as is the ability to infer the mental states of others. However, sometimes it 
is appropriate to ignore or discount the opinions and perspectives of others (e.g. Brass & 
Heyes,  2005).  One  aspect  of  this  social  ability,  and  one  that  has  been  studied  with 
particular interest in the context of adolescent development (see section 1.5.2.2.3) is the 
ability to resist peer influence. As described in section 1.5.2.2.3, a recent self-report 
study showed a linear increase between  childhood and adolescence in the ability to 
resist peer influence in a variety of negative and neutral domains (e.g. peer influence to 
commit crime, peer influence on personal taste; Steinberg & Monahan, 2007). A recent 
experimental study was carried out to investigate a behavioural correlate of this change 
in social psychological tendency:  
 
In this study, conducted by Gardner and Steinberg (2005), the influence of peers on the 
number of risks taken in a car driving game was investigated in 306 participants aged 
13-16  (adolescent  age  group),  18-22  (youth  age  group)  and  24+  (adult  age  group).   49 
Participants played a car driving simulation game, in which there were opportunities to 
act in a cautious or risky manner, for example stopping vs. continuing at a yellow traffic 
light.  Crucially,  the  game  was  played  alone  or  in  the  presence  of  two  silent  peers 
(friends). The results showed that in the presence of peers, adolescents took many more 
risks when driving, compared to when they were alone (see Figure 1.10). In contrast, 
levels of risk-taking in adults did not differ between peer and alone conditions. The 
youths  showed  an  intermediate  effect.  In  summary,  this  study  shows  continuing 
development  of  the  influence  of  a  social  context  (presence  of  peers)  on  risk-taking 
during adolescence. Further studies should investigate the mechanism by which peers 
influence risk-taking in the task. 
 
Figure  1.10  Adolescent  development  of  the  influence  of  peers  on  risk-taking.    In  a  car  driving 
simulation  game, (a), in  which opportunities arise to choose a risky or cautious action,  for example 
stopping or continuing to drive through an amber traffic light, (b) adolescents but not adults take more 
risks in the presence of peers than when alone, and youths show an intermediate pattern (Gardner & 
Steinberg, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
Although continuing development during adolescence has been shown in a number of 
social cognition tasks, behaviour in these tasks and in ecological social contexts relies 
on  many  component  processes  that  are  not  specifically  social.  These  include  the   50 
executive functions, which allow an individual to optimise and regulate their behaviour. 
There  is  evidence  that  some  executive  functions  continue  to  develop  during 
adolescence:  For  example,  planning,  prospective  memory  and  inhibition  (Romine  & 
Reynolds, 2005; Davidson et al., 2006; Dumontheil et al., 2008). Further work is needed 
to  elucidate  developmental  interactions  between  executive  functions  and  social 
cognition in adolescence (see Dumontheil et al., 2009).  
 
1.6.2 Adolescent development of reward-based decision-making 
Evidence  reviewed  above  (section  1.3.2)  suggests  that  the  real-life  tendency  in 
adolescence to engage in risky behaviours is partly attributable to social factors, such as 
peer pressure. Recent studies using laboratory-based decision-making tasks suggest that, 
in addition to these social factors, there is continuing development during adolescence 
of  a  number  of  non-social  cognitive  components  that  underlie  the  ability  to  make 
optimal decisions. These studies will be reviewed below. In general, it appears to be the 
case  that  sub-optimal  decision-making  in  adolescence  is  particularly  evident  when 
decisions are made in an emotional context. 
   
1.6.2.1 Performance in probabilistic decision-making tasks 
A number of recent studies have shown continuing development during adolescence in 
performance  on  laboratory-based  decision-making  tasks.  Often  in  these  tasks, 
participants must take into account the rewards and reward probabilities associated with 
a  selection  of  choices,  and  then  choose  so  as  to  maximize  their  total  rewards  (e.g. 
money, fictitious money, or points). 
 
For example, in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Overman et al., 2004; Crone & van der 
Molen, 2004; Hooper et al., 2004; Huizinga et al., 2007), participants repeatedly select 
cards from an array of four decks with unknown reward distributions. Two of the decks 
yield low-magnitude, constant rewards and modest probabilistic losses, resulting in net 
gain across the task. The remaining two decks yield high-magnitude, constant rewards 
but substantial probabilistic losses, resulting in a net loss. Several studies have shown 
that the tendency to adopt the advantageous strategy of selecting from the former two 
decks continues to increase with age during adolescence (between 11 and 18+ years: 
Overman et al., 2004; Crone & van der Molen, 2004; Hooper et al., 2004), although   51 
contradictory findings have been reported. In a study by van Leijenhorst et al. (2008), 
no differences were found between age 8-30 years in the ability to make advantageous 
selections in a version of the IGT. 
 
In a study by Harbaugh et al., participants aged 5-64 made a series of decisions between 
a certain reward, and a gamble with equivalent expected value (EV: the sum of potential 
outcomes weighted by their respective probabilities; Harbaugh et al., 2002). Unlike in 
the many versions of the IGT, in this task participants are explicitly informed about the 
reward probabilities associated with each decision
3. However, children and adolescents 
showed evidence of biased decisions in the task, relative to adults. Specifically, children 
and adolescents showed a lesser degree of indifference in their choice between the pairs 
of options with equivalent EV, relative to adults. A similar study by Levin et al. (2007), 
in which children (aged 5-11) and adults made a choice between gambles that differed 
in EV showed age-related increases in the tendency to make choices that maximised 
EV. The results from these two studies show that, even in relatively simple decision-
making tasks in which participants are provided with all the necessary information to 
make optimal choices, the tendency to do so continues to develop up to (Levin et al.) 
and during (Harbaugh et al.) adolescence. 
 
Several suggestions have been put forward to account for the age-related improvements 
in  performance  on  these  decision-making  tasks.  One  suggestion  is  that,  with  age, 
adolescents become better able to take into account performance feedback (wins and 
losses) and use this to maintain or modify subsequent behaviour (Byrnes et al., 1999; 
Crone & van der Molen, 2004). This might be expected to impact on performance in 
tasks including the IGT, but not in the tasks used by Levin et al. and Harbaugh et al. 
(see preceding paragraph). 
 
Another  suggestion  for  the  age-related  improvements  in  performance  on  decision-
making tasks is that the use of behavioural rules or strategies shifts during adolescence. 
For example, Huizinga et al. (2007) show evidence for an age-related improvement in 
                                                 
3 i.e. in Harbaugh et al., decisions are made under risk (probabilities of reward are 
known, but are less than unity), not uncertainty (probabilities of reward are 
unknown).   52 
the sophistication of strategies employed during the IGT. At  younger ages (e.g. 6-9 
years),  participants  behaved  in  a  way  that  was  consistent  with  sensitivity  to  the 
frequency  of  loss  and  an  insensitivity  to  loss  magnitude,  while  up  to  and  during 
adolescence (10-15  years), participants were increasingly likely to take  into account 
both the frequency and magnitude of losses. This study will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 3. The suggestion that the development of decision-making proceeds via the 
adoption  of  increasingly  sophisticated  or  unbiased  strategies  is  in  agreement  with 
Harbaugh et al. (2002), and is also in broad agreement with some influential theories of 
the development of decision-making (e.g. Brainerd & Reyna, 1990). 
 
1.6.2.2 Emotional influences on decision-making 
A number of recent studies have investigated emotional influences on decision-making 
in adolescence. Depending on one’s conceptualisation of emotion, it could be argued 
that  any  reward-based  decision-making  task  is,  strictly,  emotional  (in  that  reward 
receipt, omission or termination gives rise to ‘reward-based emotions’; Rolls, 2005). 
However,  it  is  possible  to  manipulate  the  level  of  emotional  salience  or  emotional 
intensity in decision-making tasks.  
 
In a study by Figner et al. (2009), adolescent participants aged 13-19 years and adult 
participants aged 20+  years played the Columbia Card Task (CCT), in which  cards 
shown face down are sequentially turned over to win points. On a given trial, cards can 
be turned over as long as gains are encountered, but the game terminates as soon as the 
participant turns over a loss card and the amount specified on the loss card is subtracted 
from the total payoff. In this particular study, two versions of the game were played: an 
emotional or ‘hot’ version of the task, and an unemotional or ‘cold’ version of the task. 
In the cold version, participants decided at the start of each trial how many cards they 
would turn over (a single number, e.g. 15). In the hot CCT, this decision was made 
incrementally: After each card was turned over, the participant made a decision either to 
quit  with  their  current  payoff,  or  turn  over  another  card.  Therefore,  the  hot  CCT 
provides reward feedback at each decision point. The results showed that, regardless of 
age, participants turned over a greater number of cards in the hot than in the cold CCT. 
However, the difference between the number of cards turned over in the hot version and 
the  number  of  cards  turned  over  in  the  cold  version  of  the  task  was  greater  in   53 
adolescents than in adults. The authors suggest that this effect arises due to a greater 
tendency  for  emotional  factors  to  produce  risk-seeking  behaviour  in  adolescents, 
relative to adults.  
 
In summary, a number of experimental studies have shown evidence that some basic 
cognitive components of decision-making continue to develop during adolescence. In 
addition,  the  impact  of  emotion  on  decision-making  may  be  particularly  high  in 
adolescence. Chapter 2 of this thesis describes an experiment that was carried out to 
investigate decision-making and emotion across adolescence. In the following sections, 
this and subsequent experimental chapters will be summarised. 
 
1.7 Summary of experimental chapters 
 
Evidence  reviewed  in  the  preceding  sections  indicates  that  reward-based  decision-
making continues to develop during adolescence. It has been suggested that this may 
underlie the developmental peak in real-life risky decision-making that occurs during 
adolescence, the so-called ‘inverted-U shaped trajectory’ of risk-taking (e.g. Steinberg, 
2008;  Casey  et  al.,  2008).  However,  real  life  risky  behaviour  could  arise  due  to  a 
number  of  factors.  Few  studies  have  shown  convincing  evidence  either  that  (a) 
adolescents  show  a  true  preference  for  risk-taking  per  se  (rather  than  deficient 
probability and outcome judgment), or that (b) adolescents take more risks relative to 
both children and adults (cognitive studies conducted so far have compared adolescents 
with  adults).  In  addition,  the  role  of  emotion  in  adolescent  risk-taking  is  not  well 
understood, but it is hypothesised to be important. Chapter 2 describes a study that was 
carried out to explore these outstanding issues. Eighty-three male participants aged nine 
to 35 years old performed a probabilistic decision-making task in which paired gambles 
differed  in  EV,  risk  (measured  as  outcome  variance)  and  the  potential  to  generate 
counterfactual emotions (Camille et al., 2004). Participants indicated their emotional 
responses  to  the  outcome  of  each  gamble  using  a  linear  rating  scale.  A  panel  logit 
regression procedure was used to test the contribution of EV and risk to participant 
behaviour across age, and it was predicted that whereas the former would show a linear 
age-related  improvement,  risk-seeking  would  peak  in  adolescence.  The  emotional   54 
response to counterfactual outcomes was compared between groups, and developmental 
differences were predicted. 
 
Chapter 3 describes a study carried out to investigate social and utilitarian influences 
on decision-making, in adolescents and in adults. Twenty-two adolescents (aged 12-13) 
and 14 adults (aged 21-43) completed a novel decision-making task in which happy and 
angry face stimuli were stochastically associated with reward (Averbeck & Duchaine, 
2009). Decisions were analysed by first creating a computational model of the ‘ideal 
observer’  who  optimally  integrates  outcomes  over  trials.  Participant  decisions  were 
compared with the decisions of this model on a trial-by-trial basis, and performance was 
compared  between  age  groups.  It  was  hypothesised  that  adults  would  outperform 
adolescents. As a next step in the analysis, an ‘ecological observer’ model was created 
that  more  closely  emulated  participant  decisions,  as  it  contained  parameters  that 
encapsulated distinct behavioural biases that participants were hypothesised to exhibit. 
These  included  biases  arising  from  the  social  nature  of  the  stimuli  (the  emotion 
expressions), and differential sensitivity to positive and negative performance feedback 
(wins and losses). The influence of these behavioural biases was compared between 
adult and adolescent groups. In line with previous studies (e.g. Huizinga et al., 2007; 
Gardner & Steinberg, 2005; Steinberg & Monahan, 2007), it was hypothesised that the 
response to performance feedback and social cues would develop across age. 
 
Adolescence is a time of profound socio-emotional development, and there is evidence 
that the hormonal and psycho-social changes of puberty contribute to changes in social 
awareness and emotion processing. In Chapter 4, a study is described that investigated 
pubertal changes in self-reported social emotions. Eighty-three female participants aged 
9-16  years  were  divided  into  three  puberty  groups  on  the  basis  of  a  physical 
development  questionnaire,  and  completed  an  emotional  self-report  task.  Patterns  of 
emotional  responding  were  investigated  to  evaluate  the  hypothesis  that  the  onset  of 
puberty  marks  an  increase  in  the  awareness  of  complex,  or  ‘mixed,’  emotions.  The 
emotional self-report task consisted of a series of scenarios that were designed to evoke 
either predominantly social emotions (embarrassment or guilt) or predominantly basic 
emotions (anger or fear), where social emotions are defined as those which require the 
representation  of  others’  mental  states.  It  was  hypothesised  that  mixed  emotion   55 
responding  would  develop  across  puberty,  and  that  this  development  would  be 
particular to social emotion.  
 
In Chapter 5, emotional scenarios from the study described Chapter 4 were adapted to 
investigate  the  neural  processing  of  social  and  basic  emotions.  Nineteen  female 
adolescents (aged 10-18) and 10 female adults (aged 22–32) underwent fMRI scanning 
while processing social or basic emotion scenarios. Participants were instructed to read 
and  imagine  each  scenario,  and  to  rate  their  imagined  emotional  response.  Social 
emotions were defined as emotions that require mental state processing, and therefore it 
was predicted that activity would be observed within the mentalising system (arMPFC, 
pSTS/TPJ, ATC) during social relative to basic emotion conditions. Previous studies 
have reported differences in activity within the mentalising system between adolescence 
and  adulthood  (specifically,  age-related  decreases  in  arMPFC  activity),  during 
mentalising  relative  to  control  tasks.  Therefore,  it  was  predicted  that  a  similar 
developmental pattern of activity between age groups during social relative to basic 
emotion processing would be observed in the current study.   
 
The mentalising system (arMPFC, pSTS/TPJ, ATC) is often collectively referred to as 
the mentalising ‘network’. However, a network is defined as a set of brain regions that 
demonstrate  functional  integration,  and  no  study  to  date  has  investigated  functional 
integration within the mentalising system. Therefore in Chapter 6, fMRI data from 
Chapter  5  were  reanalysed  to  investigate  connectivity  between  arMPFC  and  other 
mentalising system components, using psycho-physiological interaction (PPI) analysis. 
Connectivity  was  investigated  across  age  (11-35  years),  and  was  then  compared 
between  the  adult  and  adolescent  groups.  It  was  hypothesised  that  regions  of  the 
mentalising  system  would  show  evidence  of  connectivity  during  the  mentalising 
condition (social emotions) relative to the control condition (basic emotions), and that 
this connectivity would differ between age groups.   56 
Chapter 2 
 
The development of expected value maximising, risk-
seeking and counterfactual emotion in a probabilistic 
gambling task 
 
Human adolescents are prone to engage in risky behaviours such as dangerous driving 
and unsafe sex. In this chapter, a study is described that was conducted to investigate 
adolescent risk-seeking in a behavioural economic task. Male participants aged nine to 
35 completed a probabilistic gambling task assessing decision-making under risk, and 
the emotional response to decision outcomes (e.g. counterfactual emotions, relief and 
regret). Results show an inverted U-shaped developmental trajectory for risk-seeking, 
but the ability to maximize expected value improved gradually across age. In addition, 
there was an increase  between childhood and  young adolescence in the strength of 
counterfactual emotions (relief and regret) reported after receiving feedback about the 
gamble outcome. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
2.1.1 Adolescent development of risk-seeking 
Adolescents show a tendency to engage in risky behaviours, such as dangerous driving 
and  unsafe  sex  (Steinberg,  2008;  Eaton  et  al.  2006).  It  has  been  suggested  that 
adolescents are risk-taking in general, relative to children and adults (Steinberg, 2008; 
Casey et al., 2008). However, engagement in risky behaviour in real life is likely to have 
a  variety  of  social,  emotional  and  cognitive  causes,  and  few  empirical  studies  have 
directly  compared  risk-seeking  in  children,  adolescents  and  adults  using  laboratory-
based behavioural tasks (Harbaugh et al., 2002; Crone et al. 2008; van Leijenhorst et al., 
2008; see Boyer, 2006, for review). The current study investigated the development of   57 
risk-seeking between late childhood (age 9) and adulthood (age 35), using a behavioural 
economic  task  in  which  gambling  decisions  were  made  in  an  emotional  context. 
Heightened risk-seeking was predicted in  adolescents relative to adults, in line with 
previous empirical data (Eshel et al. 2007; Figner et al. 2009). In line with theoretical 
suggestions (Steinberg, 2008; Casey et al., 2008) and recent empirical findings (O'Brien 
&  Steinberg,  2009),  adolescents  were  also  hypothesised  to  show  heightened  risk-
seeking relative to children.  
 
2.1.2 Adolescent development of emotion 
Also of interest in the current study were age differences in the emotional response to 
gamble  outcomes.  When  faced  with  gamble  outcomes,  participant  choices  are 
influenced  by  the  rewards  that  they  hope  to  gain,  the  economist's  “expected  value” 
(EV), but are also influenced by they think they will feel afterwards. The emotional 
component  of  decisions  is  thought  to  be  the  reason  why,  once  an  individual  is 
committed to a course of action, s/he may prefer to ignore what would have happened if 
the alternative decision had been made – especially if the chosen decision results in an 
unfavourable  outcome.  In  this  situation,  counterfactual  comparison  between  what  is 
with what might have been shows that the alternative decision would have been better, 
and this can result in the feeling of regret (a ‘cognitively-mediated emotion’; Camille et 
al. 2004). Alternatively, a better outcome than the alternative may result in the feeling of 
relief.  These  cognitively-mediated  emotions  influence  decision-making  in  adults 
(Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2007). 
 
It  has  been  suggested  that  ability  to  think  counterfactually  about  the  outcomes  of 
decisions develops during adolescence (Baird & Fugelsang 2004). This may impact on 
adolescent decision-making. For example, immature counterfactual emotional responses 
during  decision-making  might  contribute  to  risky  decision-making  in  adolescents 
(Steinberg, 2008). In general, it has been suggested that adolescents show exaggerated 
or more labile emotional responses to outcomes relative to children and adults (Ernst & 
Mueller, 2007; Casey et al. 2008; Ernst et al., 2005; Eshel et al., 2007), which may also 
impact  on  decision-making.  However,  no  previous  study  has  investigated  the 
development of risk-seeking and the experience of counterfactual emotions within the 
same paradigm.    58 
 
2.1.3 Probabilistic gambling task 
In the current study, participants aged nine to 35 years played a probabilistic gambling 
task (Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005) in which paired gambles differed in EV 
(the sum of potential outcomes weighted by their probabilities) and risk, as well as the 
potential  to  generate  counterfactual  emotions  (relief  and  regret).  On  each  trial,  the 
participant chose between two gambles presented in the form of ‘wheels of fortune’ (see 
Figure 2.1). The two possible outcomes of each gamble (wins or losses of points), and 
their probabilities, were indicated on each wheel. When the participant had indicated 
which of the two gambles he wished to play, an arrow spuns round on the appropriate 
wheel, coming to rest on the number of points won or lost on that trial. In this type of 
task, a rational decision-maker should choose gambles with greater EV, since this will 
maximise winnings. However, gambles with the same EV can differ in their level of 
risk, where risk is measured as the outcome variance of a gamble (Bossaerts & Hsu, 
2008; see Methods, 2.2). The contribution to choice of risk (outcome variance) and the 
EV of a set of gambles was used to evaluate the participants’ utility function (Bossaerts 
& Hsu, 2008).  
 
2.1.3.1 Predicted development in the ability to maximize expected value 
The first goal in using this gambling task was to investigate the impact of EV on choice 
across age. It was predicted that, even at the youngest ages, participants would tend to 
choose gambles with higher EV, since it has been shown previously that children as 
young as  five  years old show a rudimentary sensitivity to EV (Schlottmann, 2001): 
When five-year olds view probabilistic events associated with different prizes won by a 
puppet, the level of happiness children judge the puppet will feel is proportional to the 
value of a prize multiplied by its approximate probability. It was expected, however, 
that  the  ability  to  maximise  EV  would  continue  to  develop  during  childhood  and 
adolescence.  Although  probability  and  value  judgment  may  be  mature  by  mid-
adolescence (Boyer, 2006), the use of this information to guide behaviour in emotional 
contexts, as in the current paradigm, is still developing. For example, in a behavioural 
economic study by Harbaugh et al. (2002) in which participants aged five to 64 years 
made a series of choices between a certain outcome and a gamble with equivalent EV, 
an  age-related  increase  was  shown  throughout  adolescence  in  the  tendency  towards   59 
rational (indifferent) decisions. Children and adolescents showed evidence of a biased 
treatment of the probability information relative to adults. Indeed, up to the age of 21 
years, participants behaved in a way that was consistent with a bias to over-weight the 
probability of rewards and under-weight the probability of losses. A study by Levin et 
al. (2007) in which children (aged 5-11) and adults made a choice between gambles that 
differed in EV also showed age-related increases in rational (EV-maximising) decisions. 
This evidence suggests that the ability to maximise EV, even when the rewards and 
probabilities are known, continues to develop during adolescence. The current study set 
out to fill in this developmental picture, by testing the ability of children, adolescents 
and adults to maximize EV when choosing between pairs of gambles that differed in 
EV. 
 
2.1.3.2 Predicted development in the influence of risk on choice 
The second goal of the current study was to investigate age differences in the impact of 
risk on choice. Participants’ preference for risk was evaluated by testing the contribution 
of the outcome variance of gambles to behaviour, where a risk-seeking participant is 
one  who  shows  a  tendency  to  choose  gambles  with  high  variance.  Because  the 
probabilities and outcomes of gambles were shown to participants, risk-seeking in the 
current  study  refers  to  a  preference  for  risk  proper.  In  contrast,  seemingly  risky 
behaviour  in  real-life  could  arise  due  to  a  number  of  factors,  including  incomplete 
knowledge  of  the  range  of  possible  outcomes,  or  a  reduced  ability  to  detect  their 
probabilities.  The  hypothesis  was  tested  that  there  would  be  an  inverted  U-shaped 
trajectory of risk-seeking with age between childhood and adulthood, with its peak in 
adolescence, as has been suggested in a number of recent studies (Figner et al. 2009; 
O’Brien & Steinberg, 2009).  
 
For example in Figner et al. (2009), adolescent participants aged 13-19 years, and adult 
participants aged 20 years and older played the Columbia Card Task (CCT), in which 
cards shown face down are sequentially turned over to win points. On a given trial, 
cards can be turned over as long as gains are encountered, but the trial terminates as 
soon as the participant turns over a loss card and the amount specified on the loss card is 
subtracted from the total payoff. In this particular study, two versions of the game were 
played: an emotional or ‘hot’ version of the task, and an unemotional or ‘cold’ version   60 
of the task. In the cold version of the task, participants decided how many cards they 
would turn over at the start of each trial (a single number, e.g. 15). In the hot CCT 
version, this decision was made incrementally:  after each card was turned over, the 
participant then made a decision either to quit with their current payoff, or turn over 
another card. Therefore, the hot CCT provides reward feedback at each decision point, 
presumably encouraging risky decisions because participant feel they are ‘on a roll’, or 
because they might ‘miss out’ if they quit. Indeed, the results showed that across age, 
participants turned over a greater number of  cards in the hot than in the cold CCT 
version. However, the difference between the number of cards turned over in the hot 
version and the number of cards turned over in the cold version of the task was greater 
in adolescents than in adults. The authors suggest that this effect arises due to a greater 
tendency  for  emotional  factors  to  produce  risk-seeking  behaviour  in  adolescents, 
relative to adults.  
 
Similar findings were elicited in a study in which adolescents and adults made risky or 
safe decisions in a car driving game: adolescents took more risks than adults in a hot, 
social-emotional  condition  in  which  their  friends  were  present  relative  to  a  cold 
condition in which they played alone (Steinberg, 2008; O’Brien & Steinberg, 2009).  
 
In light of this previous evidence, adolescents were predicted to take more risks than 
adults in the emotional decision-making task used in the current Chapter. Few (if any) 
empirical studies show increased adolescent relative to child risk-taking in emotional 
contexts;  however,  it  is  said  that  risk-taking  follows  an  inverted  U-shaped 
developmental trajectory between childhood and adulthood (Figner et al. 2009; O’Brien 
& Steinberg, 2009). This pattern was therefore was predicted in the current study. 
 
2.1.3.3 Predicted development of counterfactual emotion 
The third goal of the current study was to investigate age differences in counterfactual 
emotion  (relief  and  regret).  During  the  gambling  task,  participants  indicated  their 
emotional to the outcome of each gamble on a linear rating scale. On half of the trials 
(gambles in the complete feedback condition), the outcome of the unselected wheel was 
revealed alongside the outcome of the selected wheel, whereas on the other half of trials 
(partial feedback condition) only the outcome of the selected wheel only was revealed.   61 
Previous work in adults has shown that, in the complete feedback condition, viewing the 
outcome of the unselected wheel gives rise to a counterfactual comparison between the 
outcome of a choice (reality) and the outcome of a foregone alternative (what might 
have been),  and that this comparison modulates emotional responses  (Camille et al. 
2004, Coricelli et al. 2005). In this study as in previous studies, the emotional response 
to the outcome of a decision that is better than its rejected alternative is defined as relief, 
and worse than its alternative as regret. Based on suggestions that the ability to think 
counterfactually about the outcomes of decisions continues to develop during childhood 
and adolescence, it was hypothesised that there would be age group differences in the 
modulation  of  the  emotional  response  to  counterfactual  outcomes  in  the  complete 
feedback condition, and that this might be related to risk-taking. 
 
2.2 Methods 
 
2.2.1 Participants 
20  pre-adolescent  male  participants  (aged  9  to  11)  were  recruited  from  a  selective 
primary  school  in  London.  52  adolescent  male  participants  (aged  12  to  18)  were 
recruited from a selective secondary school in the same area of London and at which a 
proportion of school leavers from the primary school enrol each year. 17 adult male 
participants (aged 25 to 35) were recruited from a database of former students of the 
secondary school. Therefore, child, adolescent and adult participant groups were well 
matched for educational background and socio-economic status.  
 
The 89 participants were divided into four Age Groups of approximately equal size 
based on school year group: child (N = 20, age range 9.83-11.83 years: mean (sd) = 
10.83 (.641)), young adolescent (YA) (N = 26, aged 12.25-15.83: mean (sd) = 13.77 
(1.10)), mid-adolescent (MA) (N = 26, aged 15.5-18.08: mean (sd) = 16.74 (.880)) and 
adult (N = 17, aged 25.67-35.0: mean (sd) = 30.32 (3.08)).  
 
Participants  had  no  history  of  psychiatric  or  neurological  disorder,  and  none  had 
received a diagnosis of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, autism or dyscalculia. 
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To  reduce  variance  attributable  to  developmental  sex  differences  in  traits  such  as 
sensation-seeking, which might influence risk preferences (Steinberg et al. 2008), this 
study  was  restricted  to  male  participants  only.  The  selection  of  males  rather  than 
females was related to the particular focus on risk-seeking in the current study: previous 
studies have shown higher risk-seeking in males than in females (e.g. van Leijenhorst et 
al., 2008).   
 
Prior to the study, written informed consent was obtained from adult participants, and 
from a parent or guardian of adolescent participants. The study was approved by the 
local Ethics Committee. Participants were not paid. 
 
2.2.2 Procedure 
Each participant completed the probabilistic decision-making task described in Camille 
et al. (2004). On each trial of the task, the participant is presented with two ‘wheels of 
fortune’ on a computer screen (Figure 2.1). The participant must choose one of the 
wheels, with the aim of maximising the number of points won. Possible wins and losses 
on each wheel are indicated by positive or negative numbers next to the wheels, and 
their associated probabilities are indicated by the relative size of adjacent sectors on the 
wheel. When the participant has pressed a button indicating his choice, an arrow spins 
round on the wheel and comes to rest showing the number of points that have been won 
or lost on that trial. The participant is then asked to indicate how he feels using a linear 
rating  scale  at  the  bottom  of  the  screen:  from  -50  (extremely  negative)  to  +50 
(extremely positive). 
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Figure 2.1 The probabilistic gambling task: Partial feedback condition (example). On each trial, the 
participant is presented with two gambles (screen 1). In this example, the participant rejects the right 
hand gamble 2 (screen 2), which would incur a 0.5 chance of winning 50 points and a 0.5 chance of 
losing 50 points, and chooses to play left hand gamble 1 which incurs a 0.8 chance of winning 200 points 
and a 0.2 chance of losing 200 points. Probabilities and wins can occur in any combination, with the 
exception of combinations that result in identical EV between wheels. Once the participant has chosen, 
the arrow spins round on the selected gamble until it comes to rest on the obtained outcome (screen 3). 
Finally, the participant indicates his emotional response to the outcome on a continuous scale from -50 (I 
feel very negative) to +50 (I feel very positive).  
 
 
 
 
The game is played under two conditions, lasting approximately 10 minutes each. Each 
condition contains 30 self-paced trials, separated by an inter-trial interval of 1 sec. In the 
partial feedback condition (Figure 2.1) which is played first, the participant is shown 
the outcome of the chosen wheel, but not the outcome of the unchosen wheel. In the 
subsequent complete feedback condition, the participant is shown the outcomes on both   64 
wheels, but only gains the number of points indicated by the arrow on the wheel which 
he  has  chosen.  The  task  was  run  using  Cogent  software  running  in  Matlab,  which 
logged behavioural responses. Prior to the decision-making task, participants completed 
a five-trial practice task.  
  
Possible gamble outcomes took the discrete values of +200, +50, -50 or -200 points. 
Outcome probabilities for each wheel could be 0.2/0.8 or 0.5/0.5. The two gambles 
always differed in EV (see Equation 2.2) and in the value of their actual outcomes. 
Otherwise, pairs of gambles and the combination of probabilities and outcomes on each 
gamble were split approximately evenly among possible combinations. Thus, the EV of 
all 120 gambles ranged from -170 to +170, with a mean and median close to or at zero 
(mean EV = -8, median EV = 0), and a range of differences in EV between the paired 
gambles across the 30 trials in each condition from -195 to +195 (pairings of extreme 
good EV gambles with extreme bad EV gambles were avoided as this sort of trial is 
experienced as an ‘obvious’ choice), with a mean and median close to zero (mean dEV 
= 3, median dEV = 12). The set of pairs of gambles and the order in which they were 
presented was the same in each condition (see Appendix 2.1 for full parameter structure 
of the task).  
 
The task was administered individually to child and adolescent participants in a quiet 
room in school, and at the home or workplace of adult participants. The total duration of 
the experiment was between 15 and 25 mins, depending on participant reaction times. 
 
2.2.3 Data analysis 
Data points lying >3 s.d. from the grand mean of the dependent variable in each analysis 
were considered outliers and were excluded from that analysis.  
 
2.2.3.1 Logit regression analysis: the effects of expected value and risk on choice 
Decision-making  was  analysed  by  conducting  regression  analysis  with  a  panel  logit 
procedure  (Camille  et  al.  2004;  Coricelli  et  al.  2005).  This  procedure  treats  each 
participant as a unit and each subsequent trial as time, and calculates the maximum 
likelihood of a model of the data that takes into account decision variables, in this case 
the difference in EV and risk (variance) between gambles.   65 
 
In the current model, x1 and y1 represent the highest and the lowest outcome of gamble 1 
(g1, the left hand wheel), and x2 and y2 represent the highest and the lowest outcome of 
gamble 2 (g2, the right hand wheel). The probability of x1 is p and the probability of y1 is 
1 – p; the probability of x2 is q and the probability of y2 is 1 – q. The probability of 
choosing gamble 1 is estimated as: 
 
(2.1)    Pr(g1it) = 1 - Pr(g2it) = F[ dEVit, dSDit]         
   
 
where i = individual, t = time and the function F[θ] denotes the function e
θ/(1 + e
θ). The 
effect  on  choice  of  the  difference  in  EV  and  risk  between  paired  gambles  was 
investigated, with the variables dEV and dSD defined as: 
 
(2.2)    dEV = EV(g1) - EV(g2) = [(px1 + (1 - p)y1) - (qx2 + (1 - q)y2)] 
   
(2.3)    dSD = stdev(g1) - stdev(g2)           
   
 
where: 
(2.4)    stdev(g1) = √[p(x1 - EV(g1))² + q(y1 – EV(g1))²]     
   
 
A  participant  who  maximizes  EV  and  risk  will  choose  g1  if  [EV(g1)  >  EV(g2)] 
(Equation 2.2), and if [stdev(g1) > stdev(g2)] (Equation 2.3). 
 
To  ascertain  whether  the  impacts  of  EV  and  risk  on  behaviour  were  dependent  on 
participant  age,  the  two  variables  dEV  and  dSD  were  first  orthogonalised  (with  all 
common variance attributed to dEV) and then interactions between age and each of the 
orthogonalised  parameters  dEV  and  dSD  were  modelled.  The  hypothesis  that  risk-
seeking would show an inverted U-shaped trajectory with age was tested by modelling 
the interaction between a quadratic function of age (age
2) and the impact of risk (dSD) 
on behaviour; a quadratic relationship between age and EV was also tested. In order to   66 
compare  directly  the  models  testing  for  linear  and  quadratic  effects  of  age  on  the 
variables dEV and dSD, a likelihood ratio test was carried out. 
 
The outputs of the logit regressions show the coefficients of model parameters (dEV, 
dSD)  and  their  associated  significance  levels.  A  coefficient  that  is  not  significantly 
different from zero indicates that participant behaviour is neutral with respect to that 
coefficient.  For  example,  participants  could  be  risk-neutral,  or  insensitive  to  EV.  A 
coefficient that is significantly different from zero indicates that participants tend to 
maximise  or  minimise  the  decision  variable.  The  sign  of  the  coefficient  indicates 
whether the decision variable increases (+) or decreases (-) the probability of choice. 
For  example,  a  high,  positive  coefficient  for  risk  (dSD)  indicates  that  a  more  risky 
choice (one with higher outcome variance) has a higher probability of being chosen. 
Significance of the variables dEV and dSD was tested across participants and within 
each Age Group separately, with the threshold for significance set at p < 0.05. 
 
First, a simple model is reported, in which the utility function is estimated using the 
decision variables dEV and dSD (Table 2.1a). Subsequently the age variable is added, 
and its interaction with dEV and dSD, and then quadratic effects of the variables are 
tested by including interactions between age
2 and the variables dEV and dSD. We tested 
whether the addition of each variable improved the model, and report a reduced model 
including only the variables that significantly explain choice (Table 2.1b).  
 
2.2.3.2 Proportion of EV and risk-maximising choices by Age Group 
To  complement  results  from  the  logit  regression  analyses,  which  treat  age  as  a 
continuous  variable  and  therefore  may  be  influenced  by  the  distribution  of  age,  the 
proportion of trials for which each of the four Age Groups selected the gamble that 
maximized EV or risk was calculated. One-way ANOVA was used in each case to test 
for Age Group differences, with a threshold for significance at p < 0.05 and Bonferroni 
corrections applied to post hoc tests. The curve resulting from a regression between age
2 
and the proportion of risky choices was interrogated to locate the point of inflection, 
which is the age at which the proportion of risky choices is maximal.  
 
2.2.3.3 Other indices of performance   67 
Mean  winnings  closely  follow  the  proportion  of  EV-maximising  choices,  since  a 
participant  who  maximizes  EV  will  win  more  points.  However  to  add  detail  to  the 
current pattern of results, the relationship between participant age and mean winnings 
was  investigated,  by  conducting  linear  regression  analysis.  Two  regressions  were 
performed,  the  first  across  the  entire  age  range,  and  the  second  on  the  child  and 
adolescent age range, in order to rule out the possibility that this effect was driven by 
two discrete clusters in age, and since it was hypothesised that the major changes in 
performance would occur during this age range.  
 
To  ascertain  whether  any  effects  of  age  and  Age  Group  on  performance  (mean 
winnings; tendency to maximise EV) were simply due to slower learning of the task at 
younger ages (Crone & van der Molen, 2007), rather than to stable age differences in 
strategy,  linear  regression  was  conducted  between  age  and  the  difference  in  mean 
winnings between the first and second 15 out of the 30 trials per condition, as well as 
one-way ANOVA on the mean difference in winnings between the first and second half 
of both conditions, with Age Group as a between-subjects factor. 
 
2.2.3.4 Strength of counterfactual emotions by Age Group 
It  was  hypothesised  that  the  modulation  of  emotion  evaluations  by  counterfactual 
comparison would differ according to Age Group. To test this hypothesis, trials were 
selected for which a counterfactual comparison could either enhance or diminish the 
degree of satisfaction a participant would feel for a given outcome. That is, trials were 
selected from the complete feedback condition for which the obtained outcome was 
either +50 or -50, and the unchosen alternative was either +200 or -200. To clarify, 
consider the obverse situation in which a participant wins +200 points. In this case, any 
unobtained  outcome  (+50,  -50  or  -200)  would  have  been  worse;  the  counterfactual 
comparison will always be in the downward direction and will always be confounded 
with  outcome  magnitude.  In  contrast,  a  win  of  -50  may  appear  satisfactory  if  the 
unobtained outcome is revealed to be -200, but unsatisfactory if the unobtained outcome 
is revealed to be +200. Emotion evaluations from the latter trial types were therefore 
used to calculate Age Group differences in the strength (magnitude) of counterfactual 
emotions defined according to the counterfactual and reward context in which they were 
elicited, which was previously described as the ‘regret effect’ in Coricelli et al. (2005).   68 
Counterfactual emotions were compared between the four Age Groups using one-way 
ANOVA with a threshold for significance at p < 0.05, and Bonferroni-corrected post 
hoc t-tests.  
 
2.2.3.5 Overall emotional response between Age Groups 
Overall  differences  in  emotion  intensity  between  Age  Groups  and  conditions  were 
investigated by conducting mixed model repeated measures 2x2x4 ANOVA on emotion 
evaluations  in  response  to  positive  and  negative  absolute  outcomes  (within-subjects 
factor  1:  Valence;  two  levels:  win,  loss)  and  in  the  partial  and  complete  feedback 
condition (within-subjects factor 2: Feedback; two levels: partial feedback, complete 
feedback), between age groups (between-subjects factor: Age Group; four levels: child, 
YA, MA, adult). Bonferroni-corrected post hoc t-tests were used to investigate simple 
effects.  Because  order  effects  (the  partial  condition  was  always  played  first)  may 
contribute  to  a  main  effect  of  Feedback  or  interactions  thereof,  only  those  age-
independent  effects that replicate previous results are reported  (Camille et  al. 2004; 
Coricelli et al. 2005; Bault et al. 2008). 
 
2.3 Results 
 
2.3.1 Performance 
2.3.1.1 Behavioural sensitivity to the difference in EV between gambles  
Logit  regression  analysis  showed  that  during  both  the  partial  and  the  complete 
conditions,  across  participants  as  well  as  within  each  Age  Group  separately,  the 
difference in EV (see Equation 2.2, Methods, 2.2) between gambles affected choice. 
Overall, participants exhibited a behavioural preference for gambles with higher EV. 
Since the behaviour of participants with regards EV was similar in the partial and the 
complete conditions, and in order to increase power, we collapsed across conditions. 
Thus, for all 89 participants, EV coefficient dEV > 0, with p < 0.05 (see Table 2.1a) and 
for  the  Child,  YA,  MA  and  adult  groups  separately,  dEV  >  0,  p  <  0.05.  However, 
participant age modulated the extent to which the difference in EV between gambles 
affected choice (interaction between age and dEV coefficient, dEV*Age > 0, p < 0.05; 
see Table 2.1b) such that the impact of the difference in EV between gambles on choice   69 
behaviour increased with increasing age. That is, older participants exhibited a stronger 
behavioural preference for gambles with higher EV than did younger participants. The 
interaction between age² and dEV was not significant, and was therefore removed from 
the model. 
 
In order to assess statistically whether the relationship between age and the impact of 
EV on choice was better described as linear or quadratic, a likelihood ratio test was 
conducted. This showed that adding a quadratic component for the interaction between 
age and dEV (age²*dEV) did not significantly improve the model (Likelihood-ratio test: 
LR χ
 2(1) = 1.47; p = 0.226). Therefore, the effect of age on dEV is concluded to be 
linear. 
 
2.3.1.2 Proportion of EV-maximising choices by Age Group 
One-way ANOVA on the proportion of trials for which participants in each of the four 
Age Groups chose the gamble with higher EV was not significant (F3,85 = 2.354, p = 
0.078).  
 
2.3.1.3 Correlation between age and mean winnings 
Linear regression analysis showed that mean winnings across the task were positively 
correlated with age (mean winnings: β = 0.280, r
2 = 0.078, p < 0.05; two outliers were 
excluded: one YA, one MA
4; see Figure 2.2). This result is consistent with the logit 
regression  result  showing  an  age-related  increase  in  EV-maximising  behaviour.    In 
order to rule out the possibility that this effect was driven by two discrete clusters in 
age, a second linear regression analysis was carried out on mean winnings against age 
for the Child and Adolescent groups only. This showed that mean winnings across the 
task were also positively correlated with age across this age range (β = 0.340, r
2 = 
0.115, p < 0.05).  
 
                                                 
4 Note that the two lower data points shown in Figure 2.2 lie within 3 s.d. of the 
mean and are therefore not defined as outliers in this study. However, the linear 
relationship remains significant when these data points are excluded (β = 0.265, 
r
2=0.070, p < 0.05).    70 
Figure 2.2 Mean winnings across the task show a positive correlation with age, (β = 0.280, r
2 = 0.078, p 
< 0.05). Two outliers >3 s.d. away from the mean were excluded. 
 
 
 
2.3.1.4 Effect of age on learning 
Linear regression between age and the difference in mean winnings between the first 
and second 15 out of the 30 trials per condition, as well as one-way ANOVA on the 
mean difference in winnings between the first and second half of both conditions, with 
Age  Group  as  a  between-subjects  factor,  revealed  no  significant  effect  of  age 
(regression: p = 0.879; no outliers) or Age Group (F3,84 = 0.204, p = 0.894; one YA 
excluded  due  to  incomplete  partial  condition)  on  the  difference  in  mean  winnings 
between the first and second half of each condition. This suggests that the effects of age 
and Age Group on performance are due to stable age differences in strategy, and are not 
simply due to slower learning of the task at younger ages. 
 
2.3.2 Risk-seeking   71 
2.3.2.1 Behavioural sensitivity to the difference in risk between gambles 
Logit regression analysis showed that across Age Groups, the difference in risk between 
gambles  (see  Equation  2.3,  Methods,  2.2)  affected  choice.  Overall,  participants 
exhibited a behavioural preference for more risky gambles, that is, gambles with higher 
outcome variance (risk coefficient dSD > 0; p < 0.05; see Table 2.1a). The difference in 
risk between gambles also predicted choice in the Child, YA and MA groups alone (risk 
coefficient for Child, YA and MA groups separately, dSD > 0, p < 0.05), but not in the 
Adult group alone (p > 0.7). That is, children and adolescents show a preference for 
more risky gambles, but adult behaviour is insensitive to risk. 
 
2.3.2.2 Nonlinear relationship between age and the impact of risk on behaviour 
A significant quadratic interaction between age and dSD showed that participant age 
modulated the extent to which the difference in risk between gambles affected choice 
(coefficient dSD*Age² > 0, p < 0.05; see Table 2.1b), but choice was not predicted by a 
linear function of risk*age (coefficient dSD*Age < 1, p = 0.064; see Table 2.1b). In 
order to directly compare linear vs. quadratic effects of dSD, a likelihood ratio test was 
conducted. This showed that adding a quadratic component for the interaction between 
age and the risk coefficient (dSD*Age² ) to a model containing the linear component 
only (dSD*Age ) significantly improved this model (likelihood-ratio test: LR χ
2(1) = 
5.31; p < 0.05). Therefore, it is concluded that there is a quadratic relationship between 
age and the propensity to seek risk.   72 
Table 2.1 
(a) Participant choice behaviour as a function of the difference in expected value (dEV) between gambles and the difference in risk (dSD) between 
gambles. 
Variable name  Coefficient  Standard error  Z  P  [95% Conf. Interval] 
             
Difference in expected value: dEV  0.02275  0.00061  37.58  <0.001  0.02156  0.02393 
Difference in risk: dSD  0.00514  0.00051  10.09  <0.001  0.00414  0.00613 
Constant  0.17911  0.03833  4.67  <0.001  0.10398  0.25423 
             
Number of subjects = 89; number of observations = 5289. Data from all trials.  
Log likelihood = -2151.0887, Wald chi
2(3) =1453.61, Prob > chi
2 = 0.000 
 
 
(b) Participant choice behaviour as a function of the variables listed in column 1.  
 
Variable name  Coefficient  Standard errorZ  P  [95% Conf. Interval] 
             
Difference in expected value: dEV  0.01598  0.00179  8.92  <0.001  0.01247  0.01949 
Difference in risk: dSD  -0.00224  0.00464  -0.48  0.629  -0.01133  0.00685 
Interaction between EV and Age: dEV*Age  0.00043  0.00011  3.93  <0.001  0.00021  0.00064 
Interaction between risk and Age: dSD*Age  0.00099  0.00049  2.03  0.042  0.00003  0.00194 
Interaction between risk and Age²: dSD*Age²  -0.00003  0.00001  -2.5  0.012  -0.00005  -0.00001 
Constant  0.18100  0.03890  4.65  <0.001  0.10475  0.25725 
             
Number of subjects = 89; number of observations = 5289. Data from all trials.  
Log likelihood = -2127.8668, Wald chi
2(3) =1414.01, Prob > chi
2 = 0.000   73 
2.3.2.3 Proportion of risk-maximising choices by Age Group 
One-way ANOVA on the proportion of trials for which participants in each of the 
four Age Groups chose the gamble with higher risk was significant (F3,85 = 3.077, p 
< 0.05). Figure 2.3 shows the proportion of risky choices in each Age Group. For 
the  purposes  of  illustration,  a  quadratic  function  has  been  fit  to  the  group  data. 
Paired post hoc Bonferroni corrected comparisons showed that the YA group made a 
significantly greater proportion of risk-maximising choices than did the Adult group 
(p < 0.05; all other comparisons p > 0.2). Interrogation of the curve resulting from a 
regression between age
2 as a continuous variable and the proportion of risky choices 
revealed that the point of inflection was located at 14.38 years. That is, 14.38 is the 
age at which participants made the greatest proportion of risky choices. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Proportion of risky choices made by each Age Group. Logit regression revealed an 
inverted U-shape relationship between age and the influence of risk on choice. The graph is fit with a 
quadratic function for the purposes of illustration; a quadratic fit between age as a continuous variable 
and the proportion of risky choices showed that the point of inflection was at age 14.38 years, and 
logit regression showed a quadratic relationship between age and the impact of risk on choice. 
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2.3.3 Emotional response to outcomes 
2.3.3.1 Strength of counterfactual emotion by Age Group 
One-way ANOVA showed a significant effect of Age Group (F3,83 = 3.155, p < 0.05; 
two outliers were excluded
5) on the strength (magnitude) of counterfactual emotions, 
that is the emotional response to wins of ±50 when the unobtained outcome was 
±200.  Paired  post  hoc  Bonferroni-corrected  comparisons  revealed  significantly 
weaker counterfactual emotion evaluations in the Child than in the YA group (mean 
difference  6.74,  p  <  0.05),  while  no  other  comparisons  reached  significance  (all 
comparisons p > 0.5, except Child vs. MA: mean difference 5.96, p = 0.085; see 
Figure  2.4).  That  is,  the  strength  of  counterfactual  emotions  increases  between 
childhood and early adolescence, and thereafter shows no significant change.  
 
Figure  2.4  Counterfactual  emotion.  The  strength  of  the  emotional  response  to  counterfactual 
outcomes is greater in the Young Adolescent than in the Child group. 
 
 
 
                                                  
5 Outliers were one Child whose data lay +3.21 s.d. away from the mean, and one 
Adult whose data lay +4.31 away from the mean.   75 
In contrast to the results regarding counterfactual emotions, on investigating overall 
differences in emotion intensity between Groups and conditions, no evidence was 
found  for  a  generally  heightened  emotional  response  in  adolescence.  Repeated 
measures 2x2x4 ANOVA showed no two- or three-way interactions between Age 
Group and the within-groups factors: Valence x Age Group (F3,83 = 0.50, p = 0.68); 
Feedback x Age Group (F3,83 = 1.05, p = 0.38); Valence x Feedback x Group (F3,83 = 
0.32, p = 0.81; three Child outliers excluded). This suggests that the Age Group 
difference in emotion evaluations reported above is specific to emotions that are 
counterfactually-modulated.  
 
However, results from previous studies showing an influence of counterfactual and 
reward condition on the emotion evaluations were replicated. Specifically, emotion 
ratings were influenced by outcome Valence (positive vs. negative: F1,83 = 400.45, p 
< 0.05) and the nature of the Feedback (partial vs. complete: F1,83 = 9.84, p < 0.05), 
and by an interaction between the factors Valence and Feedback (F1,83 = 39.82, p < 
0.05). These findings have been described previously in adults, using the same task 
(Coricelli et al. 2005; Bault et al. 2008). The current study therefore extends these 
observations to children and adolescents.   
 
2.3.3.2 Post hoc tests on counterfactual emotion and risk-seeking 
2.3.3.2.1 Relief vs. regret 
Post  hoc  t-tests  were  conducted  on  Child  vs.  YA  differences  in  counterfactual 
emotion  evaluations  separately  for  positive  and  negative  outcomes,  in  order  to 
investigate whether the stronger counterfactual emotion evaluations in YA relative 
to the Child group was driven by  a hyper-responsiveness to  positive  rather than 
negative outcomes, as has previously been reported (Casey et al. 2008; Ernst et al., 
2005; Eshel et al., 2007). Independent samples t-tests revealed higher YA than Child 
emotion evaluations on relief (or, ‘lucky escape’) trials (t43 = -2.22, p < 0.05 (p = 
0.02 1-tailed)) whereas the same comparison for regret trials was not significant (t43 
= .73, p = 0.24 1-tailed). This post hoc result provides evidence that the YA group 
showed  an  enhanced  emotional  response  to  relief  or  ‘lucky  escape’  outcomes, 
relative to the Child group. 
 
2.3.3.2.2 Relationship between relief and risk-seeking   76 
Finally, it was of interest to investigate whether the developmental enhancement in 
the  emotional  response  to  relief  or  ‘lucky  escape’  trials  between  childhood  and 
young  adolescence  predicted  risk-taking  in  these  participants.  Linear  regression 
analyses were therefore conducted between the emotional response on relief trials 
and  the  proportion  of  risky  choices  across  age,  as  well  as  within  selected  Age 
Groups. This showed no evidence for a relationship between the emotional response 
on relief trials and the proportion of risky choices across age across the entire age 
range participants (β = 0.176, r
2 = 0.031, p = 0.103). However, this relationship was 
significant within Child and YA groups together (β = 0.305, r
2 = 0.093, p < 0.05), 
and  was  marginally  significant  within  Child,  YA  and  MA  groups  together  (β  = 
0.228, r
2 = 0.052, p = 0.056), but not in the Adult group alone (β = 0.067, r
2 = 0.005, 
p = 0.804). These regressions do not survive Bonferroni correction, and thus should 
be interpreted with caution.  
 
2.4 Discussion 
 
The current study was conducted to investigate the development between childhood 
and adulthood of the tendency to maximise expected value (EV) and seek risk, using 
a task that assessed decision-making under risk. Age differences in the emotional 
response to gamble outcomes were also investigated. Male participants aged nine to 
35  years  played  a  probabilistic  decision-making  task  in  which  paired  gambles 
differed in EV, risk and the potential to generate counterfactual emotions (relief and 
regret). Results show that the ability to maximise EV increased linearly with age, 
whereas risk-seeking showed a quadratic relationship with age. The proportion of 
risky choices peaked in mid-adolescence. This is one of the first behavioural studies 
to provide evidence for an inverted-U shaped relationship between age and risky 
decision-making.  In  addition,  results  show  an  increase  between  childhood  and 
adolescence in the strength of counterfactual emotions, although individual emotion 
scores did not predict risky decision-making across the age range. This is the first 
study to investigate the development of risk-seeking and counterfactual emotions 
between childhood and adulthood using a behavioural economic task.  
 
2.4.1 Development of rational decision-making: sensitivity to EV   77 
Participants made a series of decisions between paired gambles that differed in EV, 
which is the sum of possible outcomes of a gamble weighted by their probabilities. 
Each  of  the  four  age  groups  showed  evidence  of  taking  EV  into  account  when 
making  decisions.  At  all  ages,  decisions  were  predicted  by  a  model  in  which 
gambles with high EV were preferentially chosen over gambles with low EV. This 
result  concurs  with  previous  studies  (see  Boyer,  2006,  for  review),  which  have 
shown that even children as  young as five have a rudimentary sensitivity to EV 
(Schlottmann 2001).  
 
While all age  groups showed evidence of taking  EV into account  when making 
decisions, the extent to which participants maximised EV differed according to age 
(see  Table  2.1b).  With  increasing  age,  participants  were  more  likely  to  make 
decisions that maximised EV. Since mean winnings closely follow the proportion of 
EV-maximising choices (a participant who maximizes EV will win more points) it 
was not surprising that there was also a positive correlation between age and mean 
winnings across the task. Therefore, it can be concluded that performance on the task 
improved across age (see Figure 2.2). This suggests that the ability rationally to 
integrate reward and probability information across gambles in order to maximise 
winnings shows continuing improvement between late childhood and adulthood.  
 
This result is in agreement with previous findings. In a behavioural economic study 
conducted by Harbaugh et al. (2002) in which participants aged five to 64 years 
chose between a certain outcome and a gamble with equivalent EV, it was shown 
that the proportion of rational choices increased with age throughout childhood and 
adolescence. A study by  Levin et al. (2007) showed age-related increases in the 
tendency  to  maximise  EV  between  groups  of  young  children  (aged  5-7),  pre-
adolescents  (aged  8-11)  and  adults  in  the  Cups  Task,  which  involves  a  choice 
between gambles that differ in EV. The current study extends this developmental 
picture, by showing that the ability to maximize EV when choosing between two 
gambles (rather than a gamble and a sure thing) shows linear development between 
late childhood, adolescence and adulthood.  
 
2.4.2 Developmental profile of risk-taking 
In the current gambling task, paired gambles differed in risk, measured as outcome 
variance (Bossaerts & Hsu, 2008). Analysis of behavioural decisions revealed that   78 
the child group, and both adolescent groups, showed evidence of taking risk into 
account when making decisions. In these age groups, decisions were predicted by a 
model in which gambles with high risk were preferentially chosen over gambles 
with low risk. In contrast, the adult group showed no evidence of taking risk into 
account when making decisions; adults were risk-neutral. 
 
The extent to which participants maximized risk differed according to participant 
age. There was an inverted U-shaped relationship between age and the influence of 
risk on choice. Logit regression showed that the impact of the difference in risk 
between gambles on choice increased with increasing age at the younger end of the 
age range. Towards the middle of the age range, the increase in the impact of risk 
began to decrease with increasing age. By adulthood, the effect was reversed. That 
is,  adolescents  showed  the  strongest  tendency  to  select  high-risk  gambles.  In 
addition, there was a significant effect of age group on the proportion of trials for 
which participants selected the gamble with higher risk. Young adolescents (aged 
12-15) made a significantly greater proportion of risky choices than did adults, and 
the age at which risky choices peaked was 14.38 years (see Figure 2.3). 
 
These results extend those from previous studies that have shown that the tendency 
to make risky decisions in emotional gambling tasks decreases between adolescence 
and adulthood (age 11-15 vs. age 21-31, Eshel et al. 2007; age 13-19 vs. age 20+, 
Figner et al. 2009). However, it has been suggested that the tendency to make risky 
decisions shows an inverted-U shaped relationship with age, from childhood through 
adolescence  and  into  adulthood.  The  current  study  is  one  of  the  first  empirical 
studies  to  demonstrate  an  inverted  U-shaped  relationship  between  age  and  risky 
decisions (O’Brien & Steinberg, 2009). This result complements much theoretical 
and observational work. Epidemiological studies show a peak during adolescence in 
‘risky’ activities such as dangerous driving (Eaton et al. 2006), which has led to the 
suggestion of an inverted U-shaped relationship between age and the tendency to 
engage in risky behaviours, peaking at adolescence (Steinberg et al. 2008; Casey et 
al., 2008). However, choosing to engage in these real life activities is likely to have a 
variety of underlying causes, and as such does not constitute a preference for risk in 
a  behavioural  economic  sense.  The  current  study  showed  that  risk-taking  in  an 
emotional gambling task peaks during adolescence. This is an important first step   79 
towards clarifying the conditions under which adolescents are risk-taking,  both in 
laboratory-based tasks and in naturalistic circumstances. 
 
2.4.3 Development of counterfactual emotions 
In this study, participants rated their emotional response to the outcome of each 
gamble. On half of the trials (complete feedback condition) participants were shown 
the outcome of the unchosen wheel as well as the outcome of the chosen wheel. 
Previous work in adults has shown that this gives rise to a counterfactual comparison 
between the outcome of a choice (reality) and its foregone alternative (what might 
have been), and that this comparison modulates emotional responses and behaviour 
(Coricelli  et  al.  2007).  The  current  study  investigated  age  differences  in  the 
emotional response to counterfactual outcomes (relief and regret). Results showed 
that the strength of counterfactual emotions differed across age groups, such that 
young  adolescents (aged 12-15)  responded with  stronger  emotion evaluations on 
counterfactual trials than did children (aged 9-11). That is, the strength of emotional 
responses to counterfactual outcomes increases between childhood and adolescence. 
This result is consistent with the suggestion that the ability to think counterfactually 
about the outcomes of decisions is still developing during adolescence (Baird and 
Fugelsang, 2004).  
 
Post hoc tests indicated that the increased strength of counterfactual emotions in 
young  adolescents  relative  to  children  was  driven  by  a  more  strongly  positive 
response to relief outcomes, or ‘lucky escapes’. On these trials, participants learned 
that they had won a number of points on choosing to play a gamble which could 
instead have resulted in a large loss. This result is compatible with a developmental 
picture showing heightened sensation-seeking and reward sensitivity in adolescents 
(aged  around  15)  relative  to  children  (aged  around  10)  (Steinberg  et  al.,  2008). 
Further  studies  are  needed  to  replicate  and  extend  this  developmental  finding 
showing  an  increase  in  the  emotional  response  to  ‘lucky  escapes’.  A  tentative 
suggestion  based  on  the  (uncorrected)  correlation  between  child  and  adolescent 
emotional  responses  on  relief  or  ‘lucky  escape’  trials,  is  that  children  and 
adolescents  may  become  less  cautious  in  their  decisions  after  surprisingly  lucky 
(relieving) wins. However, this conclusion is preliminary because the correlations 
between risk-taking and emotion did not survive Bonferroni correction. 
   80 
2.4.4 Relationship between risk and other variables 
The  current  study  used  an  emotional  gambling  task  to  show  that  risk-seeking 
followed a non-linear relationship with age, peaking in adolescence, whereas the 
tendency to maximize EV increased linearly with age. These findings lend weight to 
the  suggestion  that  risk-taking  in  adolescence  cannot  solely  be  explained  by  an 
inability to gauge the most advantageous course of action, for if this were the case 
then children would take more risks than adolescents in the current task. Results 
from the current study are compatible with the notion, which has been suggested 
elsewhere (Casey et al. 2008, Steinberg 2008), that adolescent risk-taking arises due 
to  an  interaction  between  two  separate  developmental  processes:  a  gradual 
improvement in outcome judgment, and perhaps cognitive control-related abilities 
(here contributing to improvements in the ability to maximize EV), superimposed 
upon a non-linear trajectory of sensation-seeking and other socio-emotional factors. 
In the current study, it was found that the increase in risk-taking coincided with an 
increased  strength  of  counterfactual  emotions  (in  particular,  relief).  However, 
individual emotion scores did not strongly predict risk-taking. This may reflect a 
lack of power in the current study, or alternatively, either some other measure of 
emotional responding, or a cognitive variable (cf. Galvan et al. 2007) may be a more 
proximal predictor of individual risk-taking. Future studies could usefully test the 
relationship between risk-taking and the emotional response to a ‘lucky escape’. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This study was conducted to investigate the development between late childhood 
(age 9) and adulthood (age 35) of decision-making under risk, and of the emotional 
response to the outcomes of decisions. Results show that the ability to maximize EV 
in order to win points increases linearly with age. In contrast, risk-seeking showed 
an  inverted  U-shaped  developmental  trajectory.  The  peak  age  for  making  risky 
decisions  was  14.38  years.  This  is  one  of  the  first  empirical  studies  to  provide 
evidence  for  a  peak  in  risky  decisions  during  mid-adolescence,  and  the  distinct 
developmental  trajectories  for  EV-maximising  versus  risk-taking  suggest  that 
adolescents  did  not  make  risky  decisions  simply  because  they  were  unable  to 
estimate the consequences of their decisions.  
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In addition, young adolescents (age 12-15) showed an enhanced emotional response 
to  counterfactual  outcomes  (in  particular,  relief  or  a  ‘lucky  escape’)  relative  to 
children (age 9-11), although they did not differ from mid-adolescents (age 15-18) 
or adults (age 25-35) on this measure. Further studies should investigate whether 
child  and  adolescent  relief  responses  predict  risky  choices,  and  should  establish 
more  generally  which  social-emotional  and  cognitive  factors  most  strongly 
contribute to adolescent risk-taking.  
 
Finally, the current study included only male participants, as we wished to reduce 
variance attributable to developmental sex differences in traits such as sensation-
seeking, which might influence risk preferences, and in light of evidence for higher 
risk-seeking in males than in females. While a previous version of this task produced 
no sex differences in adults (Bault et al., 2008), it remains possible that there might 
be developmental sex differences. Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate 
whether the developmental trajectories of risk  taking and  counterfactual  emotion 
found here in males are also seen in females.  
 
2.5.1 The next chapter 
In Chapter 3, a study is described that was carried out to investigate in more detail 
the  influence  of  socio-emotional  factors  on  adolescent  decision-making.  In  this 
study, adult and adolescent participants completed a task in which paired happy and 
angry face stimuli were associated with differing probabilities of reward. Behaviour 
was analysed computationally, which enabled investigation of the mechanism by 
which  social-emotional  factors  influence  decision-making  across  age.  The 
computational approach was also used to investigate age group differences in the 
ability to integrate positive and negative performance feedback (wins and losses), in 
order to perform optimally on the task.    82 
Chapter 3 
 
Development of the integration of social and 
utilitarian factors in a probabilistic decision-making 
task 
 
Adolescence  is  characterized  by  continuing  development  in  aspects  of  decision-
making. In particular, adolescence is thought to be characterized by a tendency for 
emotional  and  social  factors  (e.g.  reward  feedback,  presence  of  peers)  to  cause 
‘risky’ or irrational decisions, and  in Chapter 2  a study  was  descried  in which 
adolescents showed a tendency to make risky decisions in an emotional gambling 
task. Across age, there was a linear improvement in the ability to take into account 
probability  and  reward  information,  in  order  to  maximize  expected  value.  The 
current chapter describes a study that was carried out to extend this developmental 
picture.  Adolescent  and  adult  participants  completed  a  probabilistic  decision-
making task in which rewards were associated with happy and angry face stimuli. 
The results showed that decisions of both age groups were influenced both by the 
utilitarian feedback (wins and losses), and by reward-irrelevant social-emotional 
cues (happy and angry faces). There were age group differences in performance 
such  that  adults  outperformed  adolescents,  and  a  computational  analysis  of 
adolescent  and  adult  behaviour  suggests  that  this  difference  was  due  to 
developmental  asymmetry  in  the  response  to  positive  and  negative  performance 
feedback.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
3.1.1 Developmental studies of decision-making  
The  development  of  decision-making  during  adolescence  has  previously  been 
studied  using  a  number  of  laboratory-based  decision-making  tasks  (see   83 
Introduction, 1.6.2). Often in these tasks, participants must take into account the 
rewards and reward probabilities associated with a selection of choices, and then 
make  a choice so as to  maximize their  total rewards.  For example, in the  Iowa 
Gambling Task (IGT; Overman et al., 2004; Crone & van der Molen, 2004; Hooper 
et al., 2004; Huizinga et al., 2007), participants repeatedly select cards from an array 
of  four  decks  with  unknown  reward  distributions.  Two  of  the  decks  yield  low-
magnitude, constant rewards and modest probabilistic losses, resulting in net gain 
across the task. The remaining two decks yield high-magnitude, constant rewards 
but substantial probabilistic losses, resulting in a net loss. Several studies using the 
IGT have shown that the ability to adopt an advantageous decision strategy that 
takes into account both the magnitude and probability of wins and losses continues 
to develop during adolescence (between 11 and 18+ years: Overman et al., 2004; 
Crone & van der Molen, 2004; Hooper et al., 2004; although see van Leijenhorst et 
al., 2008).  
 
In a task devised by Harbaugh et al. (2002), participants make a series of decisions 
between a certain reward, and a gamble with equivalent expected value (EV: the 
sum of potential outcomes weighted by their respective probabilities). Unlike in the 
IGT, in this task participants are explicitly informed about the reward probabilities 
associated with each decision. When participants aged between five and 64 years 
completed the task, children and adolescents showed evidence of biased decisions 
relative to adults, that is, children and adolescents failed to show indifferent choices 
between the two options with equivalent EV. A similar study by Levin et al. (2007), 
in  which  children  (aged  5-11)  and  adults  made  a  choice  between  gambles  that 
differed  in  EV  also  showed  age-related  increases  in  rational,  or  EV-maximising 
decisions.  
 
Several  suggestions  have  been  put  forward  to  account  for  the  age-related 
improvements in decision-making tasks including these. One suggestion is that, with 
age,  adolescents  become  more  proficient  at  taking  into  account  performance 
feedback,  i.e.  information  regarding  wins/losses  from  a  given  trial,  in  order  to 
maintain or modify subsequent behaviour (Byrnes et al., 1999; Crone & van der 
Molen, 2004). An observation from studies that have used rule switching tasks, such 
as the Wisconsin Card Sort Task (WCST), is that there is an improvement between 
childhood (age 8-9), adolescence (age 11–18) and young adulthood (age 18-25) in   84 
the  ability  to  take  into  account  performance  feedback.  At  all  ages,  individuals 
perform  better  in  response  to  positive  vs.  negative  feedback  (i.e.  instructions  to 
maintain vs. switch strategy). Furthermore, the degree of asymmetry in the response 
to positive vs. negative feedback is greater at younger ages (Crone et al., 2004, 2008; 
Huizinga  et  al.,  2006;  van  Duijenvoorde  et  al.,  2008).  Therefore,  the  ability  to 
respond  to  positive  and  negative  performance  feedback  in  a  rule-switching  task 
continues to develop between childhood and adulthood. However, whether a similar 
developmental asymmetry in the response to performance feedback is elicited during 
probabilistic  decision-making  tasks  such  as  the  IGT,  or  whether  this  finding  is 
specific to rule switching tasks, is not known. In the current chapter, age group 
differences  in  the  response  to  positive  and  negative  feedback  in  a  simple 
probabilistic decision-making task were analysed using a computational modeling 
approach. 
 
3.1.2 Developmental changes in strategy 
Another explanation that has been put forward to explain age-related improvements 
in  performance  on  decision-making  tasks  is  that  the  use  of  behavioural  rules  or 
strategies  shifts  with  age.  By  analysing  IGT  performance  using  a  multivariate 
technique, Huizinga et al. (2007) demonstrated that pre-adolescents (aged 6-9 years) 
behave in a way that is consistent with sensitivity to the frequency of loss and an 
insensitivity to loss magnitude, while up to and during adolescence (10-15 years), 
participants were increasingly likely to take into account both the frequency and 
magnitude of losses. Between mid-adolescence (13-15 years) and young adulthood 
(18-25 years), there were further improvements in strategy, as seen by an increase in 
the tendency to take into account both sources of information, as well as increasingly 
unbiased choosing between the two equally beneficial decks (participants did not 
persist  in  choosing  from  their  ‘favourite’  deck).  These  results  suggest  that 
developmentally  immature  decision-making  may  be  characterized  by  simplistic 
strategies comprising a particular set of biases, and focus on a subset of stimulus 
attributes. This suggestion was investigated in the current study. 
 
3.1.3 Influence of social and emotional cues 
Across age, a particular source of bias in the decision-making process arises from 
social and emotional cues. It has been shown that adults drink more of a beverage 
when it has been subliminally paired with a smiling face (Winkielman et al., 2005).   85 
Adults  are  also  reported  to  be  more  likely  to  co-operate  in  economic  exchange 
games with a partner who is smiling or attractive (Scharlemann et al., 2001; Wilson 
& Eckel, 2006).  
 
Recently, a novel probabilistic Face Decision Task paradigm in which participant 
behaviour is modelled computationally, was used to investigate the nature of social 
influences on decision-making and to characterise how social cues are integrated 
with utilitarian information to perform the task (Averbeck & Duchaine, 2009). This 
study showed that adult participants show a bias to select stimuli that depict happy 
vs. angry faces. Bayesian modeling of the data showed evidence that this social bias 
acted on behaviour via two distinct mechanisms: (1) a prior expectation that happy 
faces will be rewarded (‘prior bias’), (2) faster learning to associate happy faces with 
reward than  with non-reward, and vice versa for angry faces (‘likelihood bias’). 
 
There  is  evidence  that  adolescent  decisions  are  also  influenced  by  social  and 
emotional cues. Two studies to date have shown a heightened effect of social and 
emotional  cues  on  adolescent  decision-making  (e.g.  Gardner  &  Steinberg,  2005; 
Steinberg, 2008). For example, in Gardner & Steinberg (2005)’s car driving game, 
adolescent (age 13-16) decisions to apply the brakes in response to a stop cue were 
modulated by the social presence of peers, whereas this was not the case in adults 
(age 24+). In a different study, an increase in reaction times to associate faces with 
emotional words was shown around puberty onset (age 11-12), relative to both pre-
puberty  (age  10-11)  and  late  adolescence/adulthood  (age  16+;  McGivern  et  al., 
2002).  This  effect  was  attributed  to  a  greater  interference  by  emotion  on  the 
decision-making process in early adolescence.  
 
It is unknown whether adolescent decisions in simple decision-making tasks show 
influence of bias by social and emotional cues. Therefore, in the current study, the 
Face Decision Task from Averbeck and Duchaine (2009) was adopted to investigate 
social-emotional influences on adolescent decision-making. 
 
3.1.4 The Face Decision Task 
In the current study, groups of adults and adolescents were tested using the Face 
Decision  Task  (Averbeck  &  Duchaine,  2009;  see  Figure  3.1).  In  this  task, 
participants made a series of selections between paired happy and angry face stimuli,   86 
which were associated with differing probabilities of reward. A decision to choose 
one stimulus over the other either resulted in a win (fictitious gain of 10 p) or a loss 
(fictitious gain of 0 p), and participants were instructed to win as much as possible.  
 
Rewards  were  stochastically  associated  with  each  stimulus,  and  the  reward 
probabilities  of  the  two  stimuli  were  constant  across  trials  but  are  not  highly 
dissimilar (0.6, 0.4). Therefore, it was not obvious to participants which stimulus 
should be selected on each trial. Reward feedback was stochastic, in the sense that 
choosing the more highly rewarded face (the face for which p[win] = 0.6) did not 
result in a win on every trial. Therefore, participants had to keep track of the history 
of  positive  and  negative  feedback  across  trials  and  integrate  this  to  gain  a  best 
estimate of the more highly rewarded stimulus.  
 
Patterns of decision-making in the task were analysed computationally, in order to 
model the effects on behaviour of a biased preference for happy over angry face 
stimuli,  and  to  model  separately  the  contribution  of  negative  and  positive 
performance feedback (wins and losses) to behaviour. This enabled a quantitative 
assessment of the extent to which distinct behavioural tendencies were responsible 
for any age-related improvements in performance on the task.  
 
 
3.1.4.1 Ideal and ecological observer models 
Behaviour in the task was analysed computationally. First, a model of the ‘ideal 
observer’ was created, and participant decisions were referenced to the ‘decisions’ of 
this model. The ideal observer model did not have access to the underlying reward 
probabilities of the two faces, but optimally integrated outcomes over all the trials 
that had elapsed at a given point in the experiment to gain a best estimate of the most 
highly rewarded face. This enabled quantification of the extent to which adult and 
adolescent  participants  acted  like  the  ideal  observer,  optimally  integrating 
performance feedback to make the best choice on a  given trial. In line with the 
developmental decision-making literature, which has shown deficits in adolescent 
relative to adult decision-making (Overman et al., 2004; Crone & van der Molen, 
2004; Hooper et al., 2004; Huizinga et al., 2007; Harbaugh et al., 2002; for review, 
see Boyer et al., 2006), it was predicted that the behaviour of adolescents would   87 
deviate from that of the ideal observer to a greater extent than would the behaviour 
of adults.  
 
After fitting the ideal observer model, parameters were added to the model that each 
encapsulated  a  distinct  behavioural  tendency  that  participants  were  expected  to 
exhibit, and which might contribute to the observed deviations from ideal behaviour. 
These parameters encapsulated responsiveness to negative and positive performance 
feedback, and a biased social preference for one face stimulus (happy) over the other 
(angry). The parameters were fit to each participant’s dataset, and then collated and 
statistically tested across groups to assess significant effects on behaviour. In line 
with findings from rule-switch tasks (Crone et al., 2004, 2008; Huizinga et al., 2006; 
van Duijenvoorde et al., 2008), differential effects on behaviour in the Face Decision 
Task of the positive and negative feedback parameters were predicted. In addition, it 
was predicted that the previously-reported effect of a prior bias to select the happy 
face,  as  well  as  an  over-weighting  of  positive  outcomes  (wins)  associated  with 
happy vs. angry faces, would be elicited in adults (Averbeck & Duchaine, 2009). It 
was predicted that this finding would be extended to adolescents.  
 
Finally, the behavioural influence of each parameter was compared between adult 
and adolescent groups. It was predicted that in general, adult participants would take 
into  account  performance  feedback  to  a  greater  extent  than  would  adolescents 
(Byrnes et al., 1999; Overman et al., 2004; Crone & van der Molen, 2004; Hooper et 
al., 2004; Crone et al., 2004, 2008; van Duijenvoorde et al., 2008). In addition, it 
was predicted that a differential response to positive and negative feedback across 
age (Crone et al., 2004, 2008; van Duijenvoorde et al., 2008) might contribute to this 
tendency, such that adolescents would exhibit greater bias relative to adults in their 
treatment of positive and negative performance feedback. 
  
3.2 Methods 
 
3.2.1 Participants 
Twenty-two  adolescent  participants  (12  female;  age  range  =  12.83-13.75  years; 
mean  (s.d.)  age  =  13.28  (0.31)  years)  were  recruited  from  a  comprehensive 
secondary  school  in  Greater  London.  Fourteen  adult  participants  (9  female;  age 
range = 21.33-43.0 years; mean (s.d.) age = 30.46 (5.59) years) were recruited from   88 
the local community, including the UCL Psychology Department volunteer database 
and an email distributed to all employees of Camden council.  
 
Participants had no history of psychiatric or neurological disorder, and none had 
received  a  diagnosis  of  attention-deficit/hyperactivity  disorder,  autism  or 
dyscalculia.  
 
Participants’ general ability was assessed by administering the 2-subtest form of the 
Wechsler  Abbreviated  Scale  of  Intelligence  (WASI;  Harcourt,  1999),  after 
completion of the experimental task. Adult and adolescent groups did not differ in 
WASI  score  (adult:  mean  (s.d.)  WASI  score  =  104.2  (6.47);  range  =  89-112; 
adolescent: mean (s.d.) WASI score = 102.3 (5.29); range = 90-114; independent 
samples t-test: t34 = 0.96, p = 0.343).  
 
Information  was  obtained  regarding  the  educational  background  of  adult 
participants,  and  the  projected  educational  background  of  adolescent  participants 
based on the educational destinations of the previous year’s cohort of school leavers. 
This was used to calculate the percentage of each age group for whom the highest 
obtained  qualification  was  GCSE  (0%  adults  and  6%  adolescents),  post-16 
vocational qualifications such as NVQ (14% adults and 21% adolescents), A-level or 
equivalent (43% adults and 73% adolescents) or a university degree (43% adults; 
data not available for adolescents). Adult and adolescent groups were satisfactorily-
matched  for  educational  background:  Although  a  greater  proportion  of  the 
adolescent  group  is  expected  to  obtain  A-levels,  this  increase  is  in  line  with 
demographic trends (Data Service, 2009). 
 
Prior to the study, written informed consent was obtained from adult participants, 
and from a parent or guardian of adolescent participants. The study was approved by 
the  local  Ethics  Committee.  Adult  participants  received  a  modest  financial 
compensation for their time. As advised by the school, adolescent participants were 
not paid. 
 
3.2.2 Procedure 
Participants performed the Face Decision Task, which is a two-alternative forced-
choice  decision-making  task,  on  a  laptop  computer  (Figure  3.1;  Averbeck  &   89 
Duchaine, 2009). Each participant completed four blocks of the task, consisting of 
26 trials per block. On each trial, the participant made a choice between two faces 
presented  side  by  side  on  the  screen.  One  of  the  faces  always  had  a  happy 
expression, and the other face always had an angry expression, and the happy and 
angry faces appeared pseudo-randomly on the left or right of the screen.  
 
When the participant had selected one of the faces, they were told either that they 
had won (a fictitious gain of 10 pence) or that they had lost (a fictitious a gain of 0 
pence). The game was arranged such that within a given block, one of the faces 
(either happy or angry) won 40% of the time, while the other won 60% of the time. 
Participants were instructed that within a block, both faces would win some of the 
time, but that one face would win more often than the other. Participants were told to 
try and pick the face that won more.  
 
Participants  were  instructed  that  the  winning  face  could  change  between  blocks. 
Across the entire experiment, the happy face had a higher probability of winning on 
two out of four blocks, as did the angry face; participants were not informed of this. 
The  order  of  presentation  of  happy-win  and  angry-win  blocks  was  randomized 
across participants within each age group. Both the happy and the angry face had the 
same  identity  within  a  block.  Two  male  facial  identities  were  used  across  the 
experiment: identity A was used for two out of the four blocks (one happy-win and 
one angry-win) and identity B was used in the other two blocks (one happy-win and 
one angry-win). Facial identity alternated between blocks.  
 
The task was self-paced: participants were given an unconstrained duration to make 
a key press response on each trial, and the faces remained on the screen until a 
response was made. After a response had been made, the chosen face was presented 
at the centre of the screen along with text indicating whether the participant had won 
(10 p) or not won (0 p) that trial. A 5 kHz tone accompanied a win, and a 2.5 kHz 
tone accompanied a no-win (loss).   90 
Figure 3.1 The Face Decision Task. On each trial, a happy face and an angry face were presented on 
the screen. Participants were instructed that they could win (10 p) or lose (0 p) by choosing one or 
other of the faces, and that within a block, both faces would win some of the time, but one face would 
win more often than the other. Participants were instructed to try and pick the face that won more. 
Within a given block, one of the faces (either happy or angry) won 40% of the time while the other 
won 60% of the time.  
 
 
All  participants  were  tested  individually.  Adult  participants  completed  the 
experimental session in a quiet room at their home or place of work, or in a testing 
room at the laboratory. Adolescent participants completed the experimental session 
in a quiet room in school. Prior to completing the experimental task, participants 
completed  a one-block  practice task  in which the  stimuli were pictures of  fruits 
rather than faces, and in order to facilitate participant familiarisation with the task, 
the practice task was easier than the experimental task: Each stimulus won 30% or 
70% of the time. The total duration of the test session (Face Decision Task and 
WASI) was approximately 30 minutes per participant, depending on response times. 
 
3.2.3 Data analysis 
Data analysis was carried out using Matlab and SPSS. Analyses were based on those 
described in detail in Averbeck and Duchaine (2009). Specifically, because actual 
outcomes (a win of 10p or 0p) in the experiment were stochastic, it was possible for 
the face with a lower probability of winning in an individual block (40%) actually to   91 
be rewarded more often, especially over a short run of trials. Therefore in the first 
series  of  analyses,  participant  decisions  were  referenced  to  those  of  an  ‘ideal 
observer,’ which optimally integrated outcomes across trials. In the second series of 
analyses, parameters representing hypothesized behavioural tendencies were added 
to the ideal observer model, resulting in an ‘ecological observer model,’ which more 
closely emulated participant behaviour. 
 
3.2.3.1 Ideal observer model 
Since the outcome in each trial of the Face Decision Task was either a win or a loss, 
the ideal observer was based upon a binomial model. The likelihood that the rewards 
were being generated probabilistically by an underlying probability θi was given by: 
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Here, D is the observed series of outcomes, θi is the probability that face i (happy or 
angry) is rewarded, ri is the number of times face i was rewarded, and Ni is the 
number  of  times  face  i  was  selected.  This  equation  therefore  provides  the 
distributions over reward probabilities for each face. Specifically, as participants did 
not know the underlying probabilities, they would infer a distribution of possible 
probabilities, given the reward outcomes. For example, if one observed 7 heads in 10 
coin tosses, it would be possible that the coin was fair (i.e. p = 0.5), but it would also 
be possible that the coin was unfair and had a probability of heads equal to 0.7. 
Equation 3.1 would give the complete distribution over the probabilities for some 
set of outcomes. 
 
To make a decision, participants had to decide which face would win more often. 
This decision step was operationalised by assuming that participants would compute 
the probability that face i was more often rewarded than face j.  This was given by: 
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The integral is over the posterior.  For the ideal observer the prior was flat and, as 
such, the posterior is  simply  the normalized likelihood.   As  a  decision rule,  this 
probability was thresholded at chance. This gives the ‘ideal choice’ ( f ˆ ).   92 
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For the analyses that compared the decision of the participant to the ‘choice’ of the 
ideal  observer,  the  case  of 5 . 0 ) ( = > j i p θ θ was  handled  by  incrementing  both  the 
happy and the angry choice of the ideal observer by 0.5. The extent to which adult 
and adolescent groups showed evidence of selecting the correct face as determined 
by  the  ideal  observer  was  assessed  by  first  accumulating  contingency  tables 
comparing the actual choices of adult and adolescent participants to those predicted 
by the ideal observer on a trial by trial basis, then by conducting one-sample t-tests 
on  the  percentage  correct  selections  with  reference  to  the  ideal  observer  (test 
criterion:  50%,  i.e.  at-chance  agreement  with  the  ideal  observer  model).  An 
independent samples t-test was used to investigate whether there was an age group 
difference  in  percentage  correct  choices.  It  was  expected  that  adults  would 
outperform adolescents on the task (Harbaugh et al., 2002; Overman et al., 2004; 
Crone & van der Molen, 2004; Hooper et al., 2004). 
 
3.2.3.2 Ecological observer model 
The ideal observer gives equal weight to negative and positive feedback, and ignores 
the emotional expressions displayed in the stimuli. Human participants, however, 
may be differentially influenced by the valence of the feedback (Crone et al., 2008; 
van  Duijenvoorde  et  al.,  2008),  and  may  be  influenced  by  the  socio-emotional 
content of the stimuli (Averbeck & Duchaine, 2009). Therefore, extra parameters 
were added to the ideal observer model to account for these potential biases, and this 
new ‘biased’ model was named the ‘ecological observer’. This model contained four 
extra parameters which modelled (1) the impact of positive performance feedback on 
choice (see Equation 3.4, parameter a), (2) the impact of negative performance 
feedback on choice (see Equation 3.5, parameter b), (3) differential weighting of 
feedback based upon the emotional content of the face that was chosen (likelihood, 
or ‘evidence bias’; see Equations 3.4 and 3.5, parameter c) and (4) and a prior bias 
towards one of the faces (see Equation 3.7, 3.8, parameter d)..  
 
For  rewarded  trials  (positive  performance  feedback),  the  reward  value  in  the 
ecological observer was calculated as:   93 
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Whereas for unrewarded trials (negative performance feedback) it was calculated as: 
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The variables a, b, and c were fit as free parameters in the model.  The superscript e 
indicates  the  reward  calculated  under  the  ecological  model.    The  parameter  a 
measures the amount that positive rewards are weighted.  For the ideal observer, 
positive rewards are valued at 1, so a = 0.5.  The parameter b measures the amount 
that negative feedback is weighted.  For the ideal observer, negative feedback is 
valued at 0, so again b = 0.5 for the ideal observer model.  Therefore, values of a and 
b below (above) 0.5 measure the amount that feedback is under (over) weighted, and 
values of a and b near zero indicate that positive or negative feedback are ignored.  
The  variable  c  controls  the  bias  introduced  by  the  expression.    If  c  is  positive, 
positive feedback is given increased weight for the happy face and decreased weight 
for the angry face, and negative feedback is given decreased weight for the happy 
face and increased weight for the angry face.  Therefore, positive values of c indicate 
that the participant is more willing to pick the happy face than would be expected 
based on the feedback alone. 
 
The  total  reward  in  the  block  under  the  ecological  observer  for  face  i  was  then 
calculated as: 
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Thus, the total reward for each face, up to trial T in the current block was the sum of 
the biased reward values. 
 
The prior bias was modeled using a Beta distribution to model the prior disposition 
towards each face as:   94 
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To get a good model fit, αi and βi were constrained by reducing them to one degree 
of freedom.  This was done by estimating a single parameter, d, and then computing 
αi and βi as: 
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Nprior was set to 4.  Allowing it to float freely resulted in unrealistic values for d (i.e. 
values which were outside +/- 0.5), and a Hessian that was not invertible, which 
indicated that the optimization algorithm was not finding the maximum likelihood 
estimates.  Effectively, Nprior and d were correlated in the model, so one of these was 
fixed to eliminate this problem. The specific value of Nprior had minimal effect on the 
likelihood of the model. 
 
The parameters of the model were fit to individual participants by maximizing the 
likelihood of the parameters, given the data.  Thus, the following was calculated 
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And then the belief estimate under the ecological observer was calculated using 
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There were no prior distributions placed over the parameters, in order for these terms 
to be completely data driven.  The ideal observer can be recovered by setting a and b 
to 0.5, c to 0 and assuming a flat prior on θi, which could be achieved by setting 
Nprior to 0.  Next, the likelihood of predicting the individual participant’s sequence of   95 
decisions was maximized by adjusting the parameters a, b, c and d.  The likelihood 
was given by: 
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Where  0 = l  if the participant selected face i (e.g. the happy face) and  1 = l  if the 
participant selected face j (e.g. the angry face).  Here, D* is the series of decisions of 
the participant, as opposed to the series of outcomes, which is collected in D in the 
previous equations.  The likelihood was maximized using fminsearch in Matlab. The 
initial  starting  point  for  all  parameters  was  generally  zero,  to  minimize  the 
probability of finding false positives when significance testing was carried out.   
 
Initially, all four parameters (positive feedback, negative feedback, evidence bias, 
prior bias) were fit to the data. However, the evidence bias was not significant in 
either age group (one sample t-test (test criterion = 0): adult: t13 = 0.99, p = 0.342; 
adolescent:  t21  =  0.302,  p  =  0.765),  so  a  reduced  model  containing  the  three 
remaining parameters was subsequently fit. One-sample t-tests were used to assess 
significance within each age group of each of the three parameters, using a threshold 
for significance at p < 0.05.  
 
3.2.3.3 Group differences in ecological observer model parameters 
Of interest in the current study was the extent to which adolescent decisions in the 
Face Decision Task differed from those of adults, and what were the mechanisms 
underlying  these  differences.  Therefore,  age  group  differences  in  the  three 
parameters of the final ecological observer model were assessed using independent-
samples t-tests with a significance threshold of p < 0.05
6. 
 
3.2.3.4 Gender differences 
Finally, gender differences were investigated by conducting independent-samples t-
tests  with  Bonferroni  correction  on  all  parameters  of  interest  between  male  and 
female participants, irrespective of age group. 
 
                                                  
6 Note that it was not valid to assess the parameters within a single mixed design 
ANOVA, as they do not take values along a common scale.   96 
Statistical thresholds were set at p < 0.05, two-tailed unless otherwise specified. 
 
3.3 Results 
 
3.3.1 Performance referenced to the ideal observer model 
Participant decisions were initially referenced to those of a fictitious ideal observer 
who optimally integrated outcomes across trials. Contingency tables were created 
comparing the actual choices of adult and adolescent participants to those predicted 
by the ideal observer, on a trial by trial basis (Table 3.1). Results show that both age 
groups selected the correct face as determined by the ideal observer significantly 
above chance (adult group: 63.5%, t-test on percentage correct (test criterion 50%): 
t13  =  3.76,  p  <  0.05;  adolescent  group:  57.9%,  t-test  on  percentage  correct  (test 
criterion 50%): t21 = 5.92, p < 0.05). As predicted, there was a significant difference 
between age groups in the percentage correct choices, with adults selecting a higher 
percentage  of  correct  choices  with  reference  to  the  ideal  observer  model 
(independent samples t-test: t34 = 1.70, p < 0.05, one-tailed)
7.  
  
                                                  
7 Note that this difference between groups is not due to slower learning of the task 
in adolescents relative to adults, as the pattern of percentage correct across blocks 
was similar between age groups. See Appendix 3.1 for graph.   97 
Table 3.1 Contingency table showing the choices made by the adult (left) and adolescent (right) 
age groups, referenced to the choices of the ideal observer. The top left cell in each age group 
table  shows  the  number  of  trials  on  which  participants  picked  the  angry  face  when  the  model 
evidence indicated that the angry face was correct, from which we ascertain p(a,a); top right shows 
the number of trials on which participants picked the angry face when the model evidence indicated 
that the happy face was correct, from which we ascertain p(a,h); and so on for the bottom left and 
right cells. These probabilities were used to calculate, using Bayes’ rule, the conditional probabilities 
that participants picked the ‘wrong’ face as determined by the ideal observer model, e.g. p(h|a) = 
p(a,h)/p(a). Note that in cases where the ideal observer model had accumulated equal evidence for 
angry and happy (a tie), a value of 0.5 was added to each cell. 
  Ideal observer  
choice 
  Ideal observer  
choice 
  Angry  Happy    Angry  Happy 
Angry  431  248  Angry 
 
580.5  444.5 
 
Participant 
choice: 
Adult  
(N=14) 
Happy 
 
284.5  492.5 
 
Participant 
choice: 
Adolescent 
(N = 22) 
Happy  519.5  743.5 
 
 
In a previous study using the Face Decision Task, it was shown that although typical 
adults  were  able  to  choose  the  correct  face  as  determined  by  the  ideal  observer 
significantly above chance, they also exhibited deviations from ideal behaviour. A 
specific deviation in behaviour shown by adult participants was that they were more 
likely to select the happy face when the ideal observer selected the angry face, than 
they were to select the angry face when the ideal observer selected the happy face 
(that is, p(h|a) > p(a|h); Averbeck & Duchaine, 2009). The current study replicated 
this finding in adults, and extended it to a sample of adolescents: A comparison 
between  the  probability  that participants  chose the happy face  when  they should 
have chosen the angry face (adult mean p(h|a) = 0. 419; adolescent mean p(h|a) = 
0.483) and the probability that participants chose the angry face when they should 
have chosen the happy face (adult mean p(a|h) = 0.320; adolescent mean p(a|h) = 
0.380) was significant for each age group (paired t-tests, adult: t13 =6.22, p < 0.05; 
adolescent:  t21  =  3.21,  p  <  0.05).  There  was  no  group  difference  in  mean  bias 
(independent samples t-test: t34 = 0.104, p = 0.918).   
 
These results indicate that both age groups showed a bias towards the happy face, 
such that they picked it more often than they should have, given the feedback about   98 
rewards  captured  by  the  ideal  observer  as  the  evidence  in  favor  of  one  face  or 
another. Figure 3.2 illustrates this information, showing the fraction of times the 
adult (broken line) and adolescent (solid line) groups picked the happy vs. angry 
face (y-axis), as a function of the evidence given by the ideal observer in favor of the 
happy vs. angry face (x-axis). The choice function of both age groups intersects the 
line y = 0.5 at an x-value of less than 0.5, indicating that both age groups show a bias 
towards choosing the happy face.  
 
Figure 3.2 Graph depicting the probabilities that the adult (broken line) and adolescent (solid 
line) participants picked the happy vs. angry face (y-axis) as a function of the evidence given by 
the ideal observer in favour of each face (x-axis). The choice function of both age groups intersects 
the line y = 0.5 at an x-value of less than 0.5, indicating that both age groups show a bias towards 
choosing the happy face. 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2 Ecological observer model of behaviour 
The next analysis was carried out to test hypotheses regarding the nature and extent 
of specific deviations from ideal behaviour. In other words, this additional analysis 
was carried out to investigate the mechanisms that contributed to the (suboptimal) 
choices made by each group. This analysis was carried out via the following steps:    99 
 
For each participant dataset, an ecological observer model was fit that consisted of 
the ideal observer model plus parameters representing hypothesized influences on 
behaviour.  These  comprised  (1)  the  impact  of  positive  performance  feedback  on 
choice (see Equation 3.4, parameter a), (2) the impact of negative performance 
feedback  on  choice  (Equation  3.5,  parameter  b),  (3)  differential  weighting  of 
feedback based upon the emotional content of the face that was chosen (Equations 
3.4  and  3.5, parameter  c:  subsequently  dropped  from  the  analysis  due  to  non-
significant effects in both groups; see Methods, 3.2) and (4) a prior bias to select 
one of the faces (Equation 3.7, 3.8, parameter d). After extracting the value of 
each parameter for each participant, significance testing was conducted to evaluate 
the effect of each parameter on the behaviour of adolescent and adult groups. 
  
Results showed a significant impact of negative feedback on  choice, in both the 
adult  and  the  adolescent  groups  (1-sample  t-test:  adult:  t13  =  3.05,  p  <  0.05; 
adolescent: t21 = 2.99, p < 0.05; see Figure 3.3). There was no group difference in 
the  impact  of  this  variable  (t34  =  1.50,  p  =  0.144).  Therefore,  both  adults  and 
adolescents were less likely to select a face once it had been associated with a non-
reward, and there was no groups difference in the extent of this tendency.  
 
However, the impact of positive feedback on choice differed between age groups. 
The adult group was more sensitive to positive feedback than was the adolescent 
group  (t34  =  2.23,  p  <  0.05;  see  Figure  3.3);  that  is,  the  adult  group  showed  a 
stronger tendency than did the adolescent group to select a face once it had been 
associated with a reward. One-sample t-tests showed that the adult group showed a 
marginally significant sensitivity to positive feedback, but the adolescent group was 
insensitive to positive feedback (adult: mean (s.d.) = .378 (.682); t13 = 2.07, p = 
0.059; adolescent: mean = .028 (.229); t21 = 0.57, p = 0.577).  
 
Contingency table 3.1 indicates that participant choice was biased by the emotion 
shown  in  the  face  stimuli.  Therefore,  ecological  observer  model  parameters 
encapsulating the effects of facial emotion on choice were evaluated. This indicated 
that the adolescent group showed a prior bias to select the happy over the angry face 
(t21 = 3.42, p < 0.05), whereas the adult group did not (t13 = 1.50, p = 0.158). There 
was no group difference in the strength of the prior bias parameter (t34 = 1.21, p =   100 
0.236; see Figure 3.3), and as indicated in Methods section 3.2.3.2, there were no 
likelihood bias effects. These results indicate that the pattern of behaviour shown in 
Table 3.1, whereby adolescents are more likely to select a happy face when the ideal 
observer selects the angry than vice versa, arises in part due to a prior belief that 
happy  faces  will  be  rewarded  and  angry  faces  will  not  be  rewarded.  This  result 
extends findings from a previous study in adults using the Face Decision Task to a 
group of adolescent participants (Averbeck & Duchaine, 2009). The current study 
did not replicate the previous finding that adults show a prior bias to select the happy 
face (Averbeck & Duchaine, 2009). This issue will be addressed in the Discussion. 
 
3.3.3 Gender differences 
There  was  no  evidence  of  gender  differences  in  parameters  of  the  ecological 
observer model. 
   101 
Figure 3.3 Parameters of the ecological observer model in adults (dark bars) and in adolescents 
(pale bars). A parameter that is significantly different from zero can be said to influence participant 
behaviour. The top left graph shows the impact on decision-making behaviour of a prior bias to select 
the happy face. Adult behaviour results from a tendency to select a face which has previously been 
rewarded (top right graph), and a tendency to avoid a face that has previously been unrewarded 
(bottom left graph). Adolescent behaviour results from a biased expectation that happy faces will be 
rewarded  (top  left  graph),  and  a  tendency  to  avoid  faces  that  have  previously  been  unrewarded 
(bottom left graph). Adolescents are significantly less likely than are adults to persist in choosing a 
face that has resulted in a probabilistic win. 
 
 
3.4 Discussion 
 
The current study investigated adult and adolescent decision-making using a novel 
probabilistic  decision-making  paradigm  in  which  rewards  were  associated  with 
paired happy and angry faces. Decisions were analysed computationally. The results 
show that both adult and adolescent decisions showed evidence of bias by social 
cues, such that decisions were best described as a composite of both social (facial 
emotion)  and  utilitarian  (win/loss  feedback)  factors.  In  adolescents,  there  was   102 
evidence that this social bias arose due to a prior expectation that happy faces would 
be rewarded, but the model failed to capture the mechanism of social bias in adults. 
However, adults outperformed adolescents in the task, and the results suggest that 
this is because the adolescents showed a relative and absolute lack of sensitivity to 
probabilistic wins. In the following discussion, it is suggested that the adolescent 
pattern of behaviour is consistent with a simple strategy of switching choices after 
incurring a loss.  
 
3.4.1 Performance referenced to the ideal observer model 
Participant  decisions  were  referenced  to  those  of  a  fictitious  ideal  observer  who 
optimally integrated outcomes across trials, in order to gain a best estimate of the 
most highly rewarded (or ‘correct’) stimulus. The results of this referencing to the 
ideal observer showed that both adult and adolescent participants picked the correct 
stimulus at a rate significantly above chance. Therefore to an extent, both age groups 
were able to take into account utilitarian feedback information in order to choose the 
more highly rewarded face.  
 
Although participants selected the correct face stimulus significantly above chance 
levels, the percentage of correct selections was not particularly high: adults selected 
the correct face stimulus on 63.5% of trials, and adolescents selected the correct face 
stimulus  on  57.9%  of  trials.  These  figures  are  comparable  to  that  reported  in  a 
previous study with adults using the Face Decision Task (66% correct; Averbeck & 
Duchaine,  2009),  and  indicate  that  the  task  was  challenging  for  both  adult  and 
adolescent participants. Indeed, it is the relative difficulty of the Face Decision Task 
that  enables  subtle  biases  in  behaviour  to  exert  detectable  effects  (Averbeck  & 
Duchaine, 2009).  
 
The percentage of correct choices was significantly higher in the adult than in the 
adolescent group. This result was predicted, on the basis of evidence from previous 
decision-making  studies  showing  that  adults  show  superior  performance  on 
gambling tasks relative to adolescents (Harbaugh et al., 2002; Overman et al., 2004; 
Crone  &  van  der  Molen,  2004;  Hooper  et  al.,  2004).  Many  of  these  previous 
developmental studies have used the IGT. Unlike the current task, the IGT uses non-
stochastic  feedback  i.e.  win  or  loss  feedback  on  each  trial  indicates  whether  the 
participant should maintain or switch strategy. In the Face Decision Task, feedback   103 
is stochastic in that choosing the more highly rewarded stimulus on a given trial may 
in fact result in a loss (in fact, it will result in a loss on two out of five trials). 
Therefore,  the  current  study  presents  novel  evidence  that  the  ability  to  integrate 
stochastic feedback over multiple trials improves between adolescence (age 12-13 
years)  and  adulthood  (age  21-43).  Furthermore,  by  creating  a  model  of  the 
ecological observer, we were able to investigate possible mechanisms driving this 
age group difference in performance (see section 3.4.4, later). 
 
3.4.2 Performance referenced to the ideal observer model: social bias 
In  the  current  task,  a  purely  utilitarian  or  ‘ideal’  observer  should  ignore  the 
expressions shown in the face stimuli and make decisions purely on the basis of the 
history of wins and losses associated with each stimulus. However, in the current 
study and previously (Averbeck & Duchaine, 2009), this was not the case. Instead, 
in both groups, decisions showed evidence of a social bias, such that participants 
were more likely to choose the happy face when the ideal observer model specified 
that they should choose the angry face, than they were to choose the angry face 
when the ideal observer model specified that they should choose the happy face. The 
current result replicates this previous finding in adults, and extends it to a group of 
adolescents.  
 
It has been suggested that the social bias arises in this task arises because the face 
stimuli act as primary reinforcers (Averbeck & Duchaine, 2009; Matthews & Wells, 
1999). Participants are willing to trade fictitious financial rewards in order to view a 
happy face, and to avoid viewing an angry face. An alternative suggestion is that the 
faces act  as communicative stimuli: Viewing an  angry  face acts as a  signal that 
behaviour should be suppressed or altered (Averbeck & Duchaine, 2009; Blair & 
Cipolotti, 2000). 
 
Previous studies have suggested that, under some circumstances, adolescents may be 
more susceptible than adults to influence by social and emotional factors (McGivern 
et  al.,  2002;  Gardner  &  Steinberg,  2005;  Steinberg,  2008).  In  the  current 
probabilistic decision-making task there was no difference between adolescents and 
adults in the extent of social bias arising from the emotional expressions shown in 
the face stimuli. It would be interesting to investigate whether a group difference in 
social  bias would  be observed in the Face Decision Task  if the stimuli depicted   104 
same-age (adolescent) faces, rather than the mature adult faces used in the current 
study. One hypothesis is that adolescents might be more susceptible than are adults 
to  social  influence  from  same-age  individuals  (peer  influence),  but  not  to  social 
influence from substantially older or younger individuals (Brown, 2004; Steinberg, 
2008).  
 
3.4.3 Performance referenced to the ecological observer model: the role of social 
cues 
By referencing participant decisions to those of an ideal observer, it was shown that 
adult and adolescent behaviour was influenced by the emotion in the face stimuli. 
However, this result does not tell us anything about the nature of this influence. 
Therefore,  a  computational  model  of  participant  behaviour  was  created  (the 
ecological observer model; see Methods), containing parameters that encapsulated 
two separate mechanisms by  which the emotion shown in the face stimuli could 
affect  participants’  behaviour.  These  were:  (1)  a  differential  weighting  of 
performance feedback based upon the emotional content of the face that was chosen 
(the evidence or likelihood bias), and (2) a prior bias to select one of the faces i.e. a 
prior expectancy that a particular face would be associated with a reward.  
 
After  fitting  both  parameters  to  adult  and  adolescent  datasets,  the  differential 
learning (evidence bias) parameter was found to show weak effects across groups 
and was dropped from the analysis. Previously, this parameter was found to exert a 
relatively weak effect in adults, so the current result is not surprising (Averbeck & 
Duchaine, 2009).  
 
The  prior  bias  term  was  significant  in  the  adolescent  group,  that  is,  adolescent 
participants exhibited a behavioural expectancy that rewards would be associated 
with the happy face. This expectancy resulted in a greater frequency of choosing the 
happy face when the ideal observer model specified that the angry face should be 
chosen than vice versa. This finding extends to a group of adolescents findings from 
an  adult  study  conducted  by  Averbeck  and  Duchaine  (2009).  The  current  result 
suggests  that  the  greater  tendency  to  choose  a  happy  face  when  the  evidence 
indicates that the angry face should be chosen than vice versa in adolescents is due 
to a prior expectation that happy faces will be rewarded. This expectation, or bias, 
may reflect the operation of over-learned social cues present from infancy, or the   105 
strongly social context of many real-life decisions (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Haley 
& Fessler, 2005).  
 
The adult participants did not show a prior bias to pick the happy face. However, 
there was no significant group difference in the impact of the prior bias term, which 
renders  the  adult  finding  difficult  to  interpret.  One  explanation  is  that  whereas 
Averbeck and Duchaine’s previous study, which tested a similar number of adult 
participants,  included  mainly  university  students,  the  current  study  tested  an 
educationally diverse sample of participants whose heterogeneity introduced greater 
behavioural variance. 
 
3.4.4 Performance referenced to the ecological observer model: Developmental 
differences in the role of performance feedback 
Participant decisions were referenced to those of an ideal observer, and this showed 
that both adults and adolescents selected the correct stimulus at a level significantly 
above chance. However, adults selected the correct stimulus on a greater percentage 
of  trials  than  did  adolescents,  which  suggests  that  adults  were  more  sensitive  to 
utilitarian performance feedback (wins and losses) than were adolescents.  
 
It has previously been suggested that the ability to take into account performance 
feedback continues to develop during adolescence (Huizinga et al., 2007; Byrnes et 
al., 1999; Crone & van der Molen, 2004) and that, in particular, the time-course of 
developing sensitivity to performance feedback may differ depending on whether the 
feedback is negative or positive (Crone et al., 2004, 2008; Huizinga et al., 2006; van 
Duijenvoorde et al., 2008). The current study investigated whether the age group 
difference in performance was due to a differential response to positive (win) and 
negative  (loss)  performance  feedback,  by  creating  a  computational  model  of 
participant  behaviour  (the  ecological  observer  model)  containing  separate 
parameters encapsulating the behavioural influence of positive (‘you win 10 p’) and 
negative (‘you lose’) performance feedback on behaviour.  
 
Results of this analysis showed that the adolescent and adult groups differed in their 
behavioural  sensitivity  to  performance  feedback.  Specifically,  the  adult  group 
showed a stronger tendency than did the adolescent group to select a face once it had 
been  associated  with  a  reward.  In  both  age  groups,  receiving  negative  feedback   106 
(‘you lose’) in response to choosing a face decreased the probability that the face 
would subsequently be chosen. Thus, adult decisions reflected a composite of both 
negative and positive performance feedback whereas adolescents showed a bias to 
respond to negative feedback only.  
 
In the ecological observer model, the effect of performance feedback depended on 
the belief level of participants when the feedback was given (see Methods). If the 
evidence based on previous trials indicated that participants (as described by the 
ecological  model)  were  nearly  certain  that  a  particular  face  was  correct,  then 
receiving positive feedback in response to the alternative face had very little effect 
on  belief  and  subsequent  behaviour.  The  effect  of  performance  feedback  also 
depended  on  current  position  within  each  26-trial  block.  When  participants  had 
received very little performance feedback, at the beginning of a block, each new 
instance of feedback had a large effect. Later on in the block, each new instance of 
feedback  had  proportionally  less  effect  (see  Figures  2  and  5  in  Averbeck  & 
Duchaine, 2009). Therefore, the developmental result showing greater sensitivity to 
positive performance feedback in the adult than in the adolescent group may reflect a 
more mature ability to keep track of and update the history of rewards associated 
with each stimulus. 
 
3.4.4.1  Adolescent  response  to  positive  vs.  negative  feedback  and  behavioural 
strategies 
Results  from  the  current  study  indicate  that  adolescents  aged  12-13  exhibit  an 
unbalanced response to positive vs. negative performance feedback. This finding is 
in general agreement with studies using rule-switch tasks, which have shown that 
children and adolescents exhibit greater behavioural asymmetry in their response to 
positive and negative performance feedback than do adults (Crone et al., 2004, 2008; 
Huizinga  et  al.,  2006;  van  Duijenvoorde  et  al.,  2008).  However,  data  from  the 
current study indicate that adults are more sensitive to positive feedback than are 
adolescents  and  that  both  age  groups  are  equally  sensitive  to  negative  feedback, 
whereas  studies  using  rule-switch  tasks  tend  to  report  the  opposite  finding  that 
children and adolescents respond better to positive than to negative feedback. For 
example,  while  performance  in  rule-switch  tasks  is  consistently  worse  following 
negative (‘switch’) than positive (‘maintain’) feedback across age, performance is 
disproportionately worse following negative feedback in children aged 8-9 (Crone et   107 
al.,  2008;  van  Duijenvoorde  et  al.,  2008).  However,  the  tasks  used  are  quite 
different.  In the next paragraph, a possible explanation will be suggested for the 
divergent findings. 
 
It has been suggested that a developmental shift in strategy is responsible for the 
age-related  changes  in  behaviour  during  decision-making  tasks.  In  a  study  by 
Huizinga et al. (2007), it was shown that, whereas pre-adolescents (aged 6-9 years) 
were behaviourally sensitive to the frequency of loss only, adolescents aged 10-15 
took  into  account  both  the  frequency  and  magnitude  of  losses.  Between  mid-
adolescence (13-15 years) and young adulthood (18-25 years), the tendency to take 
into account both the magnitude and frequency of losses continued to increase, and 
in addition there was evidence for an increase between adolescence and adulthood in 
the adoption of the maximally unbiased strategy of indifferent choosing between two 
options that are equally beneficial. Therefore, developmentally immature decision-
making may be characterized by a particular set of biases, and focus on a subset of 
stimulus attributes. The pattern of adolescent behaviour in the Face Decision Task, 
whereby  adolescents  take  into  account  negative  but  not  positive  feedback,  is 
consistent with a simple behavioural strategy of switching choices after incurring a 
loss.  In  contrast,  adult  participants  are  able  to  integrate  both  wins  and  losses, 
showing  an  increased  tendency  to  switch  choices  following  a  loss,  but  also  a 
tendency to  maintain the current  choice  following a win. The divergent  findings 
between studies may be due to a difference in the strategy employed to accomplish 
distinct behavioural tasks (context-dependence of strategies). A future study could 
investigate the factors that cause adolescents to adopt a particular strategy in favour 
of another, as this could be relevant to adolescent decision-making in naturalistic 
contexts. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
The current study was carried out to investigate decision-making in adults (aged 21-
43) and adolescents (aged 12-13) using a probabilistic Face Decision Task in which 
happy  and  angry  face  stimuli  were  stochastically  associated  with  reward.  A 
computational  method  of  analysis  was  implemented,  which  showed  that  the 
decisions of both adolescents and adults can be characterized as a composite of both   108 
social and utilitarian factors. Across age, participants showed a similar social bias to 
choose the happy face; however, the response to utilitarian performance feedback 
differed  across  age.  Whereas  adults  integrated  both  positive  and  negative 
performance  feedback  (wins  and  losses)  to  either  adjust  or  maintain  ongoing 
selections, adolescents failed to respond to positive feedback, switching choices after 
incurring  a  loss.  This  suggests  that  age-related  change  in  the  ability  to  integrate 
positive  and  negative  stochastic  feedback  may  contribute  to  the  development  of 
decision-making abilities between adolescence and adulthood. 
 
3.5.1 The next chapter 
Adolescence is characterized by changes in decision-making, including in the ability 
to take into account performance feedback. In this chapter, effects of facial emotion 
cues on the decisions of adults and adolescents were shown. In general, adolescence 
is  said  to  be  characterized  by  changes  in  emotion  and  social  understanding, 
including  increased  emotional  self-awareness  and  self-consciousness.  There  is 
evidence  that  that  pubertal  development  rather  than  chronological  age  per  se 
contributes to increased social awareness and self-conscious affect (Simmons et al., 
1973; Rosenberg & Simmons, 1975). Furthermore, it has been shown that puberty 
hormones organise the structure and function of the brain, including parts of the 
brain involved in emotion and social behaviour (Romeo, 2003; Cahill, 2006; Ahmed 
et al., 2008; Schulz et al., 2009; Peper et al., 2009; Neufang et al., 2009). Therefore, 
in  the  next  chapter,  a  study  is  described  that  investigated  pubertally-associated 
development in self-reported emotions. Participants aged 9-16 years were divided 
into groups on the basis of a puberty development questionnaire, and performed an 
emotional  self-report  task.  In  the  task,  participants  were  asked  to  imagine  their 
emotional responses to a variety of social and basic emotional scenarios. Patterns of 
emotional responding were investigated, to evaluate the hypothesis that the onset of 
puberty marks an increase in the awareness of complex, or ‘mixed,’ emotions.   109 
Chapter 4 
 
Development of mixed social emotion understanding 
across puberty 
 
In the previous chapter, a study was described  that investigated the influence of 
facial emotion cues on decision-making in adolescents and in adults. Results showed 
that the decisions of both age groups reflected a preference for happy vs. angry 
faces. However, it has been suggested that developmental differences  in emotion 
processing  may  be  related  to  puberty  as  well  as  chronological  age  per  se.  The 
current chapter describes a study that was carried out to explore the relationship 
between puberty stage and a measure of social-emotional understanding. Adolescent 
females aged nine to 16 years, grouped according to self-reported puberty stage, 
completed a task in which emotional responses were elicited in response to a series 
of  emotional  scenarios.  The  scenarios  were  designed  to  elicit  social  emotion 
(embarrassment  and  guilt)  and  basic  emotions  (anger  and  fear).  The  relative 
complexity  or  ‘mixedness’  of  emotional  responses  was  calculated  and  compared 
across  puberty  groups.  This  showed  evidence  that  mixed  emotion  understanding 
differs  across  puberty  stage,  and  that  this  difference  may  be  specific  to  social 
emotions. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 Development of social emotion processing 
Social  emotions,  such  as  guilt,  embarrassment  and  shame,  are  here  defined  as 
emotions that require the representation of another person’s mental states (see also 
Olsson  &  Ochsner,  2008).  In  order  to  feel  embarrassed,  for  example,  you  must 
believe  that  other  people  think  your  actions  foolish.  In  contrast,  basic  emotions 
constitute  immediate  affective  reactions  that  do  not  require  consideration  of  the 
mental  states  of  others.  Studies  have  indicated  that  the  understanding  of  basic   110 
emotions  develops  earlier  in  life  than  the  understanding  of  social  emotions.  For 
example, Harris et al. (1987) have shown that five year old children were able to 
think of  situations in  which  a basic emotion would be felt, but  not situations  in 
which a social emotion would be felt. By the age of seven, children were able to 
think of situations that would plausibly elicit social emotions, such as pride, jealousy 
and guilt.  
 
The development of social emotion understanding beyond middle childhood is not 
well characterised. However, the period from middle childhood to adolescence is 
thought to be accompanied by an increase in multi-dimensional or abstract thinking 
about other people, and this includes thinking about the diverse factors that influence 
people’s thoughts and feelings (Wainryb, 2001; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). Therefore, 
this  age  period  is  likely  to  be  accompanied  by  an  increasingly  complex 
understanding  of  emotions  in  self  and  in  others.  Furthermore,  evidence  from 
behavioural and neuroimaging studies suggests that the interpersonal, physical and 
hormonal  changes  associated  with  puberty  may  contribute  to  changes  in  the 
behavioural and neural correlates of social emotion processing. This evidence will 
now be summarised. 
 
4.1.1.1 Social emotion development during puberty 
The period of puberty and adolescence represents a time of acute socio-emotional 
change. Self-awareness and the self-concept undergo profound development during 
the adolescent years (Sebastian et al., 2008), and the perceived opinions of other 
social  agents,  especially  peers,  are  influential  in  shaping  the  self-concept  and  in 
modulating social behaviour (Brown, 2004). There is evidence that social-emotional 
development may be linked to puberty stage as well as age per se, as self-report 
studies have shown that young adolescents (particularly girls) from early to mid-
puberty  are  more  self-conscious  than  both  pre-  and  post-pubescent  individuals 
(Simmons et al., 1973; Rosenberg & Simmons, 1975; Elkind & Bower, 1979). It has 
been suggested that the physical changes of puberty contribute directly to increased 
self-consciousness,  through  a  mechanism  of  heightened  vulnerability  to 
environmental  circumstances  that  threaten  or  impinge  upon  the  self-image 
(Simmons et al., 1973). For example, changes in physical appearance as a result of 
puberty  (e.g.  growth spurt)  may  result  in a change  in the attitudes expressed by 
others when they interact with an adolescent, and this will affect the self-image.   111 
Normative and pathological (e.g. Michaud et al. 2006) disruptions in the self-image 
at puberty are thought to stabilise into adulthood, as physical changes are assimilated 
into  a  new  adult  self-image.  In  summary,  evidence  suggests  that  the  period  of 
puberty  is  an  important  time  for  the  development  of  emotions  and  self-
consciousness, and may represent a time window of particular sensitivity to social 
emotions such as embarrassment and shame.  
 
Recent brain imaging studies suggest that the neural processing of social emotion 
changes during puberty and adolescence. Structural MRI studies in humans show 
that certain prefrontal and temporal brain regions supporting emotion understanding 
and self-awareness undergo protracted structural development until late adolescence 
and beyond (Giedd et al., 1999; Sowell et al., 1999a,b; Gogtay et al., 2004; Shaw et 
al., 2008). In particular, there seems to be a reorganisation of grey matter in the 
frontal cortex that occurs at around the onset of puberty (Giedd et al. 1999; Shaw et 
al.  2008).  Grey  matter  volume  in  the  frontal  lobe  increases  during  childhood, 
reaching its peak at around puberty onset (approximately 11 years in girls and 12 
years in boys), and is followed by a reduction in grey matter volume during the 
remainder  of  the  pubertal  transition.  This  is  hypothesised  to  have  functional 
consequences.  
The majority of human structural MRI studies conducted to date have not included a 
measure of puberty stage. However, much work in non-human animals indicates a 
role  for  puberty  in  the  structural  reorganisation  of  the  brain  and  in  neural 
responsiveness to social and emotional stimuli (e.g. Cahill, 2006; Romeo, 2003). For 
example, in male rodents, testosterone is thought to mediate effects on cell survival 
and  gross  size  of  the  amygdala  and  hypothalamus  (Romeo,  2003).  Effects  of 
oestrogen  on  the  hippocampus  are  also  documented  (Cahill,  2006).  Furthermore, 
evidence from a number of human MRI studies that have measured puberty stage 
suggests that the onset of puberty may trigger, or coincide with, a phase of grey 
matter reorganisation in frontal and temporal regions. For example, Neufang et al. 
(2009)  showed  that grey  matter volume in the amygdala varied as a  function  of 
circulating testosterone and oestrogen, as well as Tanner Stage of puberty (Tanner, 
1971).  Perrin  et  al.  (2009)  showed  evidence  that  self-reported  puberty  stage 
correlates  with  white  matter  volume  in  males.  Peper  et  al.  (2008,  2009)  report 
correlations between white matter volume and urinary concentrations of luteinising 
hormone in both sexes, and between grey matter volume and urinary oestradiol in   112 
females.  This  suggests  that  puberty  stage,  as  well  as  simply  age  per  se,  is  an 
important  factor  in  the  structural  development  of  the  brain  during  adolescence, 
including within brain regions implicated in  emotion,  social processing  and  self-
awareness.   
 
In  addition  to  changes  in  the  structure  of  the  brain,  puberty  and  adolescence  is 
accompanied by changes in the functioning of brain regions involved in emotion and 
social  awareness.  For  example,  functional  MRI  studies  have  shown  changes  in 
activity within the mentalising system across adolescence (Blakemore, 2008; Pfeifer, 
2009). Specifically, adolescents show greater activity than do adults within anterior 
rostral medial prefrontal cortex (arMPFC), a brain region involved in representing 
mental  states  (including  feelings,  beliefs  and  desires),  during  social  cognition 
relative to control tasks (see Figure 1.8); including social cognition tasks explicitly 
assessing self-other-awareness (e.g. how others see you; Pfeifer et al., 2009).  
 
A  number  of  studies  show  evidence  for  a  relationship  between  puberty  and 
functional brain activity during social-emotional tasks. For example, fMRI studies 
comparing  typical  children/adolescents  and  those  with  endocrine  disorders  (e.g. 
precocious  puberty)  indicate  a  relationship  between  adrenal  hormone  levels  and 
amygdala activity during emotional face processing in females (Ernst et al., 2007), 
and between testosterone levels and hippocampal responsiveness during emotional 
face  processing in males (Mueller  et  al.,  2009).  One  recent  study in  hormonally 
typical  adolescent  females  has  demonstrated  a  link  between  puberty  stage  and 
functional activity within the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and amygdala during an 
emotional face processing task (Forbes et al., in press). Thus, evidence from fMRI 
studies  lends  support  to  the  notion  that  there  is  a  relationship  between  puberty 
hormones and the cognitive and neural processing of social-emotional information, 
via effects on the brain.  
 
In  summary,  there  is  evidence  that  puberty  stage  influences  social-emotional 
processing via psychological effects on the self-image, changes in social-emotional 
awareness, and effects on the structure and function of the brain. However, pubertal 
changes  in  social-emotional  awareness  are  not  well  characterised.  Therefore,  the 
current study investigated the development of social emotion understanding across 
puberty. Specifically, and in order to limit the scope of this wide subject area, the   113 
current  study  focussed  on  a  single  aspect  of  emotion  understanding,  the 
understanding of mixed emotion. This concept will be explained in the following 
section. 
 
4.1.2 Development of the understanding of mixed emotion 
Mixed emotion understanding is the ability to acknowledge that a number of discrete 
emotions may be simultaneously elicited by a single event. Mixed emotions can be 
similar  in  valence,  such  as  feeling  both  anger  and  disappointment  at  a  missed 
opportunity. Mixed emotions can also be oppositely valenced, such as feeling both 
anger and relief upon the safe return of a wayward child.  
 
There  is  a  body  of  research  on  the  understanding  of  mixed  emotions  in  early 
childhood (Harter & Buddin, 1987; Harris, 1989; Larsen et al., 2007). Studies using 
a structured interview technique have shown that children around the age of five will 
deny that mixed emotions occur, or are even possible (Harter 1977; Harter 1983; 
Harter & Buddin 1987; Harris 1983; Larsen et al., 2007). For example, Harter and 
Buddin (1987) asked children between the ages of three and 11 to describe situations 
that would make them feel either opposite valence (happy, sad) or same valence 
(happy, excited) emotions at the same time. Children aged five reported statements 
such as “You’d have to be two different people to have two feelings at the same 
time”. Between the ages of six and eight, children initially succeeded in describing 
situations  in  which  two  emotions  would  be  felt  in  rapid  succession,  and 
subsequently, were able to describe situations in which two same-valence emotions 
would be experienced at the same time. Only between the ages of 10 and 11 were 
children able to describe situations in which two opposite-valence emotions would 
be felt simultaneously. 
 
A  recent  study  by  Larsen  and  colleagues  (2007)  investigated  mixed  emotion 
between  childhood and  the  onset  adolescence, in children aged five to  12  years. 
Children were presented with a video clip from a fairy tale (Disney’s  The  Little 
Mermaid), which culminated in a ‘bittersweet’ scene in which a father character is 
portrayed as having to say farewell to his daughter. Children were asked: (a) how the 
father character would feel, and (b) how the clip made them feel. Children were then 
given structured prompts to generate more than one emotion, and if they were able 
to do this, were then asked to indicate whether the emotions would be experienced   114 
sequentially or simultaneously (mixed emotions). Results showed a significant linear 
effect  of  age  on  measures  of  both  the  tendency  to  report  that  the  father  would 
experience  mixed  emotions,  and  the  tendency  to  report  personally  experiencing 
mixed  emotions.  These  data  indicate  that,  in  addition  to  developing  a  better 
conceptual understanding of mixed emotion in others (the father), older children also 
demonstrate a greater tendency to report mixed emotions in themselves.  
 
The development of mixed emotion understanding during puberty has not previously 
been studied. However, as described above, the adolescent years mark an increase in 
multi-dimensional thinking about other people and the diverse factors that influence 
their  thoughts  and  feelings  (Wainryb,  2001).  This  may  lead  to  developments  in 
mixed emotion understanding across puberty, particularly for the understanding of 
social or self-conscious emotions. 
 
It  should  be  noted  at  this  point  that  the  conceptual  understanding  of  one’s  own 
mixed  emotions  may  be  distinct  from  actually  experiencing  mixed  emotions. 
Emotional  ambivalence,  that  is,  the  expression  of  feeling  positive  and  negative 
emotions simultaneously, is shown by infants aged around age one year (Ainsworth 
et al., 1978; see also Campos et al., 1983). The observation of a developmental time 
lag  between  displaying  versus  reporting  mixed  emotions  has  prompted  the 
suggestion that mixed emotion understanding emerges as children learn to interpret 
the emotional reactions that they already express, through an increasingly mature 
appreciation of the complex causal relationships between situations and emotions 
(Harris 1989). The current study was primarily concerned with the understanding of 
one’s own mixed emotions, insofar as they can be measured by self-report.  
 
4.1.3 The current investigation: mixed emotion during puberty and adolescence 
No  study  to  date  has  investigated  the  understanding  of  mixed  emotion  across 
puberty. However as indicated above, there is evidence that pubertal development 
may influence emotional awareness via psychological mechanisms, and via effects 
on the brain. Therefore, it is reasonable to hypothesise changes in mixed emotion 
understanding across puberty, especially for social emotions.  
 
The current study investigated the understanding of mixed emotions across puberty, 
for both social and basic emotions. Eighty-three participants aged between 9.5 and   115 
16.33 years, divided into three Puberty Groups (early, mid- and post-puberty), were 
tested  using  an  emotional  self-report  task.  During  this  task,  participants  were 
instructed to imagine a series of emotional scenarios and to report how strongly they 
would feel each of four emotions (anger, fear, embarrassment and guilt) in response 
to the scenarios. Ratings along these four emotion scales were used to develop a 
measure  of  mixedness  in  emotional  responding.  It  was  hypothesised  that  mixed 
emotion understanding would develop across puberty. 
 
The scenarios were designed to evoke primarily social emotions (embarrassment or 
guilt) or primarily basic emotions (anger or fear). In a sense, social emotions are 
inherently  more  mixed  than  are  basic  emotions,  since  social  emotions  require 
consideration of the mental states of more than one agent (self and other) whereas 
basic emotions do not. Thus, it was predicted that more highly mixed emotional 
responses would be observed for social relative to basic emotion scenarios, overall. 
However, given the changes in social-emotional understanding across puberty, and 
given the structural and functional developments within brain regions involved in 
social emotion processing, it was hypothesised that mixed emotional responses to 
social emotion scenarios in particular would continue to develop across puberty. 
 
4.2 Methods 
 
4.2.1 Participants 
Eighty-three female participants aged 9.5 to 16.33 years old took part in the study. 
Participants were recruited via two comprehensive schools in central Birmingham: a 
secondary school and a primary feeder school which is located on a site adjacent to 
the  secondary  school.  This  ensured  similar  educational  background  and  socio-
economic status across the age range. 
 
Participants  were  divided  into  three  Puberty  Groups  on  the  basis  of  a  physical 
development questionnaire that was a version of the Petersen Development Scale 
adapted from  Carskadon and Acebo (Petersen  et  al., 1988;  Carskadon & Acebo, 
1993). The three puberty groups were: Early-puberty (N = 23, mean (s.d.) age = 11.7 
(1.44), range = 9.5-14.08), Mid-puberty (N = 40, mean (s.d.) age = 13.0 (1.15), range 
= 10.5-15.33)  and Post-puberty (N  =  20, mean  (s.d.) age = 15.2  (0.70), range =   116 
13.67-16.33).  One-way  ANOVA  showed  that  chronological  age  differed 
significantly between Puberty Groups (F2,82 = 49.914, p < 0.05).  
 
The  physical  development  questionnaire  (see  Appendix  4.1),  which  comprises 
questions about menarche and secondary sexual characteristics, was completed by 
secondary  school  age  participants  in  a  quiet  room  in  school,  and  was  posted  to 
parents of primary school age participants for completion by the parent alone, the 
parent  and  child  together,  or  the  child  alone,  according  to  parental  preference. 
Participants were assigned to the Early-puberty group if they circled ‘no’ in response 
to the question ‘Have you started having periods?’ and also in response to questions 
regarding secondary sexual characteristics (growth spurt, skin changes and underarm 
hair). Participants were assigned to the Post-puberty group if they circled ‘yes’ in 
response to the question ‘Have you started having periods?’ and also in response to 
questions regarding secondary sexual characteristics (growth spurt, skin changes and 
underarm hair). Participants who did not fit either of these criteria were assigned to 
the Mid-puberty group.  
 
No  information  was  elicited  regarding  participants’  history  of  psychiatric  or 
neurological disorder, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, autism or dyscalculia.  
 
The  study  was  restricted  to  female  participants  only,  for  the  following  reasons. 
Firstly, the temporal profile of puberty and its impact on social behaviour differs 
between the sexes (Savin-Williams & Weisfeld, 1989, cited in Spear 2000; Giedd et 
al. 1999; Romeo, 2003), and therefore participants were restricted to one gender 
only, to maximise the power to detect an effect in a sample size limited by time and 
resources. Secondly, it is reported that there are differences between the sexes in 
expressing emotions (Kring & Gordon, 2007), which could impact on the self-report 
measure. Specifically, females are reported to be more expressive of most emotions 
relative to males. If this is the case, then an emotional self-report task might be more 
engaging for female than in male participants: we therefore selected female rather 
than male participants.  
 
Prior to the study, written informed consent was obtained from a parent or guardian 
of adolescent participants. The study was approved by the local Ethics Committee. 
Participants were not paid.    117 
 
 
4.2.2 Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of two to four in a quiet room in school, seated so 
they were unable to see each others’ papers or confer. Participants were each given a 
paper-based task containing a series of sentences with attached emotion rating scales 
(see Figure 4.1 and Appendix 4.2). The experimenter instructed participants that 
they would be reading a number of sentences describing situations in which they 
might  feel  emotions  such  as  anger,  fear,  embarrassment  and  guilt.  Before 
commencing the experiment, the experimenter defined each of the four emotions, 
giving examples of situations in which each might be felt (see Table 4.1, second 
column). 
 
Table 4.1 Experimenter-defined emotions and example task scenarios. At the start of the session, 
the  experimenter  read  aloud  a  definition  and  example  of  each  emotion  (column  2).  During  the 
emotion task, participants read a series of 32 emotion scenarios (examples in column 3) and rated 
their imagined emotional response using four rating scales. See Appendix 4.2 for the complete set of 
emotion stimuli. 
 
Emotion  Definition and example  Example scenario from the task 
Anger  When you feel mad and annoyed at 
someone or something,  
e.g. You might feel annoyed if the bus is 
late and you know you are going to miss 
your appointment 
You saw someone walk by the 
window. They threw rubbish into 
your garden  
Fear  When you feel scared 
e.g. You feel scared when you are  
walking in a dark quiet street 
 
You were riding your bike down a 
hill. Suddenly your brakes stopped 
working.  
Embarrass- 
ment 
When you feel you look silly in front of 
people 
e.g. You trip and fall in front of your 
friends 
You ate too much cake at a party. 
You threw up in the living room in 
front of everyone.  
Guilt  When you feel that you have done 
something wrong and feel bad about it 
e.g. You broke your friend’s mobile 
phone. 
You were meant to look after your 
little brother but you went out.  
When you got back he was crying.   118 
 
 
During  the  experiment,  participants  silently  read  the  scenarios  while  the 
experimenter read the scenarios aloud. Participants were instructed to imagine how 
they would feel in each scenario, and to rate their emotional response using four 
rating scales: anger, fear, embarrassment and guilt. Participants were told that they 
could place a mark anywhere they wished on the analogue scale, either by drawing a 
circle around 0 (I would feel the emotion not at all) or 10 (I would feel the emotion 
very strongly), or by placing a mark anywhere between 0 and 10 (see Figure 4.1).  
Each  scenario  was  designed  to  evoke  primarily  one  of  four  emotions:  anger, 
embarrassment, fear or guilt. However, the stimuli were designed such that some 
sentences might reasonably evoke more than one emotion. The task consisted of 32 
scenarios in total, of which 16 were primarily Basic emotion scenarios (eight anger, 
eight fear) and 16 were primarily Social emotion scenarios (eight embarrassment, 
eight guilt; see Table 4.1 and Appendix 4.2). The order of emotion words in the 
rating section for each scenario was counterbalanced between participants. The order 
of  emotions in  the  instruction  phase and the order  of scenarios in  the task  were 
counterbalanced between the small groups of simultaneously-tested participants.   
 
Figure 4.1 Example of a task scenario. Each scenario was read aloud to participants, who were 
asked to imagine how they would feel if the scenario happened to them, and then to rate how strongly 
they would feel each of the four emotions, on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 10 (very strongly).  
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4.2.3 Data analysis 
Each  scenario  was  rated  along  four  10  cm  emotion  scales  for  anger,  fear, 
embarrassment  and  guilt.  In  order  to  investigate  mixed  emotional  responses,  a 
measure was developed that encapsulated the extent to which participants used all 
four  rating  scales  for  Social  and  Basic  emotion  scenarios.  The  distance  in 
centimetres of each emotion ratings along each of the four scales for each scenario 
was measured. These distances were therefore non-integer values ranging from 0 to 
10 cm. Next, each scenario was coded according to the number of times a rating 
>2cm was given. This was an ultimately arbitrary cut-off point, but was chosen on 
the basis that ratings below 2cm indicate very weak reported feelings of a particular 
emotion. Rating response codes were assigned as follows:  
 
Rating code 0: none of the four emotions rated >2cm 
Rating code 1: one of the four emotions rated >2cm 
Rating code 2: two of the four emotions rated >2cm 
Rating code 3: three of the four emotions rated >2cm 
Rating code 4: four out of four emotions rated >2cm 
 
A response assigned a rating code of 4 is maximally mixed, since all four emotions 
are rated >2cm (see Figure 4.2). A rating code of 1 indicates a minimally mixed 
response, since only one of the four emotions is rated >2cm. Responses assigned a 
rating code of zero, i.e. in which no emotion was rated >2cm, were omitted from the 
analysis,  since  it  was  considered  that  this  response  pattern  indicated  a  lack  of 
emotion. 
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Figure 4.2 Scoring of responses. Each response (32 per participant: 16 Social, 16 Basic) was given a mixedness score that took into account how many times a 
rating >2cm had been given. A maximally mixed emotional response (e.g. below right) was one in which all four emotions were rated >2cm. We compared mean 
mixedness scores for social and basic emotion scenarios across puberty groups. 
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For each participant, mean mixedness scores were calculated for Social and Basic 
emotion scenarios separately, resulting in a range of possible mean mixedness scores 
between 4 (maximum mixedness) and 1 (minimum mixedness). After checking for 
normality and excluding outliers lying >3 s.d. from the group mean for Social and 
Basic  scenarios  separately  (one  Basic,  Post-puberty  mixedness  score  excluded), 
mixed design repeated measures 3x2 ANOVA was conducted to test for Puberty 
Group differences in mean mixedness scores for Social and Basic emotion scenarios. 
There  was  one  between-subjects  factor  with  three  levels:  Puberty  Group  (Early-
puberty, Mid-puberty and  Post-puberty);  and one within-subjects  factor  with two 
levels: Emotion Type (Social, Basic). A threshold for significance of p < 0.05 was 
used  throughout,  and  post  hoc  Bonferroni-corrected  t-tests  were  used  to  explore 
paired differences.  
 
4.3 Results 
 
Mean mixedness scores for Social and Basic emotion scenarios by Puberty Group 
are shown in Figure 4.3. Skew and kurtosis for Social and Basic mixedness scores 
were between +2 and -2, indicating that the distribution of the data was satisfactorily 
close to normal. One Post-puberty outlier >3 s.d. from the group mean for Basic 
mixedness was excluded. Repeated  measures  ANOVA revealed a  main effect of 
Emotion Type on mixedness scores (F1,79 = 151.89, p < 0.05) such that more highly 
mixed emotional responses were given for Social than for Basic emotion scenarios 
(Social: mean (s.d.) mixedness = 2.21 (0.70); Basic: mean (s.d.) mixedness = 1.68 
(0.61)). Paired samples t-tests showed that mixedness for Social Emotion scenarios 
was significantly higher than mixedness for Basic Emotion scenarios in all three 
Puberty Groups (Early: t22 = 6.82, p < 0.05; Mid: t39 = 7.71, p < 0.05; Post: t19 = 
7.02, p < 0.05). 
 
There was no main effect of Puberty Group (F2,79 = 1.901, p = 0.16). However, there 
was  a  significant  interaction  between  Puberty  Group  and  Emotion  Type  (F2,79 = 
4.614, p < 0.05). The interaction was driven by higher mixedness scores in the Post-
puberty group than in the Early-puberty group for Social Emotion scenarios (t41 = 
2.89, p < 0.05), but not for Basic Emotion scenarios (t40 = 1.07, p = 0.291). The 
Mid-puberty  group  did  not  differ  from  the  Early-  or  Post-puberty  groups  on 
mixedness score for either Social or Basic Emotions (Social: Early vs. Mid: t61 =   122 
1.40, p = 0.167; Mid vs. Post: t58 = 1.83, p = 0.072; Basic: Early vs. Mid: t61 = 1.40, 
p = 0.184; Mid vs. Post: t57 = 0.06, p = 0.955). 
 
Figure 4.3 Mean mixed emotion score for Social (left) and Basic (right) emotion scenarios in 
each Puberty Group. The maximum possible mixedness score was 4 (four emotions rated >2cm) 
and the minimum was 1 (one emotion rated >2cm). There was an interaction between Puberty Group 
and Emotion driven by higher mixedness scores for social relative to basic emotions in the Post-
puberty group relative to the Early-puberty group. 
 
 
 
4.4 Discussion 
 
Previous research has demonstrated that the ability to acknowledge that a number of 
discrete emotions may be elicited by a single event, or the understanding of ‘mixed’ 
emotion, first emerges in middle childhood and continues to develop up to age 12 
(Harter, 1983; Harter & Buddin, 1987; Harris et al., 1986; Larsen et al. 2007). On 
the basis that pubertal development is related to social awareness and self-conscious 
affect  (Simmons  et  al.,  1973;  Rosenberg  &  Simmons,  1975),  and  in  view  of 
evidence that puberty hormones organise the structure and function of  the brain, 
including regions of the brain involved in social behaviour and emotion (Romeo, 
2003; Cahill, 2006; Schulz et al., 2009; Peper et al., 2008, 2009; Neufang et al., 
2009), the current study investigated mixed emotion understanding across puberty. 
Mixed emotion understanding was assessed by taking a measure of the number of   123 
discrete  emotions  reported  in  response  to  imagined  social  or  basic  emotion 
scenarios. 
 
4.4.1 Mixedness in social emotion 
The current results revealed two main findings. First, and as predicted, responses 
were significantly more mixed for social emotions than for basic emotions across 
puberty  groups.  Social  emotions,  such  as  guilt  and  embarrassment,  require  the 
representation  of  another  person’s  mental  states.  In  contrast,  no  mental  state 
representation is required to experience basic emotions. Thus, social emotions can 
be seen as inherently more representationally complex than basic emotions. Social 
emotions usually involve the consideration of social norms and conventions, as well 
as the social or moral implications of one’s own actions. For example, the feeling of 
guilt involves the consideration of one’s mental states and actions resulting perhaps 
in anger and shame directed at the self, but also the feelings of the wronged party 
and perhaps the real or imagined opinions of a judging third party. In contrast, the 
feeling of fear minimally involves an immediate emotional reaction to a threatening 
stimulus.  Therefore,  it  can  be  concluded  that  the  current  result  showing  greater 
mixed  emotional  responding  to  social  emotion  scenarios  than  to  basic  emotion 
scenarios  across  all  puberty  groups  reflects  the  greater  inherent  emotional 
complexity,  and  requirement  for  representing  multiple  mental  states,  in  social 
relative to basic emotions. 
 
4.4.2 Development of mixed emotion understanding 
The  second  result  in  the  current  study  was  the  significant  interaction  between 
puberty group and emotion condition. Results showed that the degree of mixedness 
in  the  emotional  response  to  social,  but  not  basic,  emotion  scenarios  increased 
between early- and post-puberty. This result provides evidence for the continued 
development  of  mixed  emotion  understanding  across  the  period  of  puberty,  and 
indicates that this development may be specific to social emotions. 
 
Previous research has shown that the understanding of basic emotions precedes the 
understanding  of  social  emotions  developmentally,  and  that  mixed  emotion 
understanding continues to develop during childhood and up to the age of 12 (Harris 
et al., 1986; Harter & Buddin, 1987; Larson et al., 2007). The results of the current 
study are consistent with, and extend, this developmental picture. This study showed   124 
no change in mixed emotion reporting for basic emotions after late childhood (early-
puberty), at around 11 years, but a change in mixed emotion reporting for social 
emotions across the puberty range included here, and up to the age of 16. One caveat 
in the current study is that puberty stage was significantly related to chronological 
age.  This  issue  should  be  addressed  in  a  subsequent  study  in  which  groups  are 
matched for age but differ in puberty stage (e.g. Tanner Stage of puberty). Methods 
and  issues  in  pubertal  measurement  will  be  covered  in  the  Discussion  (section 
7.2.3).  
 
Another  caveat  is  with  the  method  of  assessing  emotional  mixedness.  Previous 
studies using structured interviews are consistent with the current finding, and show 
that  mixed  emotion  understanding  shows  protracted  development  throughout 
childhood (Harter, 1983; Harter & Buddin, 1987; Harris 1989; Larsen et al., 2007). 
Another  study  has  shown  age  differences  during  adulthood  in  mixed  emotion, 
specifically, in self-reported discomfort in response to watching adverts that elicit 
mixed  emotions  between  young  and  older  adulthood  (Williams  &  Aaker,  2002). 
Thus, the result from the current chapter showing an increase in the reporting of 
mixed social emotions across puberty is consistent with extant findings. However, 
the  method  by  which  mixedness  was  assessed  in  the  current  chapter  requires 
validation.  The  current  result  also  needs  to  be  replicated  using  the  previously-
employed structured interview technique. 
 
4.4.3 Structural and functional brain development and puberty 
Bearing in mind the abovementioned caveats, the current result showing evidence 
for the development across puberty of mixed emotion responding for social emotion 
scenarios could be a due to a number of factors. As mentioned in section 4.1.1, there 
are  changes  in  emotion  and  self-awareness  during  adolescence  that  have  been 
attributed to pubertal development (Simmons et al., 1973; Rosenberg & Simmons, 
1975; Michaud et al. 2006). In addition, development within regions of the brain 
implicated  in  self-awareness,  social  cognition  and  emotion  occurs  during 
adolescence, and studies suggest that at least some of these changes are related to 
puberty. For example, Neufang et al. (2009) showed that grey matter volume in the 
amygdala varied as a function of circulating testosterone and oestrogen, as well as 
Tanner  Stage  of  puberty  (Tanner,  1971),  and  Peper  et  al.  (2008,  2009)  report 
correlations  between  white  matter  volume  and  puberty  hormones.  Multimodal   125 
studies are now needed that investigate the separate contributions of puberty and 
chronological age to measures of structural brain development and social-emotional 
processing.  
 
Changes in the structure of brain regions involved in emotion understanding and 
self-awareness  are  proposed  to  result  in  changes  in  the  information  processing 
carried  out  in  these  regions,  and  in  the  resultant  cognitive  and  behavioural 
capabilities of  the  developing individual (Olesen et al., 2003; Schmithorst et al., 
2005; Stevens et al., 2007; 2009; Olson et al., 2009). Several functional imaging 
studies have shown a change in patterns of neural activity during social cognition 
tasks  between adolescence  and adulthood.  In  particular, these fMRI  studies have 
shown that activity in arMPFC decreases between adolescence and adulthood during 
social cognition (including social emotion) tasks (see Blakemore, 2008, for review; 
and Figure 1.8 for meta-analysis). It is not known how these changes in social brain 
activity  are  related  to  puberty  stage.  One  recent  study  has  demonstrated  a  link 
between puberty stage and brain activity during a social task (Forbes et al., in press). 
An interesting avenue for future research will be to look at the relationships between 
puberty stage and functional brain activity during social emotion and mixed emotion 
tasks.  
 
4.4.4 Mixedness and cognitive development 
In addition to changes in hormones and neuroanatomy, the cognitive changes that 
occur during puberty and adolescence may pave the way for a more sophisticated 
understanding of mixed emotion. Early cognitive-developmental research suggested 
that  the  period  from  middle  childhood  to  adolescence  is  characterised  by  an 
increased capacity for abstract reasoning (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). This may result 
in a more sophisticated conceptual understanding of emotions, including mixedness 
in emotions. Relatedly, it has been suggested that the capacity for counterfactual 
reasoning continues to develop during adolescence (Baird & Fugelsang, 2004). This 
could enable development in mixed emotion understanding, since a single situation 
needs to be interpreted in different (e.g. counterfactual) ways for it to yield a mixed 
emotional evaluation. Finally, there is evidence that the social cognitive ability to 
take into account the perspectives of other social agents develops throughout the 
adolescent  years  (Dumontheil  et  al.,  2009;  Choudhury  et  al.,  2006;  see  section 
1.6.1.2).  In  Dumontheil  et  al.  (2009),  continuing  development  during  late   126 
adolescence was reported in a visual perspective task requiring the online use of 
mental state (visual perspective) information. Social emotions require one to take 
into  account  another  individual’s  emotional  perspective  (thinking  about  how 
someone else would feel, or how they would think about you, as a consequence of 
your actions). Therefore, development of perspective-taking ability across puberty 
and  adolescence  might  contribute  to  developments  in  the  awareness  of  mixed 
feelings  in  social  emotion  situations.  Further  studies  should  investigate  the 
relationship between cognitive development and the development of mixed emotion 
understanding, across puberty and age. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The current chapter presents evidence that mixed emotion understanding develops 
across  puberty  in  females,  and  that  this  development  may  be  specific  to  social 
emotion scenarios. As discussed above, this result could be due to changes in social-
emotional awareness, cognition, and development in the structure and function of 
the  brain.  However,  since  puberty  stage  was  related  to  chronological  age  in  the 
current study, a follow-up study should be conducted in which puberty groups are 
matched for age. In addition, follow-up studies are needed to extend these findings 
in males and to evaluate the current methodology. 
 
4.5.1 The next chapter 
In the next chapter, the emotional scenarios described in the current chapter were 
adapted  to  investigate  the  neural  processing  of  social  and  basic  emotions  using 
fMRI. In line with the current definition of social emotions as emotions that require 
mental state processing, it was predicted that participants would show activity during 
social  vs.  basic  emotion  processing  within  the  mentalising  system,  comprising 
arMPFC, pSTS/TPJ and ATC. However, an age-related shift in activity has been 
reported  within  the  mentalising  system,  between  adolescence  and  adulthood 
(Blakemore, 2008; see section 1.5.2.2.2). Relative to adults, adolescents (aged 10-
18)  show  stronger  activity  within  arMPFC  during  mentalising  relative  to  control 
conditions. It was of interest to ascertain whether a comparable developmental shift 
would be seen for social vs. basic emotion processing. Therefore, in Chapter 5, 
adolescent and adult participants were scanned with fMRI while processing a set of 
social and basic emotion scenarios adapted from Chapter 4, and it was predicted   127 
that  activity  within  the  arMPFC  would  be  stronger  in  adolescents  than  in  adults 
during social vs. basic emotion processing.  
 
Unlike in the current chapter, in Chapter 5 participants were grouped according to 
age rather than puberty. This was because a relatively small number of participants 
took part in the fMRI study (19 adolescents and 10 adults) and the adolescent group 
was not considered large enough for subdivision according to puberty measures, and 
in addition given the age range (from 10 to 18 years) puberty stage was likely to 
correlate strongly with age. In addition, previous fMRI studies have shown an age-
associated shift in activity within the mentalising system (puberty has not previously 
been assessed with regards mentalising), and it was of interest to conduct a study 
whose results could be compared with previous fMRI studies of mentalising and 
emotion.   128 
Chapter 5 
 
A functional magnetic resonance imaging study of 
social emotion processing in adolescents and in 
adults 
 
 
The previous chapter described a study that investigated a behavioural measure of 
social  emotion  understanding  across  puberty.  This  showed  evidence  that  the 
understanding of social emotions continues to develop across puberty, which was 
related  to  age  in  the  experimental  sample.  In  the  current  chapter,  a  study  is 
described that investigated developmental differences in the neural processing of 
social  emotions,  using  fMRI.  Female  adolescents  and  adults  underwent  fMRI 
scanning while processing scenarios in which either a social or a basic emotion 
would  be  felt.  The  results  indicate  that  both  age  groups  showed  activity  during 
social vs. basic emotion processing within brain regions implicated in mentalising, 
including  the  anterior  rostral  medial  prefrontal  cortex  (arMPFC).  However,  a 
region of arMPFC was activated more strongly by adolescents than by adults for 
this contrast, and conversely the left anterior temporal cortex (ATC)  was activated 
more strongly by adults than by adolescents. This set of results provides evidence 
that the neural strategy for social vs. basic emotion processing develops between 
adolescence and adulthood. In agreement with previous developmental fMRI studies 
of social cognition, activity shifts from frontal (arMPFC) to temporal brain regions 
with age. Further studies should investigate possible relationships between this age 
group  difference  in  functional  brain  activity,  and  both  cognitive  and 
neuroanatomical development. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
5.1.1 fMRI studies of mentalising in adults 
A  number  of  functional  imaging  and  neuropsychological  studies  in  adults  have 
shown  that  mentalising  tasks,  i.e.  tasks  that  require  processing  of  internal  states   129 
including beliefs, feelings and desires, activate or rely upon a circumscribed set of 
brain regions known as the mentalising system (Frith & Frith, 2003). This set of 
brain regions comprises the anterior rostral medial prefrontal cortex (arMPFC), the 
posterior  superior  temporal  sulcus  (pSTS)  bordering  on  the  temporo-parietal 
junction (TPJ) and the anterior temporal cortex (ATC). The purported role of each of 
these brain regions is as follows:  
 
The ATC, or temporal polar cortex, is thought to be a multimodal convergence zone 
where information about complex social (as well as non-social) stimuli is integrated 
with  emotional  signals  (Olson  et  al.,  2007).  Functional  imaging  and 
neuropsychological  studies  (e.g.  in  fronto-temporal  dementia  patients)  show 
evidence that the ATC represents complex semantic knowledge that is needed to 
navigate  social  situations  and  respond  in  a  socially  and  emotionally  appropriate 
manner. Thus, it has been suggested that the ATC represents ‘social scripts’, that is, 
semantic information relevant to specific social encounters (Frith, 2007).  
 
The pSTS is responsive to complex movements, including biological movements of 
the eyes, face and hands. This brain region is more active when predictions based on 
these movements are in  error,  relative to when they  are  correct (Pelphrey et al., 
2004a,  2004b). Therefore,  the  pSTS is thought to play a  role  in  decoding social 
gestures and signals, and using these to form predictions of action or intent (Frith, 
2007).  
 
There seems to be overlap in the roles of the pSTS and the TPJ. However it has been 
suggested  that,  in  contrast  to  the  pSTS  which  decodes  complex  (including 
biological)  movements,  the  TPJ  is  more  concerned  with  spatial  perspective 
information (Aichhorn et al., 2006; Frith, 2007). Spatial perspective information is 
necessary for understanding the epistemic states of social agents based on what they 
can and cannot see. This knowledge forms a part of mentalising, which is the ability 
to attribute mental states to social agents.  
 
The arMPFC (BA 10) is also thought to play a role in representing or using mental 
state information. These include the emotional, motivational and epistemic mental 
states of self and other (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Gilbert et al., 2006). Frith (2007) has 
suggested that the more general role of arMPFC in representing mental states is to   130 
enable human communicative interactions. Perspectives on the role of arMPFC in 
mentalising will be discussed in a later section (5.4.1.1). 
 
The mentalising system is of interest with regards emotion development, since it has 
been suggested that mentalising plays a key role in learning about emotions (Olsson 
&  Ochsner,  2008).  FMRI  studies  in  which  adult  participants  reflect  upon  social 
emotions have shown activity within components of the mentalising system (e.g. 
arMPFC; Moll, Grafman et al., 2005; Takahashi et al., 2004; Berthoz et al., 2002; 
Moll et al., 2002; Shin et al., 2000). In the current study a social emotion task was 
employed  to  investigate  age-related  changes  in  activity  within  the  mentalising 
system. 
 
5.1.2 Developmental fMRI studies of mentalising 
Several recent fMRI studies have shown an age-related shift in activity within the 
mentalising system during social cognition tasks that have a mentalising component. 
In particular, a number of studies have shown evidence for an age-related decrease 
in  activity  within  arMPFC  during  social  cognition  tasks  with  a  mentalising 
component, between adolescence and adulthood (Blakemore et al. 2007; Pfeifer et 
al.  2007;  Wang  et  al.  2006;  Pfeifer  et  al.,  2009;  also  between  childhood  and 
adolescence:  Moriguchi  et  al.,  2007).  Specifically,  activity  within  the  arMPFC 
during  mentalising  relative  to  control  tasks  decreases  between  adolescence  and 
adulthood  (see  Blakemore,  2008  for  a  meta-analysis).  The  current  study  was 
designed to test whether a comparable developmental shift would be observed for 
social emotions, which are defined as emotions which require the consideration of 
others’ mental states.  
 
Unlike  in  the  previous  chapter,  participants  in  the  current  chapter  were  grouped 
according to age (adolescent vs. adult), rather than puberty stage. This was because a 
relatively small number of participants took part in the fMRI study (19 adolescents 
and  10  adults)  and  the  adolescent  group  was  not  considered  large  enough  for 
subdivision  according  to  puberty  measures,  and  in  addition  given  the  age  range 
(from 10 to 18 years) puberty stage was likely to correlate strongly with age. In 
addition, since previous fMRI studies have shown an age-associated shift in activity 
within  the  mentalising  system  (puberty  has  not  previously  been  assessed  with 
regards mentalising), the aim of the current chapter was to conduct a study whose   131 
results could be compared with findings from previous fMRI studies. Findings from 
these previous studies will now be summarised. 
 
Previous  studies  have  demonstrated  remarkably  consistent  differences  in  activity 
within the mentalising system between adolescence and adulthood (see Figure 1.8; 
Blakemore et al. 2007; Wang et al. 2006; Pfeifer et al. 2007; Pfeifer et al., 2009; see 
Blakemore,  2008  for  a  meta-analysis).  For  example,  in  Blakemore  et  al.  (2007), 
adolescents (aged 12-18) and adults (aged 22-38) were scanned with fMRI while 
they read sentences about intentions (e.g. “You want to go to the cinema. Do you 
look  in  the  newspaper?”),  relative  to  sentences  featuring  unintentional  physical 
events (e.g. “It has been raining all night. Is the ground warm?”). Results showed 
that part of arMPFC was more active in adolescents than in adults during intentions 
vs. physical events (Figure 1.8, blue dots), whereas the adult group showed more 
activity than did adolescents within a region of right STS during this comparison.  
 
A similar developmental shift  in  brain  activity  was found using  a  task based on 
decoding communicative intentions (Wang et al., 2006). When children/adolescents 
(aged  9-14  years)  and  adults  (aged  23-33  years)  judged  whether  a  series  of 
communications  were  sincere  or  ironic  (sarcastic),  the  child/adolescent  group 
showed stronger activity within arMPFC than did adults (Figure 1.8, green dots). 
Adults activated more posterior brain regions, including the superior temporal and 
fusiform gyri, more.  
 
Two  studies  that  focussed  on  the  processing  of  self-related  sentences  showed  a 
similar age-related decrease in arMPFC activity. In Pfeifer et al. (2007), children 
(aged 9-11 years) and adults (aged 23-32 years) silently read phrases such as ‘I like 
to read just for fun’. It was shown that the arMPFC and ACC were more active in 
children than in adults (Figure 1.8, yellow) when these phrases were applied to the 
self,  relative  to  when  they  were  applied  to  a  familiar  other  (Harry  Potter).  The 
authors suggest that this pattern of activity may reflect a greater degree of online, 
self-reflective  processing  (performed  by  the  arMPFC)  in  children  vs.  adults.  In 
Pfeifer et al. (2009), adolescents (aged 11-14 years) and adults (aged 23-30 years) 
processed self-related sentences from their own vs. another’s perspective (parent, 
best friend, or class; e.g. ‘My best friend thinks I am good at maths’). Age group 
differences were observed in arMPFC (Figure 1.8, grey dot). Activity in the medial   132 
fronto-parietal network was also enhanced when adolescents took the perspective of 
someone more relevant to a given domain (e.g. ‘My mother/my class thinks I am 
popular at school’).  
 
Finally,  in  a  study  conducted  by  Moriguchi  et  al.  (2007),  child  and  adolescent 
participants watched the Frith-Happé mentalising animations (Castelli et al., 2000), 
in which simple geometric shapes (triangles) move in such a way as to suggest the 
presence of mental states (e.g. a desire to hide from another triangle, a desire to play 
with another triangle). In control (non-mentalising) animations, the same geometric 
shapes move in a manner that suggests they are merely inanimate objects operating 
under the physical laws of gravity and inertia. Moriguchi et al. showed that, during 
mentalising  relative  to  control  animations,  activity  within  a  ventral  portion  of 
arMPFC decreased with age across childhood and adolescence (Figure 1.8, red dot), 
whereas activity within a more dorsal portion of arMPFC showed an age-related 
increase  in  activity.  This  study  had  no  adult  comparison  group,  but  the  age-
associated  changes  in  arMFPC  activity  are  consistent  with  adolescent  vs.  adult 
studies.  
 
Thus,  a  number  of  recent  studies  have  consistently  shown  that  activity  within 
arMPFC during mentalising or social cognition tasks is greater in adolescents than in 
adults,  whereas  activity  in  certain  posterior  brain  regions  shows  the  opposite 
developmental  pattern.  The  current  study  was  designed  to  test  whether  this 
developmental pattern is also seen during a social emotion task. 
 
5.1.3 Development of social emotion 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the understanding of social emotion develops during 
early to middle childhood. Studies have shown that at around the age of seven, a 
child  is  able  to  describe  situations  in  which  a  social  emotion  such  as  pride  or 
embarrassment will be experienced (Harris et al., 1987). However at around puberty, 
individuals become increasingly aware of and concerned with people’s opinions of 
them, which suggests a heightened experience of social emotions or perhaps greater 
self-relevance of social emotions (Parker et al., 2006; Adams & Berzonsky, 2003; 
Elkind, 1967; Elkind & Bower, 1979; Zeman et al., 2006). The adolescent years are 
marked  by  an  increasing  dependence  of  the  self-image  upon  perceived  social 
reputation  (Davey  et  al.,  2008),  especially  reputation  with  peer  groups  (Brown,   133 
2004). Finally, a variety of socialization experiences with parents and peers mean 
that adolescence is a key time for learning about how social emotions should be 
expressed in different social contexts (Zeman & Shipman, 1997). 
 
5.1.4 Predictions 
It is unknown whether the neural correlates of social emotion processing develop 
between adolescence and adulthood. To investigate this question, an fMRI study was 
conducted in which 19 adolescents (aged 10–18 years) and 10 adults (aged 23–32 
years) were scanned as they read a series of sentences (adapted from Chapter 4) that 
were designed to elicit either a social emotion (guilt or embarrassment) or a basic 
emotion (disgust or fear). The replacement of anger by disgust was effected because 
it was decided that anger has a greater social component, and therefore a greater 
likelihood of eliciting mentalising, than disgust. 
 
In  line  with  previous  studies,  it  was  predicted  that  social  vs.  basic  emotion 
processing would be associated with greater activity within the mentalising system, 
including arMPFC (Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, et al., 2005; Moll, Zahn, et al., 2005; 
Takahashi et al., 2004; Moll et al., 2002). A second prediction was that adolescents 
would  activate arMPFC more strongly than adults during  social relative  to basic 
emotion  processing,  in  line  with  previous  developmental  fMRI  studies  of 
mentalising (Blakemore, 2008). 
 
In the current study, social and basic emotion scenarios pertained either to the self or 
to  another  person.  This  additional  component  was  included  because  adults  show 
differences in neural activity within parts of the mentalising system when processing 
emotions  in  the  first  vs.  third-person  perspective  (Ruby  &  Decety,  2004),  and 
because children show differences relative to adults in neural activity within parts of 
the  mentalising  system  when  processing  statements  in  the  first  vs.  third-person 
perspective (Pfeifer et al., 2007; 2009). For example, Pfeifer et al. (2007) showed 
that  attributing  statements  to  self  vs.  Harry  Potter  was  associated  with  greater 
activity in arMPFC in children, but greater activity in the lateral temporal cortex in 
adults. Therefore the current study included both first and third-person social and 
basic emotion processing conditions.  It was decided that third-person protagonist 
(the  ‘other’)  in  this  study  would  be  the  participant’s  mother,  as  this  protagonist 
would be sufficiently familiar to participants to enable the adoption of her emotional   134 
perspective, but sufficiently distinct from self that participants would not necessarily 
use their own perspective as an heuristic for their mother’s (cf. Ruby & Decety, 
2004).  To  quantify  how  similar  each  participant  perceived  herself  to  be  to  her 
mother,  the  NEO-V  Factor  Personality  Inventory  (Costa  &  McCrae,  1991)  was 
completed  from  the  self  and  mother  perspective  by  participants  (see  Methods, 
5.2.2.4).  
 
The study was conducted with female participants only, for the following reasons. 
First,  structural  differences  between  the  sexes  have  been  observed  within  brain 
regions involved in emotion and social cognition (Schmithorst et al., 2008; Lenroot 
et al., 2007). Specifically, there are significant sex differences in the age at which 
grey matter volume peaks in the frontal and parietal cortices (11 years in girls vs. 13 
years in boys; Giedd et al., 1999), and sex differences in trajectories of white matter 
development (Schmithorst et al. 2008). Second, sex differences have been observed 
in fMRI studies of emotion, in both adolescents and in adults (Yurgelun-Todd & 
Killgore, 2006; Hall et al., 2004; Killgore & Yurgelun-Todd, 2004), as well as in 
fMRI studies of specifically social emotion processing in adults (Moll, de Oliveira-
Souza, et al., 2005; Moll, Zahn, et al., 2005). Third, there are differences between 
the  sexes  in  expressing  emotions  (Kring  &  Gordon,  2007),  which  could  either 
impact  on,  or  be  a  result  of,  sex-specific  neurocognitive  strategies.  This  sex 
difference  in  emotion  expression  becomes  accentuated  with  age,  as  sex-specific, 
culturally-defined rules for the expression of emotion are learned and internalised 
during  childhood  and  beyond  (see  Brody,  1985,  for  a  review).  That  is,  the 
relationship between feeling and expressing emotions not only differs between the 
sexes, it also changes with age in a sex-specific way. Including both sexes would 
therefore have added unquantifiable variance to the between-groups fMRI data. 
 
The  choice  of  females  rather  than  males  in  the  current  study  was  related  to  the 
documented sex differences in the expression of emotion. Specifically, females are 
reported to be more expressive of emotions than males (Kring & Gordon, 2007). If 
this is indeed the case, a social emotion task may be more engaging for female than 
for male participants. 
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5.2 Methods 
 
5.2.1 Participants 
Nineteen female adolescents (age range = 10.83 to 18.17 years; mean age = 14.8 
years) and 10 female adults (age range = 22.92 to 31.83 years; mean age = 26.41 
years)  took  part  in  the  study.  Adult  participants  were  recruited  from  the  local 
community  via  posters  and  a  community  website,  as  well  as  from  the  UCL 
Psychology Department participant database and via personal contacts. Adolescent 
participants were recruited from a database of interested potential volunteers who 
had previously contacted the research group, via teacher contacts in a number of 
London schools, and from the local community via posters (e.g. in the Institute of 
Education common room). 
 
Participants had no history of psychiatric or neurological disorder, and none had 
received  a  diagnosis  of  attention-deficit/hyperactivity  disorder,  autism  or 
dyscalculia.  
 
Participants’ general ability was assessed by administering the 4-subtest form of the 
Wechsler  Abbreviated  Scale  of  Intelligence  (WASI;  Harcourt,  1999),  prior  to  or 
after the MRI scanning session. Mean (± s.d.) full-scale IQ (FSIQ) was 115.52 (± 
6.63)  for  the  adolescent  group  and  111.14  (±  14.10)  for  the  adult  group.  An 
independent-samples  t-test  revealed  no  significant  difference  in  FSIQ  between 
groups (t(22) = 1.052, p > 0.3). Three adult participants did not complete the WASI, 
but since they had completed university-level education at a leading university, their 
general ability level was judged to be comparable to or higher than the mean for the 
adult group. 
 
Prior to the study, written informed consent was obtained from adult participants, 
and  from  a  parent  or  guardian  of  participants  younger  than  18.  The  study  was 
approved  by  the  local  Ethics  Committee.  Adult  participants  received  a  modest 
financial  compensation  for  their  time  and  adolescent  participants  were  not  paid. 
Prior to the experimental session, it was ascertained that all participants had a living, 
healthy mother. 
 
5.2.2 Experimental Design   136 
The fMRI experiment had a 2x2x2 mixed factorial design. There were two within-
subjects factors: Emotion (social emotion vs. basic emotion) and Protagonist (self 
vs. other perspective). The between-subjects factor was Group (adolescent vs. adult).  
 
During functional MR-imaging, participants silently read 144 emotional sentences 
which described social or basic emotion scenarios pertaining either to self or mother 
(Figure  5.1a;  see  Appendix  5.1  for  the  emotion  scenarios).  Participants  were 
instructed to imagine each scenario. After reading each scenario, participants rated 
how much the protagonist (self/mother) would feel the named emotion, on a discrete 
rating scale from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much), using a button box. The mean (plus 
the range) word length and the number of clauses in the emotion sentences were 
equated between conditions.  
 
5.2.2.1 Emotion factor 
Each scenario primarily featured either a social emotion or a basic emotion. The 
social emotions were embarrassment and guilt, and the basic emotions were disgust 
and  fear.  Emotion  sentences  from  Chapter  4  were  adapted  to  maximize  the 
difference in mentalising requirement between social and basic emotion conditions. 
Therefore, the basic emotion sentences featured immediate and viscerally evocative 
situations. Whereas in Chapter 4, the basic emotions were anger and fear, in the 
current chapter the basic emotions were fear and disgust. The replacement of anger 
by  disgust  was  effected  because  it  was  decided  that  anger  has  a  greater  social 
component, and therefore a greater likelihood of eliciting mentalising, than disgust. 
 
The sentences were chosen from a larger set of sentences that was presented in the 
form of a questionnaire to 17 female adolescents and 7 female adults (see Appendix 
5.2  for  pilot  questionnaire).  Pilot  participants,  who  were  different  from  the 
participants in the fMRI study, rated their emotional response to each sentence on a 
discrete rating scale from 1 (I would not feel the emotion at all) to 4 (I would feel the 
emotion a lot). For all sentences in the pilot questionnaire, the emotion to be rated 
(embarrassment, guilt, disgust or fear) was specified, and the protagonist in each 
sentence was the self (‘you’). Any sentence that was given a rating of one by any 
participant in the pilot study was discarded. Then, for each age group, the remaining 
sentences  were  ranked  according  to  group  mean  emotion  ratings.  Sentences  that 
were  rated  highly  by  both  age  groups  were  chosen  for  use  in  the  fMRI  study.   137 
Sentences rated highly by one group only were discarded. This was to ensure that 
the emotion sentences used in fMRI were similarly effective for both age groups. 
 
Both social and basic emotion scenarios featured the main protagonist plus one other 
person (e.g. a friend, family member or unnamed onlooker). This was to ensure that 
the difference between social and basic emotion conditions was the need to take into 
account another person’s mental state, not the mere presence of another person in 
the scenario (which is thought to result in activity in TPJ; Abraham et al. 2008, 
Coricelli & Nagel, 2009). 
 
5.2.2.2 Protagonist factor 
The protagonist in each scenario was either the participant (self, or ‘you’) or the 
participant’s  mother (other,  or ‘your  mum’). The same emotional  scenarios  were 
used for the self and other conditions, but sentence construction and vocabulary was 
altered to preserve equal word length between conditions. 
 
5.2.2.3 Task structure 
Sentences were presented in blocks of three (see Figure 5.1b). Participants had 9 
seconds to read silently, imagine, and rate their response to each emotion sentence. 
The experiment was blocked by emotion and protagonist such that within a block, all 
three scenarios featured the same emotion (disgust, embarrassment, fear, or guilt) 
and the same protagonist (self or other). This was to maximise the strength of the 
imagined emotions, while minimising carry-over effects between sentences featuring 
different emotions and protagonists. Sentence, block and condition orders were fully 
randomized. 
 
At  the  start  of  each  block,  a  1  second  cue  screen  informed  participants  which 
emotion and which protagonist the proceeding three sentences would feature. This 
was to minimise the effect on BOLD response to the first sentence in each block of 
possible age differences in latency to identify the relevant emotion/protagonist.  
 
Each 12 minute session of the fMRI experiment contained 24 emotion blocks, and 
each block lasted 28 sec (see Figure 5.1a). In addition, there were two 28 sec visual 
fixation blocks per session, occurring one third and two thirds of the way through 
each  of  the  two  sessions.  Stimulus  presentation  was  programmed  in  Cogent   138 
(www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent/index.html)  running  in  Matlab  6.5,  which  recorded 
participant responses.  
 
Prior to scanning, all participants completed a practice session outside the scanner 
room. The practice session consisted of four emotion scenarios (one from each of the 
four specific emotions). The sentences used in the practice task did not appear inside 
the scanner. 
 
Figure 5.1 Structure of the experiment (a) Participants completed two runs of the task, lasting 728 
sec per run. During each run, 24 emotion blocks and 2 fixation blocks were presented. There were 
three emotion sentences per block (b), which appeared for 9 sec each; participants therefore had 9 sec 
to read and respond to each sentence. Each emotion block was preceded by a 1 sec cue screen. Within 
a block, all three sentences featured the same emotion (disgust, embarrassment, fear or guilt) and the 
same protagonist (self or mother).  
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5.2.2.4 Participants’ perceived similarity to their mothers 
To quantify any age-related differences in participants’ perceived similarity to their 
mothers,  which  might  cause  between-group  differences  in  brain  activity  in  the 
protagonist  condition  e.g.  within  arMPFC  (Mitchell  et  al.  2006),  participants’ 
perceived  similarity  to  their  mothers  was  quantified  by  administering  after  the 
scanning  session  two  separate  versions  of  the  NEO-V  personality  questionnaire 
(Costa  &  McCrae,  1991).  The  two  versions  of  the  questionnaire  were  identical 
except  that  in  one  version  participants  answered  personality  questions  about 
themselves, and in the other version they answered the same questions about their 
mother. 
 
5.2.3 Data Acquisition 
A  1.5-T  Siemens  Sonata  head  MRI  scanner  was  used  to  acquire  both  3-D  T1-
weighted fast-field echo structural images and multi-slice T2*-weighted echo-planar 
volumes,  with  blood  oxygenation  level-dependent  (BOLD)  contrast.  Each  T2 
functional volume was composed of thirty-three 3-mm axial slices with a 1.5-mm 
gap and in-plane resolution of 3x3 mm, angled at 308 to cover the whole brain and 
minimize  signal  dropout  from  the  facial  sinuses.  Repetition  time  was  3  sec. 
Functional volumes were acquired in two scanning sessions of approximately 12 
minutes  each,  in  which  a  total  of  554  volumes  were  acquired,  or  277  scans  per 
session. The acquisition of a T1-weighted anatomical image occurred after the two 
functional scanning sessions for each participant. The total duration of scanning was 
approximately 35 minutes for each participant.  
 
5.2.4 Data Analysis 
Behavioural and fMRI data were analyzed by collapsing the four emotions – disgust, 
embarrassment, fear, and guilt – into two emotion conditions, social and basic. This 
was  because  the  experimental  hypotheses  related  to  differential  neural  effects  of 
social vs. basic emotion, not to the neural effects of specific emotions. 
 
Behavioural  data  (emotion  ratings  and  NEO-V)  were  analyzed  using  the  SPSS 
statistical  package.  Emotion  ratings  were  analysed  to  investigate  main  effects  of 
Emotion and Protagonist in both groups, as well as two- and three-way interactions 
between Emotion, Protagonist, and Group, using mixed-model repeated measures   140 
ANOVA with within-subjects factors Emotion and Protagonist and between-subjects 
factor Group. NEO-V data were analysed to yield perceived self-mother difference 
(PSMD) scores, by calculating the square root of the summed squared self-mother 
difference  scores  for  all  five  dimensions  of  the  NEO-V  ‘self’  and  ‘mother’ 
personality questionnaires. A median test of PSMD score vs. age group, and linear 
regression between PSMD score and age, were carried out to investigate possible 
relationships. A significance threshold of p < .05 was used for behavioural data.  
 
Imaging data were analyzed using SPM2 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The first six 
functional image volumes from each run were discarded to allow for T1 equilibrium 
effects, leaving 542 image volumes per participant. Preprocessing included rigid-
body transformation (realignment) and slice timing to correct for head movement 
and slice acquisition delays. The images were then stereotactically normalized into 
the standard space defined by the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template 
using the mean of the functional volumes, and smoothed with a Gaussian filter of 6 
mm full width at half maximum to increase the signal-to-noise ratio and facilitate 
group-level analysis. The time series for each participant were high-pass filtered at 
128 sec to remove low-frequency drifts. 
 
The  analysis  of  the  functional  imaging  data  entailed  the  creation  of  statistical 
parametric  maps  representing  a  statistical  assessment  of  hypothesized  condition-
specific effects (Friston et al., 1994b), which were estimated with the general linear 
model. The effects of interest were the four scenario block types (2 emotion x 2 
protagonist)  and the visual fixation blocks. The six  realignment  parameters  were 
modelled as effects of no interest, in order to account for any group differences in 
head movement. Each component of the model served as a regressor in a multiple 
regression analysis for each participant. The resulting parameter estimates for each 
regressor  at  each  voxel  were  then  entered  into  a  second  level  analysis,  where 
‘participant’  served  as  a  random  effect  in  a  within-subjects  ANOVA,  enabling 
population inferences to be made. 
 
The  main  effects  and  interactions  between  conditions  were  specified  by 
appropriately  weighted  linear  contrasts,  and  determined  using  the  t-statistic  on  a 
voxel-by-voxel basis. Statistical analysis at the second level was performed for each 
group separately to first examine the main effect of all scenarios vs. fixation in order   141 
to check that the expected brain regions (visual, motor, reading) were activated in 
this contrast. Next, in order to test the main hypotheses, the three-way interaction 
between  emotion,  protagonist,  and  group  was  investigated.  A  significant  result 
permitted the implementation of a series of planned t-contrasts to investigate the 
main  effects  of  condition  for  the  two  groups  separately,  as  well  as  two-way 
interactions between group and condition. Specifically, for each group separately, t-
tests were carried out to investigate the main effect of Emotion (social > basic, basic 
> social) and Protagonist (self > other, other > self), interactions between Group and 
Emotion, using the contrast [adult (social > basic)–adolescent (social > basic)], and 
vice versa, and interactions between Group and Protagonist, using the contrast [adult 
(self > other)–adolescent (self > other)] and vice versa. Finally, we the interaction 
between Protagonist and Emotion was investigated in each Group separately using 
the contrasts [adult ([self > other]–[social > basic])] and vice versa, and [adolescent 
([self > other]–[social > basic])] and vice versa. 
 
Statistical contrasts were used to create an SPM{t}, which was transformed into an 
SPM{Z} and thresholded at P < .05 (corrected on the basis of the theory of random 
Gaussian fields for multiple comparisons across the whole brain volume examined). 
Regions are reported that survive correction at P < .05, as well as activations within 
regions  for  which  there  was  an  a  priori  hypothesis:  For  these  regions,  a  small-
volume  correction  was  applied  (SVC;  12  mm  radius  sphere,  unless  otherwise 
specified) at P < .05. A priori regions of interest were the arMPFC (Blakemore et al., 
2007; Gilbert et al., 2006, 8 mm), the pSTS/TPJ (Aichhorn et al. 2006; Frith & Frith, 
2003), the ATC (Blakemore et al., 2007; 8 mm), and the precuneus (Blakemore et 
al., 2007) for social > basic emotion; the anterior insula (Moll et al., 2002) and the 
inferior frontal gyrus (Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, et al., 2005; Moll, Zahn, et al., 2005) 
for basic > social emotion; the postcentral gyrus for self > other (Ruby & Decety, 
2004); and the medial fronto-polar gyrus, the left STS, the left ATC, the posterior 
cingulate  gyrus,  and  the  right  inferior  parietal  lobule  for  other  >  self  (Ruby  & 
Decety, 2004). 
 
5.3 Results 
 
5.3.1 Behavioural Results   142 
5.3.1.1 Emotion Ratings 
Participants rated the extent to which the protagonist of each scenario (self, mother) 
would feel the named emotion on a discrete rating scale from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very 
much). Mixed design, repeated measures 2x2x2 ANOVA showed that mean emotion 
ratings did not differ between groups (F1,26 = 0.60; p > 0.4; see Table 5.1). There 
were  no  significant  two-  or  three-way  interactions  between  age  Group  and  the 
factors  Emotion  and  Protagonist  (all  p  >  0.2).  For  both  groups,  basic  emotion 
scenarios were given higher ratings than social emotion scenarios (F1,26 = 9.44, p < 
0.05), and other scenarios were given higher intensity ratings than self scenarios 
(F1,26  =  4.47,  p  <  0.05).  Therefore,  there  is  no  evidence  for  any  age  Group 
differences in the intensity of imagined emotions.  
 
Table 5.1 Mean and standard deviation of the emotion ratings (from 1 to 4), by Group (adult, 
adolescent), Emotion (social, basic), and Protagonist (self, other). Ratings for basic emotions were 
significantly higher than for social emotions, and ratings from the other perspective were significantly 
higher  than  from  the  self  perspective.  There  were  no  significant  group  differences,  and  no 
interactions. 
 
 Emotion 
 
 Protagonist 
 
 Group 
 
Mean 
  Std. Deviation
Social  Self  Adult  2.98  0.349 
     Adolescent  2.94  0.397 
   Other  Adult  3.34  0.343 
     Adolescent  3.07  0.514 
Basic  Self  Adult  3.16  0.283 
     Adolescent  3.11  0.417 
   Other  Adult  3.29  0.395 
      Adolescent  3.24  0.427 
 
 
5.3.1.2 Perceived Self–Mother Difference 
Data were not available for one adult participant. For the remaining participants, 
perceived self-mother difference (PSMD) scores were computed by calculating the 
square  root  of  the  summed  squared  self-mother  difference  scores  for  all  five 
dimensions  of  the  NEO-V  ‘self’  and  ‘mother’  personality  questionnaires.  This 
yielded PSMD scores ranging from 5.57 to 37.03 (mean ± SD = 20.34 ± 9.14). A 
median test of the PSMD scores revealed no difference between adult and adolescent 
participant groups (X
2  =  0,  p > 0.99).  Linear regression  revealed no relationship   143 
between age and PSMD score (r
2 = .009, p > 0.6). There is therefore no evidence for 
age group differences in perceived similarity of self to mother.  
 
However, possible neural effects of perceived similarity of self to (m)other were of 
interest. We therefore used the PSMD scores as a regressor in the SPM analysis (see 
Appendix 5.3).  
 
5.3.2 Functional Imaging Results 
Data from both imaging runs of one adolescent participant and one run of a second 
adolescent participant were excluded due to excessive head movement (> 5 mm). 
After these data were excluded, there were no statistical differences in mean head 
movement between the two age groups for any of the six dimensions of movement 
(independent-samples t-tests (df = 26): all p > 0.15). However for caution’s sake, the 
six realignment parameters were modelled as effects of no interest in the general 
linear model. 
 
5.3.2.1 Main effect of sentences vs. visual fixation 
In  both  adult  and  adolescent  groups,  the  main  effect  of  all  scenarios  vs.  visual 
fixation resulted in expected activation of visual and motor areas, as well as areas 
involved in reading. 
 
5.3.2.2 Three-way interaction between Emotion, Protagonist, and Group 
The  three-way  interaction  between  Protagonist  (self  >  other),  Emotion  (social  > 
basic), and Group (adult > adolescent) yielded a significant region of activation in 
the left TPJ (MNI coordinates [-42 -68 44]; Z = 3.60, p < 0.05 SVC; Figure 5.2, top 
left.  For  illustration  purposes,  parameter  estimates  are  shown  relative  to  visual 
fixation).  Activity  in  this  region  was  driven  by  a  main  effect  of  social  >  basic 
emotion in adolescents, and an interaction between emotion and protagonist in the 
adult  group  (Figure  5.2,  bottom).  The  opposite  contrast  with  respect  to  Group 
(adolescent  >  adult,  social  >  basic,  self  >  other)  did  not  yield  any  significant 
activations. 
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Figure 5.2 Three way interaction between Emotion, Protagonist and Group in left TPJ, shown 
at P < 0.001 on a sagittal glass brain projection. Parameter estimates for each condition are shown for 
each group. This region of the left TPJ is most active in adult self-social emotions and other-basic 
emotions, and in adolescent self- and other-social emotions. 
 
 
 
 
5.3.2.3 Main effect of Emotion in each Group 
In the adult group, the main effect of social > basic emotion resulted in activation of 
the arMPFC, the left pSTS/TPJ, and the left ATC (Table 5.2, Figure 5.3). In the 
adolescent  group,  the  main  effect  of  social  emotion  (social  >  basic)  resulted  in 
activation of the arMPFC, the left and right pSTS/TPJ, and the precuneus (Table 
5.2, Figure 5.3). 
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Figure 5.3 Main effect of Emotion (social > basic) in each Group. Sagittal and transverse glass 
brains showing average group activation for adults and adolescents. Shown at P < 0.005; minimum 
spatial extent = 10 voxels; smoothed with a filter of 6mm full width at half-maximum at the second 
level. 
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5.3.2.4 Interactions between Group and Emotion 
To identify group differences in brain activity to social > basic emotion, interactions 
between Group (adult, adolescent) and Emotion (social, basic) were investigated. 
 
[Adult (social > basic)–adolescent (social > basic)] 
This analysis revealed a cluster in the left ATC (Table 5.2, Figure 5.4). Inspection 
of  parameter estimates,  as well as inclusive masking (with adult social  >  basic), 
showed that this region was more active during social than basic emotions in adults, 
and more active to basic than to social emotions in adolescents (Figure 5.4). 
 
[Adolescent (social > basic)–adult (social > basic)]   146 
A  cluster  in  left  lateral  arMPFC  (Table  5.2,  Figure  5.5)  was  active  during  the 
contrast  [adolescent  (social  >  basic)–adult  (social  >  basic)].  Inspection  of  the 
parameter estimates, as well as inclusive masking (with adolescent social > basic), 
showed that this region was more active during social than during basic emotions in 
adolescents,  and  more  active  during  basic  than  during  social  emotions  in  adults 
(Figure 5.5). 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Interaction between Group (adult > adolescent) and Emotion (social > basic). Top 
left: activity in left ATC ([-40 -6 -26]) resulting from the contrast [adult (social > basic) - adolescent 
(social > basic)], shown at P < 0.005 projected onto a sagittal T1 image, with crosshair at [-40 8 -30]; 
top  right:  graph  showing  parameter estimates  in left  ATC  for  social  and  basic  emotion,  in  both 
groups; bottom panel: positive correlation between age and adjusted BOLD signal in left ATC ([-40 -
6 -26]) in the contrast [social > basic]; r = 0.572; p < 0.05). 
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Figure 5.5 Interaction between Group (adolescent > adult) and Emotion (social > basic). Top 
left: activity in arMPFC ([-16 42 20]) resulting from the contrast [adolescent (social > basic) - adult 
(social > basic)], shown at p < 0.005 projected onto a sagittal T1 image, with crosshair at [-16 42 
20]); top right: graph showing parameter estimates of activity in arMPFC for basic and social emotion 
conditions, in both groups; bottom panel: negative correlation between age and adjusted BOLD signal 
in arMPFC ([-16 42 20]) in the contrast [social > basic] (r = 0.541; p < 0. 05). 
 
 
 
 
5.3.2.5 Main effect of Protagonist in each Group 
In the adult group, the main effect of self (self > other) did not yield any significant 
activations. In the adolescent group, the main effect of self (self > other) resulted in 
activation of the left postcentral gyrus (Table 5.2). The main effect of other (other >   148 
self) did not yield any significant activations in either the adult or the adolescent 
group (however, see Appendix 5.3). 
 
5.3.2.6 Interactions between Protagonist and Group 
No brain regions showed a significant interaction between Protagonist and Group. 
 
5.3.2.7 Interactions between Emotion and Protagonist 
To identify differences in brain activity to social > basic emotion which differed as a 
function  of  Protagonist  (self,  other),  interactions  were  between  Emotion  (social, 
basic) and Protagonist (self, other) were assessed within each age group separately. 
 
Adult [(self social > self basic)–(other social > other basic)]  
The adult group activated the left TPJ in this contrast (Table 5.2; Figure 5.2, top 
left). At an uncorrected threshold of P < 0.001, the adult group activated an antero-
dorsal  portion  of  the  MPFC  for  this  contrast  (Table  5.2;  Figure  5.6,  top  left). 
Inspection of the parameter estimates, as well as inclusive masking (with social > 
basic for self only; and basic > social for other only), showed that this antero-dorsal 
region  of  MPFC  was  more  active  during  self-social  emotions  than  in  any  other 
condition (Figure 5.6, bottom left). In contrast, the left TPJ was more active during 
self-social emotions and other-basic emotions than in the other conditions (shown in 
the graph in Figure 5.6). 
 
Adolescent [(self social > self basic)–(other social > other basic)]  
At  an  uncorrected  threshold  of  P  <  0.001,  the  adolescent  group  showed  activity 
within an antero-dorsal region of the MPFC for this contrast, at a similar location to 
that found in adults (Table 5.2; Figure 5.6, top right). Inspection of the parameter 
estimates, as well as inclusive masking (with social > basic for self only; and basic > 
social for other only), showed that this antero-dorsal MPFC region was more active 
during self-social emotions than in any other condition (Figure 5.6, bottom right). 
 
Adult and adolescent [(other social> other basic)–(self social > self basic)]  
No brain regions were significantly active for this contrast, in either group.  
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Figure 5.6 Interaction between Emotion (social > basic) and Protagonist (self > other) in each 
age  Group.  Top  panel: adult  (left)  and adolescent  (right)  activity  in  antero-dorsal  MPFC in  the 
contrast [(self social > self basic) - (other social > other basic)], shown at p < 0.005 on sagittal glass 
brain  projections.  The  adult  interaction  in  left  TPJ,  containing  the  region  showing  a  three-way 
interaction, can also be seen. Bottom panel: parameter estimates for the interaction between Emotion 
and Protagonist in antero-dorsal MPFC in adults (left) and adolescents (right) are shown. In both 
groups, this antero-dorsal region of MPFC is most active during self-social emotions. 
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Table 5.2 MNI co-ordinates, Z-values and cluster size (in mm
3) for regions of activation in the main 
effect of Emotion, the interaction between Emotion and Group, the main effect of Protagonist, the 
interaction between Protagonist and Group, and the three-way interaction between all three factors. 
 
Contrast  Region of activation  MNI co-
ordinates 
Z value  Size in mm
3 at p < 0.001 
Emotion: 
social>basic 
Adults 
Anterior rostral MPFC 
 
 
Left pSTS/TPJ 
Left anterior temporal cortex 
 
Adolescents 
Anterior rostral MPFC 
 
 
 
 
 
Precuneus 
 
 
Left TPJ 
 
 
Right pSTS/TPJ 
 
-14 44 2 
4 48 18 
6 42 12 
-56 -62 28 
-36 8 -30 
 
 
-10 52 18 
-6 62 22 
-4 50 28 
-18 42 16 
-4 52 -8 
-16 48 34 
-4 -56 28 
14 -56 34 
-4 -62 40 
-38 -66 42 
-48 -62 36 
-38 -62 32 
44 -48 28 
 
3.82 
3.56 
3.28 
3.48 
3.43 
 
 
4.13 
4.03 
3.64 
3.65 
3.43 
3.37 
4.64 
3.49 
3.32 
4.00 
3.98 
3.62 
3.31 
 
96 
216 
(part of above cluster) 
32 
24 
 
 
1600 
(part of above cluster) 
(part of above cluster) 
128 
64 
40 
1360 
(part of above cluster) 
64 
2032 
(part of above cluster) 
(part of above cluster) 
40 
Interaction 
between 
emotion and 
group 
[Adult (social>basic) – adolescent 
(social>basic)] 
Left anterior temporal cortex  
 
[Adolescent (social>basic) – adult 
(social>basic)] 
Left lateral anterior rostral MPFC 
 
 
-40 -6 -26 
 
 
 
-16 42 20 
 
 
3.43 
 
 
 
3.39 
 
 
32 
 
 
 
32 
Protagonist: 
self>other 
Adolescents 
Left postcentral gyrus 
 
-24 -40 52 
 
4.32 
 
112 
Interaction 
between 
emotion and 
protagonist 
[(Self social > 
self basic) - 
(other social > 
other basic)] 
Adults 
Left TPJ 
Antero-dorsal MPFC 
Adolescents 
Antero-dorsal MPFC 
 
-42 -66 40 
14 42 36 
 
14 38 44 
 
3.83 
3.38* 
 
3.29* 
 
264 
5 
 
8 
Interaction 
between 
emotion, 
protagonist and 
group 
(For contrast, see Figure 5.2) 
Left TPJ 
 
-42 -68 44 
-52 -58 34 
 
3.60 
3.50 
 
264 
40 
* = active at P < 0.001, uncorrected   151 
5.4 Discussion 
 
The current fMRI study conducted to investigate the neural correlates of social vs. 
basic emotion processing in adolescents and in adults. It was predicted that both age 
groups would show activity within the mentalising network during social vs. basic 
emotion  processing,  but  that  adolescents  would  show  greater  activity  within 
arMPFC for this contrast. The fMRI results uphold this prediction.  
 
Adults activated a region of left ATC more than did adolescents during social vs. 
basic emotion, and this result is novel. The self vs. other contrast did not show a 
clear pattern of results, either within or between age groups.  
 
5.4.1 FMRI correlates of social emotion processing in both groups 
5.4.1.1 Anterior rostral MPFC 
Social emotions require a representation of the mental states of others (mentalising). 
That is, social emotions require insight into the emotions, beliefs and opinions of 
other people—whether they are physically present, imagined, or perhaps represented 
by the concept of societal norms (Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, et al., 2005; Moll, Zahn, 
et al., 2005). For example, guilt is experienced when one believes that one’s actions 
warrant  disapproval  or  punishment,  or  that  they  have  caused  harm  to  another 
individual. In contrast, basic emotions such as ‘visceral’ fear and disgust entail a 
lesser  degree  of  mentalising,  since  they  only  require  insight  into  one’s  own 
instantaneous internal state. In line with this distinction between social and basic 
emotions,  the  current  study  found  that  both  age  groups  activated  brain  regions 
involved in mentalising, namely, the arMPFC and the pSTS/TPJ (Amodio & Frith, 
2006; Frith & Frith, 2003; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), during social vs. basic emotion 
processing.  In  a  recent  review  paper,  Olsson  and  Ochsner  (2008)  have  drawn 
attention to the partial overlap between brain regions involved in social cognition 
and in social emotion. The results of the current study concur with this picture. 
 
Parts  of  the  arMPFC,  which  has  been  identified  as  the  portion  of  MPFC  most 
consistently active in studies involving mental state attribution (MNI y-coordinates 
from 30 to 60; z-coordinates from 0 to 40; Amodio & Frith, 2006; Gilbert et al., 
2006),  were  active  in  both  groups  for  social  vs.  basic  emotion.  This  result  is   152 
therefore in agreement with a large body of evidence. More narrowly, this result is in 
agreement  with studies of social  emotion  in adults,  which have  reported  activity 
within the arMPFC (Takahashi et al., 2004; Berthoz et al., 2002; Moll et al., 2002
8). 
This finding is consistent with the notion that a cognitive process, that is, mental 
state attribution, is involved in certain emotional tasks including imagining social 
emotion situations (cf. Olsson & Ochsner, 2008). This is not surprising, given the 
current stimuli were explicitly designed to maximise the difference in mentalising 
requirement  between social and basic emotion  conditions.  The  current  pattern of 
results in arMPFC does not shed any light on the cognitive components of social 
emotional processing (see Poldrack, 2008, re. reverse inference). They do, however, 
support  the  notion  that  arMPFC  is  associated  with  mentalising  in  an  emotional 
context, whereas many previous adult and developmental studies have focussed on 
mentalising in an unemotional context (e.g. den Ouden et al., 2005, Blakemore et al., 
2007). 
 
The implication of the current finding in arMPFC depends on what role the arMPFC 
plays in  mentalising.  It has  been  proposed that  the cognitive  role  of arMPFC  in 
mentalising is to ‘decouple mental states from physical reality’ (Frith, 2007). Recent 
evidence  from  Gilbert  et  al.  (S.  Gilbert,  personal  communication)  supports  this 
notion
9. An alternative, not necessarily incompatible view of the role of arMPFC is 
that it represents the motivational relevance (Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, et al., 2005; 
Moll,  Zahn, et al., 2005), the value (Rushworth et al.,  2007) or changing  action 
values (Matsumoto et al. 2007) of social behaviors. A broader conceptualization of 
the role of MPFC in general (not just the anterior rostral portion), which has just 
been put forward in the literature, is that this large region of the brain is concerned 
with  representing  ‘fuzzy’,  inexact  and  shifting  realities  –  including  social 
information, which is highly context-dependent and mutable (Mitchell, 2009). The 
                                                  
8 Although see Moll et al. (2005a), who did not report activity in arMPFC during 
social/moral disgust (indignation) vs. basic visceral disgust 
9 An fMRI study conducted by S. Gilbert et al. (personal communication) used a 
multivariate technique to map the representation of distinct mental states in 
arMPFC and other regions of the brain. Patterns of activity corresponding to 
distinct mental states could not be identified in arMPFC (although this region was 
generally activated during mentalising conditions). However, patterns of activity 
corresponding to distinct mental states could be identified in the medial temporal 
lobe. One explanation for this finding could be that the arMPFC enables 
mentalising, drawing information on specific mental state representations from 
medial temporal regions of the brain.   153 
current study was not designed to distinguish between these possibilities. However, 
a  role  for  arMPFC  in  self-relevant  social  information,  needed  for  social  actions, 
would be consistent with the social vs. basic contrast in the current study.  
 
An alternative explanation for the finding that arMPFC is more active in social than 
basic emotions, is that the social emotion condition is more engaging and evocative 
(see Mitchell, 2009). Although we found no evidence for higher emotion ratings in 
social than basic emotions (in fact, the opposite was found), self-rated emotion is a 
notoriously  slippery  and  unreliable  measure.  This  explanation,  however,  is  also 
compatible  with  the  notion  that  arMPFC  is  representing  self-relevant  social 
information, as this information is engaging. Clearly, further work is needed on the 
precise role of the arMPFC in social-emotional tasks, and implications for models of 
social cognitive functioning and emotion processing.  
 
Finally,  several  previous  studies  have  demonstrated  activity  within  child  and 
adolescent arMPFC during mentalising relative to control conditions (Blakemore et 
al., 2007; Moriguchi et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2006). These previous studies have 
variously  investigated  mentalising  using  intentional  vs.  physical  causality 
statements,  animated  shapes  moving  in  a  manner  that  suggest  characters  with 
intentions,  and  judgments  of  sincere  vs.  sarcastic  statements.  The  current  result 
extends this developmental finding to show that arMPFC is also active in adolescent 
participants during mentalising in a strongly emotional context. 
 
5.4.1.2 Posterior superior temporal sulcus/ temporo-parietal junction 
Adults and adolescents activated the pSTS/TPJ for social vs. basic emotion, with 
activity greater on the left than on the right. The left TPJ is consistently reported for 
its involvement in mentalising tasks, and is thought to play a role in reasoning about 
the beliefs of others (Samson et al., 2004; Frith & Frith, 2003; Saxe & Kanwisher, 
2003). Elsewhere, it has been argued that pSTS/TPJ represents a prediction error (or 
‘pay  attention!’)  signal  for  updating  social  information  (Hampton  et  al.,  2008; 
Kawawaki et al., 2006). This is not in consistent with the current result. 
 
The pSTS/TPJ has been reported to be activated during mentalising in adolescents 
(Blakemore et al., 2007; Moriguchi et al., 2007). Activity within this region in the 
social relative to basic emotion condition may be related to the need for representing   154 
or reasoning about other people’s beliefs when imagining social vs. basic emotion 
situations. 
 
5.4.2 Group differences in the fMRI correlates of social emotion processing 
5.4.2.1 Anterior rostral MPFC 
Although both age groups activated parts of the anterior rostral MPFC for social vs. 
basic emotion, a more lateral part of this region was activated for social vs. basic by 
the  adolescent  group,  but  not  by  the  adult  group  (Figure  5.5).  This  region  was 
contiguous with the region activated by adolescents in the main effect of social vs. 
basic emotion. Activity to social vs. basic emotion at this locus was also negatively 
correlated with age. This result suggests that, as well as showing greater activity 
than adults within parts of arMPFC for social vs. basic emotion, adolescents also 
activate a greater volume of the arMPFC for social emotion processing, or activate 
additional parts of arMPFC that adults do not. This result is consistent with recent 
developmental neuroimaging studies looking at other aspects of  social  cognition, 
such as thinking about how intentions cause behaviour (Blakemore et al., 2007) and 
understanding the intended meanings of ironic remarks (Wang et al., 2006). These 
previous studies demonstrated an age-related decrease in activity in social relative to 
control conditions in arMPFC, in a similar location to that found in the current study 
(see Blakemore, 2008 for meta-analysis).   155 
Figure 5.7 arMPFC shows greater activity in adolescents relative to adults during mentalising 
tasks. The current study found greater mentalising-related activity in a region of arMPFC in the 
adolescent than in the adult group, at a similar location (pink star) to that found in previous studies 
(Blakemore, 2008; Pfeifer et al., 2009; Figure 1.8). 
 
 
 
 
5.4.2.2 Anterior temporal cortex 
The left ATC demonstrated a significant group by condition interaction (Figure 5.4) 
such that the adult group showed more activation of this region than did adolescents 
for social vs. basic emotion processing. Activity to social vs. basic emotion in the 
left  ATC  was  also  positively  correlated  with  age.  The  ATC  is  thought  to  store 
semantic social-emotional knowledge, or ‘social scripts’ (Frith, 2007; Zahn et al., 
2007; Olsson et al., 2007), and it has been suggested that activation of the ATC 
during mentalising tasks  in adults is  due to the accessing  and use  of this  stored 
knowledge (Frith, 2007). 
 
5.4.2.3 Interpretation of group differences 
One interpretation of the difference in activation pattern between age groups is that it 
reflects a difference in the cognitive strategy for social vs. basic emotion processing, 
and for mentalising or social cognition in general. A region of MPFC implicated in 
mentalising was found to be more active in adolescents than in adults during social   156 
vs. basic emotion processing. Therefore it could be the case that during adolescence, 
either  a  greater  degree  of  mental  state  attribution,  or  a  more  effortful  and  less 
automatic form of mental state attribution, takes place in social-emotional situations. 
Later, during mature adulthood, the role of mentalising in social-emotional situations 
is diminished, because accumulated social experience allows for a greater reliance 
on  semantic  social-emotional  knowledge  (e.g.  represented  in  anterior  temporal 
cortex). This is a purely speculative interpretation (see Poldrack, 2008), but it could 
be investigated using cognitive-psychological paradigms.  
 
An alternative explanation for the age group difference in arMPFC is that in adults, 
recruitment of the arMPFC during  mentalising is  more  metabolically or  neurally 
efficient (Durston et al., 2006). This explanation would make it difficult to explain 
the  age-related  increase  in  activity  within  the  left  ATC,  and  further  studies  are 
needed to look at developmental trajectories of functional activity across the brain. 
This issue is explored in more detail in the general Discussion, Chapter 7 (section 
7.2.4). 
 
5.4.3 FMRI correlates of self/other processing 
In the  current study, participants imagined  emotion scenarios either from a first-
person  (self)  or  a  third  person  (mother)  perspective.  This  additional  factor  was 
included because previous studies have shown that neural activity to emotion (in 
adults) and semantic knowledge (in adults vs. adolescents) differs between self and 
other perspectives (Ruby & Decety, 2004; Pfeifer et al., 2007). In the current study, 
thinking about emotion from a first-person vs. third-person perspective resulted in 
activation in the right postcentral gyrus in adolescents. Activation of this region is 
consistent  with  previous  studies  (Ruby  &  Decety,  2004),  and  may  be  related  to 
imagining the sensory consequences of emotional scenarios. A region of the MPFC 
showed a significant interaction between protagonist and emotion in both groups. 
This  region  of  the  MPFC  was  similarly  located  in  both  groups,  and  was  more 
anterodorsal than the main foci of activation to social vs. basic emotion and self vs. 
other processing. Inspection of the parameter estimates for this region revealed that, 
in both groups, the anterodorsal MPFC was most active to social emotion in the 
first-person perspective. 
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A region of activation was seen in the left TPJ for the three-way interaction between 
emotion, protagonist, and group. Although the left TPJ was more active for social 
vs. basic emotion in the adolescent group, the adult group showed highest activation 
of  this  region  for  basic  emotion  in  the  third-person  perspective  and  for  social 
emotion in  the  first-person perspective. The role of this brain region in thinking 
about others’ beliefs has been highlighted in adult neuroimaging and lesion studies 
(Samson et al., 2004; Frith & Frith, 2003). The differential recruitment of the left 
TPJ  in  adults  and  adolescents  in  the  current  study  may  indicate  that  different 
cognitive strategies are being used for the attribution of social and basic emotions to 
self  and  other.  For  a  given  emotion,  the  left  TPJ  seems  to  differentiate  better 
between self and other in adults than it does in adolescents. A possible interpretation 
of these data, which has been proposed elsewhere (Moriguchi et al., 2007), is that 
adolescents  rely  more  heavily  on  a  simulation-based  strategy  when  imagining 
another person’s emotional response than adults do. It is notable that this difference 
in brain activity occurred despite a lack of group difference in perceived self–mother 
similarity (see Results, section 5.3.1.2).  
 
5.4.4 Role of the arMPFC in social cognitive development 
An interesting perspective on the role of the arMPFC in social cognition has recently 
been raised in the adult lesion and neuroimaging literature. Although the arMPFC is 
robustly activated by mentalising tasks, and adults presenting with MPFC lesions 
usually show mentalising deficits (Frith & Frith, 2003; see Frith, 2007), there is one 
report  of  an  individual  who  suffered  extensive  bilateral  MPFC  damage  during 
adulthood but who was unimpaired on mentalising tasks (Bird et al., 2004). The 
arMPFC is not recruited when adults make semantic discriminations among abstract 
social concepts, such as ‘brave’ or ‘stingy’ (Zahn et al., 2007). Rather, this process is 
associated with activity within superior ATC. In addition, a small number of social 
emotion studies in adults fail to find arMPFC activation, but do find activity within 
other regions of the mentalising network such as the STS and the ATC, as well as in 
more ventral and/or anterior prefrontal regions such as the fronto-polar and orbito-
frontal  cortex  (Moll,  de  Oliveira-Souza,  et  al.,  2005;  Moll,  Zahn,  et  al.,  2005; 
Takahashi et al., 2004). The current study, as well as previous studies, found greater 
arMPFC  activity  in  adolescents  than  in  adults  for  mentalising  relative  to  control 
tasks  (Blakemore  et  al.,  2007;  Pfeifer  et  al.,  2007;  Wang  et  al.,  2006).  One 
interpretation of this collection of findings is that the role of arMPFC in mentalising   158 
tasks becomes less crucial across age. Studies investigating mentalising ability in 
individuals who have sustained lesions to arMPFC during childhood, adolescence or 
adulthood would be important in evaluating this hypothesis. 
 
Further  work  is  needed  on  the  development  during  adolescence  of  the  cognitive 
strategies for understanding people. For example, it is not known whether the type of 
mentalising needed for social emotion understanding changes with development. It 
may be the case that a more explicit mentalising process is needed to learn about 
social emotions initially, but that more scripted, heuristic, or intuitive strategies are 
employed later on (Haidt, 2001). 
 
Another factor which may contribute to a change in the role of the arMPFC with age 
is  anatomical  brain  development.  Volumetric  MRI  studies show that  gray matter 
volume  in social  brain  regions such as the MPFC  and the  TPJ decreases  during 
adolescence, whereas white matter volume increases (Shaw et al., 2008; Gogtay et 
al., 2004; Giedd et al., 1999; Paus et al., 1999; Sowell et al., 1999). These changes 
are thought to be due to synaptic pruning and axonal myelination/increases in axonal 
calibre  (see  Introduction,  sections  1.4.2  and  1.4.3.2.1.1/.2.2),  and  may  result  in 
increased coordination between components of the social brain network and greater 
processing efficiency within brain regions mediating social cognition. 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
This  fMRI  study  showed  evidence  that  the  neural  processing  of  social  emotion 
develops  between  adolescence  and  adulthood.  Although  components  of  the 
mentalising system including the arMPFC were active in both groups, adolescents 
activated the lateral rostral MPFC more for social vs. basic emotion whereas adults 
did not. Adults activated the left ATC more for social vs. basic emotion than did 
adolescents.  These  results  indicate  that  the  neural  processing  of  social  emotion 
continues to develop between adolescence and adulthood, such that the predominant 
activity moves from anterior (arMPFC) to more posterior (temporal) regions with 
age.  Further  work  is  needed  to  ascertain  how  this  is  related  to  neuroanatomical 
development  within  social  brain  regions,  and  to  possible  changes  in  cognitive   159 
strategies. Only female participants were included in the current study. It would be 
interesting to conduct a study with male participants. 
 
The current study shows evidence that adolescents and adults use a similar neural 
network for social emotion processing, but with relative differences. However, the 
functional relevance of this developmental shift across adolescence is not clear. The 
current experiment did not look for behavioural differences between the age groups. 
Indeed, it was important that performance between groups was matched because, 
had performance differed between groups, it would have been impossible to interpret 
any differences in neural activity, which might have been a cause or a consequence 
of  differences  in  task  performance.  Very  few  empirical  studies  have  reported 
significant  behavioural  development  during  adolescence  that  is  specific  to  social 
cognition  and  which  cannot  be  explained  by  general  improvement  in  attention, 
concentration, memory, and so on. The reasons for this are probably multifactorial. 
One possibility is that, in the lab, adolescents are able to pass complicated social 
cognitive tasks, which in everyday life they do not accomplish successfully. More 
naturalistic paradigms might be useful in addressing this issue.  
 
5.5.1 The next chapter 
In the current chapter, evidence was presented that the fMRI correlates of social 
emotion differ between adolescent and adult groups. Further studies are needed to 
establish the extent to which this age group difference is due to a shift in cognitive 
strategies,  and/or  changes  in  brain  activity  as  a  result  of  neuroanatomical 
development. However, an outstanding issue that should be addressed as a priority is 
the extent to which the collection of brain regions referred to as the mentalising 
system, or “mentalising network” (e.g. Frith & Frith, 2003), indeed function as a 
network during mentalising tasks relative to control tasks. A network is defined as a 
set of brain regions that demonstrate functional integration despite spatial separation, 
but there is currently limited evidence that the so-called mentalising network does 
indeed show functional integration.  
 
The study described in the next chapter was conducted to address this outstanding 
issue.  In  Chapter  6,  fMRI  data  from  Chapter  5  were  reanalysed  to  investigate 
functional integration between brain regions involved in mentalising. The technique 
which  was  chosen  to  address  this  research  question  is  known  as  psycho-  160 
physiological interaction (PPI) analysis. This method was used to test the hypothesis 
that there would be greater functional integration, i.e. connectivity, as assessed using 
PPI analysis, between the arMPFC and the pSTS/TPJ and ATC during mentalising 
(social emotion) relative to a control condition (basic emotion). In addition, it was 
hypothesised that functional integration within the mentalising system would differ 
between adult and adolescent age groups, in line with evidence from developmental 
connectivity studies using non-mentalising tasks (see section 6.1.3), and given the 
evidence that white matter tracts connecting spatially distant brain regions undergo 
continuing maturation across adolescence (e.g. Paus et al., 1999; Giedd et al., 1999a; 
Giorgio et al., 2008; Barnea-Goraly et al., 2005).   161 
Chapter 6 
 
Effective connectivity during social emotion 
processing in adolescents and in adults 
 
 
In the previous chapter, results were reported from an fMRI study of social and 
basic emotion processing in adolescents and in adults. Activity was observed within 
parts of the mentalising system including arMPFC in both age groups. However, 
there were age group differences in activity, such that adolescents activated a region 
of arMPFC more strongly than did adults for social vs. basic emotion, and adults 
activated  part  of  the  left  ATC  more  strongly  than  did  adolescents  during  this 
contrast. The current chapter describes a reanalysis of this fMRI dataset that was 
implemented  to  investigate  effective  connectivity  within  the  mentalising  system. 
Effective connectivity, defined as the influence that one neuronal system exerts over 
another, can be assessed using a statistical technique known as psychophysiological 
interaction  (PPI)  analysis.  Using  this  technique,  evidence  is  presented  that 
components of the mentalising system interact functionally during social emotion 
processing, and furthermore that there are age group differences in connectivity. 
Further studies are needed to replicate and extend these findings, and to investigate 
the structural pathways responsible for within-mentalising system interactions and 
their development. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Many studies have reported co-activation of the anterior rostral medial prefrontal 
cortex  (arMPFC),  posterior  superior  temporal  sulcus  (pSTS)  bordering  on  the 
temporo-parietal  junction  (TPJ)  and  anterior  temporal  cortex  (ATC)  during 
mentalising tasks, and as a consequence this set of brain regions is often referred to 
as the mentalising ‘network’ (Frith & Frith, 2003). However, a network is defined as 
a  set  of  brain  regions  that  demonstrate  functional  integration  despite  spatial   162 
separation. It would appear from the mentalising literature that no study to date has 
tested whether this set of brain regions indeed demonstrate functional integration. 
There  is  evidence  that  components  of  the  mentalising  system  are  connected 
anatomically in rhesus macaques (e.g. MPFC receives projections from the temporal 
pole  and  superior  temporal  gyrus:  Bachevalier  et  al.,  1997;  MPFC  reciprocally 
connected with superior temporal cortex: Barbas et al., 1999), and a resting-state 
connectivity study in humans has shown correlations in activity between arMPFC 
and both ATC and the TPJ during ‘rest’ (i.e. unconstrained task conditions; Kelly et 
al., 2009).  
 
It would appear that the only study to date that has looked at connectivity during a 
mentalising task is a positron emission tomography study by Castelli et al. (2002). 
This study demonstrated task-dependent correlations in activity between pSTS/TPJ 
and an extrastriate region implicated in biological motion, during a mentalising task 
in which  participants attributed  mental  states  to moving two-dimensional shapes. 
Indeed,  surprisingly  in  view  of  the  wealth  of  functional  imaging  data  collected 
during mentalising tasks (Frith & Frith, 2003; Mitchell, 2009), no study to date has 
investigated within-mentalising system connectivity during mentalising tasks. It is 
conceivable that these regions are co-activated during mentalising tasks, but do not 
directly interact. Therefore, the first aim of the current study was to test whether the 
brain regions which comprise the mentalising system show evidence of functional 
interactions during a mentalising task.  
 
6.1.1 PPI analysis 
The technique which was chosen to address this research question is known as PPI 
analysis, or the analysis of ‘psychophysiological interactions’ (Friston et al. 1997). 
PPI analysis is a way of explaining responses in one brain region in terms of an 
interaction  between  the  influence  of  another  region,  and  some  experimental 
parameter (e.g. task; cognitive process). PPI analysis, along with other techniques 
for  analysing  effective  connectivity
10,  allow  one  to  make  inferences  about  the 
influence that one neuronal system could be exerting over another. This is in contrast 
to  analyses  of  functional  connectivity,  in  which  conclusions  may  only  be  drawn 
about  simple  correlations  in  activity  between  brain  regions  –  correlations  which 
                                                  
10 E.g. structural equation modelling, dynamic causal modelling   163 
could  be  spurious  or  uninteresting,  such  as  stimulus-evoked  transients,  and  the 
correlations that are measured in resting-state functional connectivity studies. 
 
In PPI analysis, hypothesised effective connectivity is predicated on a model of the 
influence that one neuronal system is exerting over another. The parameters of the 
model (the connection strengths) are identified as those which allow the model to 
emulate the observed regional activities, or interregional correlations. The essential 
idea behind PPI analysis (see Figure 6.1) is this: If one were to regress the activity 
of one brain region (call it region B) on the activity of another brain region (region 
A), the slope of this regression would reflect the influence the second region (A) 
could be exerting over the first region (B).  If this regression were then repeated 
using data acquired in a different experimental context, the slope might change, and 
this  change  in  slope  is  a  PPI.  The  degree  to  which  activity  in  region  B  can  be 
predicted on the basis of activity in region A corresponds to the contribution of 
region  A  to  region  B,  where  this  contribution  can  be  related  to  effective 
connectivity.  
 
Figure 6.1 Graphical depiction of a fictitious psychophysiological interaction (PPI). There is a 
PPI between Condition (1 vs. 2) and activity in region A that is expressed in region B. 
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For a given PPI there are two statistically equivalent explanations (which may differ 
in physiological plausibility). The first explanation is that the experimental context 
(e.g. task, cognitive process) is modulating the contribution of activity in region A to 
activity in region B (i.e. there is a context-specific change in effective connectivity). 
For example, mentalising vs. no-mentalising may modulate the effect that activity in 
region  A  has  on  activity  in  region  B.  The  second  explanation  is that activity  in 
region  A  is  modulating  the  impact  of  experimental  context  on  activity  in  brain 
region  B  (i.e.  effective  connectivity  modulates  stimulus-specific  responses).  For 
example, the extent of activity in region A may modulate the impact of mentalising 
on activity in region B. Therefore the results from the current PPI analysis will not 
distinguish statistically between these possibilities. 
 
6.1.2 Mentalising system connectivity 
In the current Chapter, fMRI data from Chapter 5, collected while participants 
silently read a series of scenarios designed to evoke social emotions (embarrassment 
or guilt) or basic emotions (disgust or fear), were reanalysed in order to test whether 
effective connectivity within the mentalising system would be greater during social 
than basic emotions. Specifically, PPI analysis was used to test the prediction that 
arMPFC activity would more strongly predict activity in pSTS/TPJ and ATC during 
social than during basic emotions
11. 
 
6.1.3 Age group differences in connectivity 
The second aim of the current study was to investigate age group differences in 
effective connectivity. Recent fMRI studies of social cognition in adolescents and in 
adults, analysed in the conventional manner to look at mean activity levels in social 
and non-social conditions (Burnett et al., 2009, Blakemore et al. 2007, Wang et al. 
2006, Pfeifer et al. 2007; Pfeifer et al., 2009), have demonstrated an apparent shift in 
activity between late childhood/adolescence (age 9-18) and adulthood (age 22-38). 
Specifically, these studies show an age-related decrease in activity within arMPFC, 
and an increase in activity in temporal portions of the mentalising system (pSTS/TPJ 
or ATC; for review, see Blakemore, 2008). In the current study, it was hypothesised 
that this shift in mean activity would be accompanied by a developmental shift in 
effective connectivity. 
                                                  
11 Or, equivalently, that social > basic emotion would more strongly predict 
activity in pSTS/TPJ and ATC while MPFC was more vs. less activated   165 
 
This hypothesis was prompted by recent evidence from non-social tasks that age-
related  changes  in  mean  activity  during  fMRI  are  accompanied  by  changes  in 
functional and/or effective connectivity. For example, Stevens et al. (2007, 2009) 
demonstrated  adult  vs.  adolescent  group  differences  in  both  mean  activity  and 
effective connectivity, in brain regions engaged during performance of the go/no-go 
task
12. Hare et al. (2008) found that the amygdala was more active in adolescents 
relative  to  adults  while  viewing  fearful  faces,  and  that  across  age,  functional 
connectivity between ventral prefrontal cortex and the amygdala was correlated with 
a ‘habituation’ of amygdala activity upon repeated exposure to the faces. Finally, 
Menon et al. (2005) showed an age-related decrease in activity within the left medial 
temporal  lobe  during  memory  encoding  (in  11-19  year  olds)  which  was 
accompanied  by  increased  functional  connectivity  with  dorsolateral  prefrontal 
cortex.  However,  no  previous  study  has  investigated  the  development  between 
adolescence and adulthood of effective (or indeed functional) connectivity within the 
mentalising system, during social cognition tasks. This, therefore, was the second 
aim of the current PPI investigation. 
 
6.2 Methods 
 
6.2.1 Participants, experimental design and data acquisition 
The  participants,  task  and  scanning  parameters  were  as  described  in Chapter 5, 
sections 5.2.1-5.2.3: Nineteen female adolescents (age range = 10.83 to 18.17 years; 
mean age = 14.8 years) and 10 female adults (age range = 22.92 to 31.83 years; 
mean  age  =  26.41  years)  underwent  fMRI  scanning  as  they  read  sentences 
describing scenarios in which a social or a basic emotion would be felt. For each 
participant, 554 functional volumes were acquired over two consecutive scanning 
sessions lasting 12 min each.  
 
                                                  
12 Brain regions: Correct responses engaged a network comprising left lateral 
prefrontal cortex, left postcentral gyrus/inferior parietal lobule, striatum, and left 
cerebellum. A similar network was engaged during errors, but this network was 
not integrated with activity in regions believed to be engaged for higher-order 
cognitive control. In addition, a medial/dorsolateral prefrontal-parietal network 
responded to all no-go stimuli, but with greater activity to errors. ICA analyses 
also identified a third error-related circuit comprised of ATL, limbic and 
pregenual cingulate cortices, possibly representing an affective response to errors.   166 
In  the  conventional  analysis  of  the  fMRI  data  (Chapter  5,  section  5.2.4),  mean 
signal in adults vs. adolescents was analysed during social vs. basic emotion, and 
from the perspective of self vs. other, in a 2x2x2 mixed factorial design. However 
for  the  current  PPI  analysis,  a  2x2  mixed  factorial  design  was  employed,  with 
between-subjects factor age group (adolescent vs. adult) and within-subjects factor 
emotion  (social  vs.  basic),  by  collapsing  the  self/other  levels  of  the  protagonist 
factor. The reason for collapsing self and other scenarios in the current PPI analysis 
was because no significant differences were found in activity within any mentalising 
regions for self > other or other > self in either age group, and to increase power. 
 
6.2.2 PPI Analysis 
PPI analysis assesses the hypothesis that activity in one or a set of brain regions can 
be explained by  an interaction between activity  in another  part  of the brain (the 
physiological source), and the presence of a cognitive process (the psychological 
context).  This  is  implemented  by  denoting  activity  in  the  source  region  as  the 
physiological regressor, and psychological context is the psychological regressor. A 
third regressor in the analysis represents the interaction between the first and second 
regressor,  and  brain  regions  are  identified  for  which  the  interaction  regressor 
predicts BOLD signal. 
 
6.2.2.1 Definition of physiological source and PPI target regions 
In  the  conventional analysis reported  in Chapter 5, the arMPFC, pSTS/TPJ and 
ATC  were  active  in  either  or  both  age  groups  during  social  relative  to  basic 
emotions. Overlapping portions of arMPFC were active in both age groups, as were 
portions of left pSTS/TPJ; the right pSTS/TPJ was active in the adolescent group 
only, and left ATC was active in the adult group only.  
 
In  the  current  PPI  analysis,  the  arMPFC  was  selected  as  the  source  of  the 
physiological regressor due to (a) its confirmed involvement in mentalising (Amodio 
& Frith, 2006), and (b) because overlapping regions of arMPFC were active in both 
age groups during social vs. basic emotion in Chapter 5, whereas the same was not 
true of pSTS/TPJ and ATC. Effective connectivity between the source region and 
target  regions  of  interest,  during  social  relative  to  basic  emotions,  was  then 
investigated. Target regions of interest were pSTS/TPJ and ATC. 
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The  precise  region  of  arMPFC  from  which  the  physiological  regressor  (BOLD 
signal)  was  extracted  was  defined  in  the  following  manner.  First,  taking  as  a 
reference the mentalising region of arMPFC (BA 10) delineated in Gilbert et al. 
(2007), arMPFC was defined as the volume from -8 to +8 on the x-axis, from +40 to 
+56 on the y-axis and from -12 to +30 on the z-axis. Then, in each single-subject t-
contrast  map  for the emotion  contrast (social >  basic), thresholded  at  P < 0.005 
uncorrected (minimum voxel extent 4), SPM2 was used to locate the nearest local 
maximum to the centre of this volume (i.e. the nearest single-subject peak to the co-
ordinate [0 48 9]). A volume of interest was then created in the form of a sphere of 
radius 8 mm centred on the single-subject peak. If there was no significantly active 
cluster within arMPFC at this threshold (N = 7 datasets, of which 6 were from the 
adolescent group), the threshold was lowered to P < 0.05 uncorrected (minimum 
voxel extent 4). Two datasets that did not contain a peak within the defined arMPFC 
volume at this significance level were excluded (1 adolescent, 1 adult), leaving 17 
adolescent and nine adult datasets in the PPI analysis. Finally, each single-subject 
social > basic t-contrast map was smoothed to facilitate group level analysis, and the 
BOLD signal time-series was extracted from each subject’s 8 mm sphere of interest 
in arMPFC. 
 
6.2.2.2 Group level PPI analysis 
Voxel-wise PPI analysis was conducted at the combined group level (N = 26), in 
order to identify target brain regions that showed a significant increase in correlated 
activity with the arMPFC volumes of interest (VOI) during social relative to basic 
emotion,  at  an  uncorrected  threshold  of  P  <  0.01  with  minimum  voxel  extent  4 
(Penny et al., 2003). For non-hypothesised target regions, a threshold of P < 0.05 
(minimum voxel extent 4) was applied  with  family-wise  error  correction.  Target 
regions were defined as pSTS/TPJ (co-ordinates as in Aichhorn et al., 2006) plus the 
caudal portion of STS that extends into TPJ (as in Frith & Frith, 2003; Hein  & 
Knight, 2008), as well as the ATC (as in Frith & Frith, 2003; Burnett et al., 2009; 
Hein & Knight, 2008).  
 
After the combined  group-level analysis, voxel-wise PPI  analysis  was  conducted 
within each age group (adolescent: N = 17, aged 11-18, mean (s.d.) age = 14.83 
(2.16)  years;  adult:  N  =  9,  aged  22-32,  mean  (s.d.)  age  =  26.69  (3.66)  years) 
separately.  To  directly  compare  group  differences  in  effective  connectivity,  the   168 
interaction between PPI (the interaction between arMPFC VOI activity and emotion) 
and group (adolescent vs. adult) was investigated. Finally, t-contrasts were used to 
investigate,  within  each  group  separately,  effective  connectivity  during  social  > 
basic emotion within brain regions that showed this group-by-PPI interaction. 
 
6.3 Results 
 
6.3.1 Psychophysiological interaction across participants 
At  the  combined  group  level  (N  =  26  participants,  aged  11  to  32),  PPI  analysis 
revealed a significant interaction between emotion (social > basic) and signal in the 
arMPFC volumes of interest (VOI), expressed in other regions of the mentalising 
system.  Specifically,  the  left  TPJ,  right  pSTS  and  left  ATC  showed  greater 
connectivity with arMPFC during social than during basic emotion scenarios (Table 
6.1; Fig. 6.2). No other regions showed significant interaction with the arMPFC VOI 
during social vs. basic emotions.  
 
Table 6.1 
PPI results: brain regions expressing an interaction 
between activity within arMPFC and emotion 
condition (social vs. basic) across participants (N = 
26)       
    P  T  Z 
Size in voxels at P 
< 0.01 
R pSTS  [48 -42 2]  <0.001  4.21  3.63  343 
  [60 -42 2]  0.001  3.62  3.21  (part of above) 
  [62 -32 -4]  0.002  3.21  2.91  (part of above) 
           
L TPJ  [-44 -48 20]  0.002  3.25  2.94  51 
  [-42 -46 28]  0.007  2.66  2.48  (part of above) 
  [-58 -46 28]  0.003  2.96  2.71  10 
  [-46 -66 38]  0.005  2.76  2.56  8 
           
L anterior temporal 
cortex  [-46 10 -12]  0.005  2.75  2.55  14 
  [-46 8 -12]  0.006  2.7  2.51  7 
  [-66 -4 -22]  0.003  3.08  2.81  50 
  [-48 22 -18]  0.005  2.77  2.56  6 
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Figure 6.2 PPI results across participants: (a) regions of significant interaction between emotion 
(social > basic) and activity in arMPFC, shown at P < 0.01 projected onto transverse and sagittal T1 
images;  (b)  graphs  showing  parameter  estimates  for  regions  of  significant  interaction  between 
emotion (social > basic) and activity in arMPFC. 
 
 
 
6.3.2 Psychophysiological interactions within each age group separately  
Within the adult group (N = 9, aged 22 to 32), PPI analysis revealed a significant 
interaction  between  emotion  (social  >  basic)  and  signal  in  the  arMPFC  VOI, 
expressed in the ATC bilaterally and in the right pSTS/TPJ (Table 6.2a). That is, in 
the adult group, these regions showed greater effective connectivity with arMPFC 
during social than during basic emotions. 
 
Within  the  adolescent  group  (N  =  17,  aged  11  to  18),  PPI  analysis  revealed  a 
significant interaction between emotion (social > basic) and signal in the arMPFC 
VOI, expressed in the left pSTS extending into left TPJ, in left TPJ proper, in right 
pSTS  and  in  the  left  ATC  (Table  6.2a).  That  is,  in  the  adolescent  group,  these 
regions  showed  greater  effective  connectivity  with  arMPFC  during  social  than 
during basic emotions.  
 
6.3.3 Interaction between the arMPFC-emotion PPI and age group 
In the conventional analysis of the fMRI data (Chapter 5), adolescents were found 
to show stronger mean activity within arMPFC during social > basic emotion than 
did adults, whereas adults showed stronger mean activity within left ATC for this   170 
contrast  compared  to  adolescents.  In  the  current  PPI  analysis,  the  aim  was  to 
determine whether effective connectivity between arMPFC and other regions of the 
mentalising  system  also  varied  as  a  function  of  age  group.  Indeed,  PPI  analysis 
revealed a significant interaction between age group and the PPI between emotion 
condition and signal within the arMPFC VOI, expressed within a region of left pSTS 
extending into TPJ (Table 6.2b; Figure 6.3). In other words, effective connectivity 
between left pSTS/TPJ and the arMPFC VOI during social > basic emotion differed 
between adolescent and adult groups.  
 
In order to investigate the directionality of this age group difference, post hoc t-tests 
were conducted. These tests revealed greater adolescent connectivity between the 
arMPFC VOI and the central portion of left pSTS/TPJ during social relative to basic 
emotion (region (iii) in Figure 6.3: [-44 -34 10]; adolescents: paired samples t-test, 
t16 = -1.83, P = 0.04; adults: paired samples t-test, t8 = -0.76, P = 0.24). In a more 
peripheral portion of the left pSTS/TPJ region, adults showed the opposite pattern 
(region (ii) in Figure 6.3: [-38 -34 20]; adults: paired samples t-test, t8 = -2.31, P = 
0.02; adolescents: paired samples t-test, t16 = -1.15, P = 0.13). No other regions 
showed a significant interaction between age group and the emotion-arMPFC PPI.   171 
Table 6.2 
(a) 
PPI results: brain regions  expressing an interaction  between arMPFC 
signal  and  emotion  condition  (social  vs.  basic)  within  each  age  group 
separately 
 
Adult (N = 9)  P  T  Z 
Size in voxels at 
P < 0.01 
R pSTS/TPJ  [62 -44 4]  0.002  4.12  2.93  71 
  [68 -44 4]  0.002  3.97  2.87  (part of above) 
L anterior temporal cortex  [-48 16 -20]  0.002  3.99  2.88  31 
R anterior temporal cortex  [58 6 -32]  0.003  3.83  2.81  8 
           
Adolescent (N = 17)         
L pSTS extending into L TPJ  [-36 -36 8]  0.001  3.93  3.24  402 
  [-48 -38 8]  0.001  3.69  3.09  (part of above) 
  [-44 -44 0]  0.002  3.47  2.95  (part of above) 
L TPJ  [-58 -48 26]  0.006  2.86  2.53  8 
R pSTS/TPJ  [60 -30 -4]  0.001  3.64  3.06  249 
  [36 -28 18]  0.001  3.62  3.05  (part of above) 
  [60 -38 0]  0.003  3.15  2.74  (part of above) 
L anterior temporal cortex  [-44 -4 -24]  0.003  3.1  2.7  11 
 
(b) 
Group-by-PPI interaction: Brain regions expressing an interaction between arMPFC activity, 
emotion condition (social vs. basic) and group (adolescent vs. adult) 
    P  T  Z 
Size in voxels at P 
< 0.01 
L pSTS extending into L TPJ  [-40 -42 2]  <0.001  3.75  3.29  247 
  [-44 -34 10]  0.001  3.45  3.08  (part of above) 
  [-38 -34 20]  0.003  2.97  2.72  (part of above) 
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Figure 6.3 Interaction between group, emotion and arMPFC signal in left pSTS/TPJ (a) Region 
showing significant interaction between group (adolescent vs. adult), emotion (social vs. basic) and 
activity in anterior rostral MPFC, shown at P < 0.01 projected onto a sagittal T1 image. Crosshair is 
at peak voxel [-40 -42 2]. Regions in which there was also an effect of social vs. basic emotion within 
each group separately are circled; (b) graph showing parameter estimates for this interaction. Key: (i) 
peak voxel [-40 -42 2]; (ii) secondary peak voxel [-44 -34 10]; (iii) secondary peak voxel [-38 -34 20] 
 
 
 
 
6.4 Discussion 
 
The  current  study  had  two  aims.  The  first  aim  was  to  investigate  effective 
connectivity within the mentalising system during a social emotion task, using PPI 
analysis. A previous, conventional analysis of the same fMRI data had shown that 
components of the mentalising system, namely parts of the arMPFC, pSTS/TPJ and 
the ATC, were more active during social than during basic emotion processing in 
adolescents and/or adults (Chapter 5). In the current study, it was additionally found 
that pSTS/TPJ and ATC showed greater connectivity with arMPFC during social 
than during basic emotions. It would appear that this is the first study to demonstrate 
effective connectivity within the mentalising system. 
 
The second aim of the current study was to investigate age group differences in 
mentalising system connectivity. In Chapter 5, it was shown that activity in a region 
of arMPFC during social relative to basic emotions was greater in adolescents than 
in adults, whereas activity in left ATC was greater in adults for this contrast. The   173 
current PPI analysis adds to this developmental picture by showing greater effective 
connectivity between arMPFC and the left pSTS/TPJ during social relative to basic 
emotion processing in adolescents than in adults, while ATC shows task-dependent 
connectivity with arMPFC in both age groups. 
 
6.4.1 Effective connectivity within the mentalising system 
Conventional neuroimaging analysis provides information about how some index of 
brain activity within a set of brain regions differs between groups and conditions. 
PPI  analysis,  on  the  other  hand,  provides  information  regarding  correlations  in 
activity between brain regions, and how these correlations differ between groups and 
conditions (Friston et al., 1997). A task-dependent correlation between two brain 
regions  is  taken  to  imply  that  these  brain  regions  interact  more  during  one 
experimental condition than during another. 
 
The  previous,  conventional  analysis  showed  that  components  of  the  mentalising 
system were more active during social than during basic emotion processing. The 
current PPI analysis shows that components of the mentalising system also show 
effective  connectivity.  Specifically,  bilateral  pSTS/TPJ  and  the  left  ATC  show 
stronger  connectivity  with  arMPFC  during  social  relative  to  basic  emotion 
processing.  This  finding  adds  weight  to  the  notion  that  these  brain  regions  may 
function  as  a  network  during  mentalising  tasks.  It  is  possible  that,  at  a 
neurophysiological  level,  effective  connectivity  is  mediated  by  direct  anatomical 
connections between arMPFC and both pSTS/TPJ and ATC, as have been identified 
in rhesus macaques (Bachevalier et al., 1997; Barbas et al., 1999). However, more 
evidence is needed. 
 
The current study shows evidence for effective connectivity between arMPFC and 
parts  of  the  left  ATC  in  both  adult  and  adolescent  groups.  The  previous, 
conventional analysis indicated that adults activated left ATC for social relative to 
basic emotion, whereas adolescents did not (even at reduced significance threshold). 
Because conventional and PPI analyses test different constructs, these two sets of 
results  provide  complementary  information.  Indeed,  the  current  finding  mirrors 
those  from  other  PPI  studies  reported  in  the  literature,  in  which  effective 
connectivity between two brain regions has been demonstrated when conventional 
analysis  had  shown  no  activity  in  one  or  both  regions  during  a  particular   174 
experimental  context.  For  example,  Rao  et  al.  (2008)  showed  that,  whereas  no 
regions within prefrontal cortex were active during an executive sensorimotor task
13, 
there was nevertheless demonstrable effective connectivity between parts of lateral 
PFC  and  relevant  sensorimotor  regions  during  task  performance.  Rao  et  al. 
interpreted this result as showing evidence that PFC plays a regulatory (rather than 
direct) role in the task. Thus, one possibility in the current study is that during social 
relative  to  basic  emotion  processing,  arMPFC  and  the  ATC  are  engaged  in  a 
regulatory rather than a direct relationship. Exactly what this means, however, is 
unclear. Further studies are needed to investigate the directionality of this arMPFC-
ATC relationship, and explore in more detail its functional role.  
 
6.4.2 Adolescent vs. adult effective connectivity 
The  second  aim  of  this  study  was  to  investigate  whether  effective  connectivity 
within the mentalising system differed between adolescent and adult groups. To the 
author’s knowledge, no previous fMRI study has examined age group differences in 
effective connectivity during a mentalising task. The current study shows evidence 
for  an  age-related  decrease  in  effective  connectivity  between  arMPFC  and  left 
pSTS/TPJ during social relative to basic emotion processing.  
 
This finding is at odds with the small number of developmental studies of functional 
and  effective  connectivity  in  the  literature,  which  report  age-related  increases  in 
correlated activity. However, all previous studies have been restricted to non-social 
domains, so it is not clear how comparable the findings are. Effective connectivity 
has been investigated in adolescents vs. adults during go/no-go task performance 
(Stevens et al., 2007, 2009) and during memory encoding (Menon et al. 2005). In 
these  studies,  age-related  increases  in  connectivity  were  shown  between  brain 
regions instrumental in performing the tasks
14. Other studies have investigated the 
development  of  functional  connectivity  during  ‘rest’,  or  unconstrained  task 
conditions (Fair et al., 2007, 2008; Kelly et al., 2009). These studies have shown that 
some within-network correlations increase, whereas some decrease with age. The 
                                                  
13 A puzzling result, given that lesions to this part of PFC interfere with 
performance of the task. 
14 In Stevens et al., age-associated increases in the strength of within-network 
connectivity were accompanied by a decrease in strength of between-network 
connectivity. In the current study, we do not know whether the set of brain regions 
we are interested in participates in a single discrete network, or a set of interacting 
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current  finding  that  social  emotion-dependent  arMPFC-pSTS/TPJ  connectivity  is 
greater  in  adolescents  than  in  adults  needs  to  be  replicated,  and  then  tested  for 
generalisability using other mentalising tasks.   
 
6.4.3 Implications for the development of mentalising 
An interpretation of the age-related decrease in connectivity between arMPFC and 
left pSTS/TPJ during social relative to basic emotions is that, in order to accomplish 
this  task,  adolescents  require  not  only  higher  activity  in  arMPFC  (as  found  in 
Chapter 5) but also stronger co-activation of the mentalising system, relative to 
adults. This may be because the maturing network in adolescents is less efficient in 
accomplishing  the  task.  Continuing  synaptic  elimination  and  axonal  myelination 
during adolescence (Yakovlev & Lecours, 1967; Huttenlocher, 1979; Huttenlocher 
et  al.,  1982;  Benes  et  al.,  1994;  Huttenlocher  &  Dabholkar,  1997),  and  perhaps 
developing axonal calibre (Paus et al., 2008) may act to increase the efficiency of the 
system. Another (not mutually exclusive) possibility is that the shift in functional 
connectivity between arMPFC and left pSTS/TPJ with age is related to a change in 
the type of mentalising used in social cognition tasks such as these. More naturalistic 
tests of mentalising, on  which adolescents do  not show  ceiling  performance,  are 
needed to test this hypothesis. Performance on a visual perspective-taking task has 
recently been shown to develop throughout adolescence (Dumontheil et al. 2009; see 
Introduction). Follow-up studies should ascertain whether this is accompanied by 
changes  in  functional  (including  connectivity)  brain  measures.  Studies  are  also 
needed  that  combine  measures  of  functional  connectivity  during  with  static 
anatomical measures of grey and white matter volume, and white matter integrity 
(e.g. voxel-based morphometry and diffusion-tensor imaging; Olesen et al., 2003; 
see Discussion, sections 7.2.4 and 7.2.5).  
 
PPI analysis is used for investigating how an experimental manipulation modulates 
functional connectivity between brain regions, or alternatively how one brain region 
modulates the impact of an experimental manipulation on activity within a second 
brain region (Friston et al., 1997). In the current study, it could be the case that the 
social  emotion  task  causes  differences  in  connectivity  between  the  mentalising 
regions,  or  instead  that  activity  within  arMPFC  modulates  the  response  of  other 
mentalising regions to the social emotion task. The directionality of the functional 
connectivity reported here is unknown; whether arMPFC is influencing activity in   176 
the rest of the mentalising  network, or vice  versa,  cannot be determined by  PPI 
analysis. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
Several recent fMRI studies (including Chapter 5) have shown evidence for the 
development  during  adolescence  of  activity  within  the  mentalising  system. 
However, the development of effective connectivity within the mentalising system 
has  not  previously  been  studied  in  adolescents,  or  indeed  in  adults.  This  study 
represents  an  initial  step  in  this  direction,  by  demonstrating  that  arMPFC  shows 
task-dependent connectivity with pSTS/TPJ and ATC, during social relative to basic 
emotion processing, in adolescents and in adults. Future studies are needed to extend 
this finding, and to replicate the developmental result that functional connectivity 
between arMPFC and pSTS/TPJ during social relative to basic emotions decreases 
between adolescence and adulthood.   177 
Chapter 7 
 
Discussion 
 
 
This  Discussion  will  summarise,  place  in  context  and  draw  out  implications  of 
findings from each of the preceding chapters. Subsequently, outstanding issues will 
be discussed, with general and specific suggestions for future investigation.  
 
7.1 Summary of findings  
  
7.1.1 Chapter 2: The development of expected value maximising, risk-seeking 
and counterfactual emotion in a probabilistic gambling task 
Adolescents  are  said  to  be  risk-seeking,  and  this  is  thought  to  underlie  real-life 
adolescent engagement in ‘risky’ activities, that is exciting activities which have a 
relatively high risk of causing harm (Geier & Luna, 2009). However, engagement in 
such activities, which include experimentation with substances and unsafe sex, is 
likely to occur for a variety of reasons. One possibility is that adolescents show a 
genuine preference for risk (e.g. Casey et al., 2008). However, another possibility is 
that the ability to estimate and weigh up potential consequences is still developing. 
The  study  described  in  Chapter  2  investigated  behavioural  economic 
operationalisations of each of these two hypotheses, in participants aged nine to 35. 
The propensity to seek risk was investigated by measuring the tendency to maximise 
outcome variance in a gambling task, and the ability to choose the optimal set of 
possible consequences was investigated in the same task by measuring the tendency 
to maximise expected value (EV). EV is the sum of possible outcomes of a decision 
(e.g. a quantity of points or money) weighted by their probabilities.  
 
The results show that both components of decision-making, the ability to maximise 
EV and the tendency to seek risk, continue to develop during adolescence. However, 
these two components showed distinct developmental trajectories. The tendency to 
maximise EV increased linearly between the ages of nine and 35 years (see Figure   178 
2.2), whereas the tendency to make risky choices showed a nonlinear (inverted-U 
shaped)  developmental  trajectory  with  its  peak  in  adolescence  (age  14.38;  see 
Figure 2.3). This set of results implies that adolescent engagement in risky activities 
in real life may be partly due to a true underlying preference for risk, relative to 
children and adults. Furthermore, the distinct trajectories for risk and EV imply that 
adolescent risk-seeking does not arise due to a simple deficit in EV-maximising. The 
study in Chapter 2 is one of few (or indeed the first) experimental studies to show 
evidence  for  the  often-cited  inverted-U  shaped  developmental  trajectory  of  risk-
seeking, with its peak in adolescence (Casey et al., 2008; Steinberg, 2008; see Figner 
et al. 2009; O’Brien & Steinberg, 2009). 
 
In naturalistic situations, decision-making involves additional components beyond 
the ability to calculate EV and risk. Thus, age differences in the tendency to engage 
in risky activities may also be due to development of the ability to detect possible 
outcomes and estimate their respective probabilities (e.g. Crone & van der Molen, 
2004), or age differences in the subjective value of certain decision outcomes. The 
latter  is  of  course  difficult  to  compare  across  individuals,  but  the  task  used  in 
Chapter 2 assessed one aspect of subjective value, i.e. emotion. After the outcome 
of  each  gambling  decision  was  revealed,  participants  reported  their  emotional 
response  using  a  linear  rating  scale,  and  these  responses  were  assumed  to 
approximate participants’ actual emotional responses. The absence of overall age 
differences  in  emotion  evaluations  suggests  there  were  no  overall  age  group 
differences in the use of the rating scale, and/or that adolescents were not hyper-
emotional in general, as has been suggested elsewhere. However, interestingly, there 
was an age group difference in the impact of counterfactual context on the emotion 
evaluations.  Relative  to  children  (aged  9-11),  young  adolescents  (aged  12-15) 
reported feeling more positive (/negative) in response to winning (/losing) a small 
number of points when the alternative decision could have resulted in a loss (/gain) 
of points (relief/regret), and in particular, young adolescents showed a heightened 
evaluative  response  to  relief  outcomes,  or  ‘lucky  escapes’  relative  to  children. 
Further  studies  should  investigate  whether  this  emotional  response  contributes 
directly to adolescent risk-taking. In addition, reasons for the age-related decline in 
risk-taking  between  adolescence  and  adulthood  should  be  explored  (see  section 
7.2.1).  
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7.1.2 Chapter 3: Development of the integration of social and utilitarian cues in 
a probabilistic decision-making task 
A number of studies, including the study described in Chapter 2, have shown that 
young adolescents are not yet mature in their ability to choose optimally in decision-
making tasks. It has been suggested that one reason for this is that, relative to adults, 
adolescents are disproportionately influenced by social-emotional factors. However, 
this  may  be  expected  to  operate  to  a  greater  extent  in  real  life  situations  or  in 
laboratory-based tasks with a strong emotional component, and to a lesser extent in 
simple, relatively unemotional decision-making tasks. In the decision-making task 
used in Chapter 3, adults outperformed young adolescents (aged 12-13), but this 
was  not  attributable  to  a  heightened  influence  of  social-emotional  factors  on  the 
decision-making  process.  Computational  modelling  of  adult  and  adolescent 
behaviour showed that the emotional content of the forced-choice stimuli (happy and 
angry facial expressions) influenced decisions in both age groups, and there was no 
difference in the extent or nature of this influence. This study represents a first step 
towards investigating the interaction between social and non-social influences on 
decision-making  across  development.  Further  applications  of  this  approach  are 
outlined in section 7.2.2. 
 
The study described in Chapter 3 showed no age group differences in the impact of 
a social cue on decision-making in a simple forced-choice task. Therefore, other 
explanations  for  the  age  group  difference  in  performance  were  sought.  One 
interesting  possibility  from  the  literature  is  that  adolescents  approach  decision-
making  tasks  using  relatively  less  cognitively  sophisticated  strategies,  compared 
with  adults.  For  example,  studies  including  those  by  Huizinga  et  al.  (2007)  and 
Harbaugh et al. (2002) have shown that age-related improvements in performance on 
decision-making tasks are accompanied by (or due to) a decrease in decision-making 
bias, and an increase in the tendency to take into account all relevant sources of 
utilitarian  information  (performance  feedback).  Therefore,  the  study  described  in 
Chapter 3 adopted a computational modelling approach to evaluate this suggestion. 
Performance  was  analysed  computationally  to  show  evidence  that,  while  both 
adolescent  and  adult  groups  were  able  to  take  into  account  probabilistic  reward 
feedback (wins and losses) in order to perform at a level above chance, there was a 
developmental  asymmetry  in  the  response  to  positive  vs.  negative  performance 
feedback (wins and losses). Whereas adults integrated across both wins and losses in   180 
order to adjust or maintain ongoing selections, adolescents were not significantly 
responsive  to  positive  feedback,  a  pattern  that  was  consistent  with  a  simple 
behavioural strategy of switching choices after incurring a loss.  
 
Further studies are needed to explore this suggestion, in particular with regards its 
generalisability to other decision-making tasks. It would be interesting to explore 
possible relationships between the extent of developmental bias in decision-making, 
and executive function development. For example, the extent of bias in sensitivity to 
sources  of  performance  feedback  could  be  hypothesised  to  be  related  to  the 
development  of  working  memory  efficiency  (Romine  &  Reynolds,  2005)  and 
perhaps to the ability to shift set (Davidson et al., 2006; Romine & Reynolds, 2005). 
Again, the application of a computational modelling approach to this problem could 
be fruitful (see section 7.2.2). 
 
7.1.3 Chapter 4: Development of mixed social emotion understanding across 
puberty 
The  studies  described  above  were  carried  out  to  investigate  the  development  of 
decision-making,  including  the  influence  of  emotion  on  decision-making,  in 
adolescence.  However,  it  has  been  suggested  that  puberty  stage  rather  than 
chronological  age  influences  aspects  of  development  across  adolescence.  In 
particular, the hormonal and psychosocial changes of puberty are thought to interact 
with emotional development, including via effects on the brain (see Introduction 
and Chapter 4). Therefore in Chapter 4, an exploratory study was carried out to 
explore  the  relationship  between  puberty  stage  and  a  measure  of  emotion 
understanding. Adolescent females aged nine to 16 years were divided into early, 
mid- and post-puberty groups on the basis of a pubertal self-report questionnaire, 
and then completed an emotion task. In this task, participants read and imagined a 
series  of  emotional  scenarios  that  were  designed  to  elicit  social  emotions 
(embarrassment and guilt) and basic emotions (anger and fear). Participants were 
instructed to imagine each scenario and to rate their imagined emotional response 
using four discrete rating scales, one for each of the four emotions. The ratings were 
then analysed using a novel measure that encapsulated the relative complexity or 
‘mixedness’  in  emotional  responses,  since  previous  work  has  suggested  that  the 
understanding  of  mixed  emotion  shows  a  protracted  developmental  trajectory 
(Harter & Buddin, 1987; Larsen et al., 2007). The results of this analysis showed   181 
greater mixed emotional responses (use of multiple rating scales) in the post-puberty 
than in the early-puberty  group. This  difference was seen  for the social  emotion 
scenarios featuring guilt and embarrassment, and not for the basic emotion scenarios 
featuring anger and fear.  
 
This result is consistent with, and extends, previous work on mixed emotion and on 
social  vs.  basic  emotion.  For  example,  a  study  by  Larsen  et  al.  (2007)  used 
structured interviews to show continuing development between the ages of seven 
and 12 in the tendency to report mixed emotional responses to a bittersweet video 
clip.  Studies  by  Harter  and  colleagues  have  shown  that  the  ability  to  describe 
situations in which a social emotion would be experienced  emerges roughly two 
years later than the same for basic emotion (age 7 vs. age 5, respectively). The study 
described in Chapter 4 extends this work, using a different methodology and age 
range,  and  by  investigating  relationships  between  emotional  development  and 
puberty stage. However, puberty stage was significantly related to age in the study. 
Further studies  should investigate  mixed  emotion  understanding in  groups  which 
differ in puberty stage but not in age. 
 
The development of mixed social emotion understanding could be related to changes 
in self- and social awareness, which have been shown to occur across age and are 
thought to be related to puberty development. In addition, cognitive development 
during  adolescence  may  also  play  a  role  in  the  development  of  mixed  emotion 
understanding, by facilitating the representation of multiple emotional and mental 
states. However, there are a number of outstanding issues with the study conducted 
in Chapter 4 and as such the results are tentative. The method of assessing mixed 
emotion understanding needs to be validated, for example by comparing previous 
structured interview methods and the self-report rating scale method within the same 
study.  Another  issue  is  the  measurement  of  puberty.  Self-report  questionnaires 
assessing  Tanner  stage  of  puberty  are  appropriate  for  assessing  the  psychosocial 
effects  of  puberty,  as  their  results  reflect  the  respondent’s  body  image  and  self-
perceptions  (Dorn  et  al.,  2006).  However  they  are  less  reliable  in  terms  of 
identifying  and  differentiating  between  stages  of  puberty.  The  issue  of  puberty 
measurement will be explored in section 7.2.3. Further studies are needed to assess 
the  relationship  between  pubertal  development  and  social-emotional  awareness,   182 
given evidence for interactions between puberty hormones and regions of the brain 
important for emotion and social cognition (see section 4.1.1.1).  
 
7.1.4  Chapter  5:  A  functional  magnetic  resonance  imaging  study  of  social 
emotion processing in adolescents and in adults 
Chapter 4 described a study that assessed the development during puberty of an 
understanding  of  social  emotion.  In  Chapter  5,  a  study  was  carried  out  to 
investigate  development  of  the  functional  neural  correlates  of  social  emotion 
processing using fMRI. Note that in order to compare the results with previously-
published fMRI studies of social cognition, Chapter 5 investigated the relationship 
between adolescent age rather than puberty stage on the fMRI pattern of results. 
Previous  fMRI  studies  have  shown  an  age-associated  shift  in  activity  between 
adolescence  and  adulthood  within  brain  regions  associated  with  mentalising 
(representing  and  processing  mental  states  such  as  beliefs,  feelings  and  desires), 
during mentalising/social cognition relative to control tasks. The study described in 
Chapter 5 was carried out to investigate whether a comparable developmental shift 
would be observed during an overtly emotional mentalising task, i.e. social vs. basic 
emotion processing. As in Chapter 4, social emotions are defined as emotions that 
require representation of others’ mental states, and the social emotions used in the 
task were embarrassment and guilt, as in Chapter 4. Basic emotions were defined as 
emotions that do not require a representation of others’ mental states, and the basic 
emotions used in the task were fear (as in Chapter 4), and disgust (the replacement 
for Chapter 4’s anger; see Chapter 5 section 5.2.2.1). 
 
The results in Chapter 5 provide evidence that both adolescent and adult age groups 
showed activity (BOLD signal change) during social vs. basic emotion processing 
within  mentalising  regions  of  the  brain,  including  the  anterior  rostral  medial 
prefrontal  cortex  (arMPFC)  and  the  posterior  superior  temporal  sulcus  (pSTS) 
bordering on the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). However, there were age group 
differences in activity during social vs. basic emotion. Whereas a region of arMPFC 
was  activated  more  strongly  by  adolescents  than  by  adults  for  social  vs.  basic 
emotion (Figure 5.5), adults activated the left anterior temporal cortex (ATC) more 
strongly than did adolescents during this contrast (Figure 5.4). This set of results is 
in  agreement  with  previous  developmental  fMRI  studies  of  social  cognition  (see 
Figure  5.7;  Wang  et  al.,  2006;  Blakemore  et  al.,  2007;  Pfeifer  et  al.,  2007;   183 
Moriguchi et al., 2007; Pfeifer et al., 2009; see Blakemore 2008 for review). The 
result in ATC is novel, but consistent with the adult mentalising fMRI literature (e.g. 
Frith & Frith, 2003; Frith, 2007).  
 
In summary, Chapter 5, as well other recent fMRI studies, has shown an age-related 
decrease in activity within arMPFC during mentalising/social cognition relative to 
control tasks, whereas activity within more posterior, temporal cortex regions shows 
the opposite developmental pattern. There are several possible explanations for this 
pattern  of  results.  First,  there  may  be  an  age  group  difference  in  the  cognitive 
strategy  employed  during  these  tasks,  as  has  been  shown  using  a  different 
mentalising task (Dumontheil et al., 2009). Second, this change in cognitive strategy 
or proficiency might be accompanied by a shift in the recruitment of specialised 
brain  regions,  and/or  may  be  related  to  neuroanatomical  development.  These 
possibilities will be discussed in more detail in section 7.2.4.  
 
7.1.5  Chapter  6:  Effective  connectivity  during  social  emotion  processing  in 
adolescents and in adults 
In  Chapter 6,  fMRI  data from  the  functional  imaging  study of social  and basic 
emotion processing in adolescents and in adults in Chapter 5 were re-analysed to 
investigate  effective  connectivity  within  the  mentalising  system  (arMPFC, 
pSTS/TPJ,  ATC;  Frith  &  Frith,  2003).  Effective  connectivity,  defined  as  the 
influence  that  one  neuronal  system  exerts  over  another,  can  be  assessed  using  a 
statistical  technique  known  as  psychophysiological  interaction  (PPI)  analysis 
(Friston  et  al.,  1997).  This  analysis  revealed  evidence  for  functional  integration 
between  components  of  the  mentalising  system,  during  social  relative  to  basic 
emotion processing, in that task-dependent interactions were shown between activity 
in the seed volume in arMPFC, and regions within the right pSTS, left TPJ and the 
left ATC.  
 
This is the first study to show effective connectivity within the mentalising system, 
which is surprising  given  the  wide  availability  of effective  connectivity methods 
(available since at least 10 years ago), the large number of published fMRI studies 
showing activity within this circumscribed set of brain regions during mentalising 
relative to control tasks (Frith & Frith, 2003), and the fact that this collection of 
brain regions is frequently referred to as a ‘network’. Further studies should now be   184 
conducted to replicate the current finding using more standard and well-validated 
mentalising tasks (e.g. the Frith-Happé animations: Castelli et al., 2000). This could 
be done relatively easily using existing fMRI datasets, and could be supplemented 
using diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) to infer connecting white matter tracts. 
 
Chapter 6 also showed evidence for age group differences in effective connectivity. 
The  adolescent  group  showed  stronger  task-dependent  connectivity  between  the 
arMPFC seed region and the left pSTS/TPJ, relative to adults. Further research is 
required before this result can be interpreted convincingly (see sections 7.2.4-5). In 
particular,  the  developmental  difference  in  Chapter  6  is  at  odds  with  a  (small) 
number  of  existing  developmental  connectivity  studies,  which  show  age-related 
increases in network correlations (Stevens et al., 2007, 2009; Menon et al. 2005). 
However, these studies investigated non-social domains of cognition, and it is not 
clear  how  comparable  the  findings  are.  Studies  that  have  investigated  the 
development of functional connectivity during ‘rest’ (Fair et al., 2007, 2008; Kelly 
et al., 2009) have shown that some within-network correlations increase with age, 
whereas others show age-related decreases. The current result should be replicated 
(e.g. using more standard mentalising tasks) before interpretations can justifiably be 
proposed. 
 
Also of interest from Chapter 6 is the finding that the adolescent group showed a 
significant  PPI  between  arMPFC  and  the  ATC  during  social  vs.  basic  emotion, 
despite showing no mean activity within ATC during social relative to basic emotion 
processing (see Chapter 5). One possible explanation for this finding is that, prior to 
the  ATC  becoming  functionally  mature  during  development,  it  is  engaged  in  a 
subthreshold or regulatory relationship with arMPFC. A similar interpretation was 
suggested in a study by Rao et al. (2008). In this study, no regions within PFC were 
active during an executive sensorimotor task thought to rely on PFC, but there was 
effective  connectivity  between  parts  of  lateral  PFC  and  relevant  sensorimotor 
regions, suggesting that PFC plays a regulatory (rather than direct) role in the task. 
However, as stated in the preceding paragraph, follow-up studies should extend the 
current pattern of developmental findings in ATC using a variety of social cognition 
and mentalising tasks (e.g. Grosbras et al., 2007). DTI studies should investigate 
white  matter  pathways  responsible  for  purported  functional  interactions  between 
spatially  distant  components  of  the  mentalising  system  (e.g.  Kelly  et  al.,  2009;   185 
Giorgio et al., 2009), and the development of their contribution to functional brain 
activity across age. 
 
7.2 Outstanding issues and future directions 
 
7.2.1 Reasons behind adolescent risk-taking in decision-making tasks 
Further studies should investigate which aspects of the task used in Chapter 2 were 
key in producing the non-linear developmental profile of risk-taking. One possibility 
is that the emotional aspect of the task played a role. A previous study by Figner et 
al.  (2009)  has  shown  elevated  adolescent  relative  to  adult  risk-taking  in  a  ‘hot’, 
emotional  version  of  the  Columbia  Card  Task  (CCT),  and  not  in  ‘cold’,  less 
emotional version of the task. Similarly elevated adolescent vs. adult risk-taking was 
reported in a study in which participants made risky or safe decisions in a car driving 
game: adolescents took more risks than adults in a hot, social-emotional condition in 
which their friends were present, relative to a cold condition in which they played 
alone (Gardner & Steinberg, 2005). Therefore in Chapter 2, adolescent risk-taking 
may have arisen due to the emotional aspect of the task. 
 
However, there is an outstanding issue with this explanation. In Chapter 2, as well 
as in Figner et al. (2009), in Gardner and Steinberg (2005) and in Eshel et al. (2007), 
elevated risk-taking was demonstrated in adolescents relative to adults in emotional 
tasks, but adolescents also take more risks than children. This has been shown in 
Chapter 2, in which the logit regression results shown an increase in the impact of 
risk on decisions increases between childhood and adolescence, and in an as yet 
unpublished study by O'Brien and Steinberg (2009) which showed heightened risk-
taking in adolescents relative to children. In Chapter 2, an increase in counterfactual 
emotion was shown between childhood and young adolescence, but thus far, neither 
this nor any other study has shown evidence to suggest that emotional factors can 
explain the increase in risk-taking from childhood to adolescence, and its decrease 
into adulthood. Similarly, it has been suggested that sensitivity to peer influence may 
underlie adolescent risk-taking, but a self-report study has shown that children are 
indeed more sensitive to peer influence than are adolescents (Steinberg & Monahan, 
2007).  Therefore  neither  peer  influence,  not  emotion,  can  solely  account  for  the 
increase in risk-taking into adolescence and for its decrease into adulthood.    186 
 
A solution to this issue, and one that has been suggested elsewhere, is to propose a 
dual-process model of the development of risk-taking (Casey et al., 2008; Steinberg, 
2008). In this model, emotional factors such as heightened sensation-seeking, and 
social factors such as alignment with peers are suggested to cause an increase in 
risk-taking  between  childhood  and  adolescence,  but  cognitive  factors  (e.g.  better 
judgment and control) are thought to contribute to the decline of risk-taking into 
adulthood.  This  dual-process  model  needs  to  be  tested  by  conducting  studies 
comparing  adolescents  with  both  children  and  adults,  as  in  Chapter  2.  Studies 
should take the approach used in Figner et al. (2009) and compare risk-taking under 
emotional  and  less-emotional  task  conditions.  Emotionally  engaging  tasks  are 
needed to more closely emulate the real-life conditions in which adolescents take 
risks, as studies including Steinberg’s car driving experiment have shown that under 
calm,  unemotional  circumstances  in  a  laboratory,  adolescents  are  no  more  risk-
taking than are adults. Further application of logit regression and other statistical 
approaches will be useful in evaluating separately the distinct factors that contribute 
to  risky  behaviour  across  age.  Another  fruitful  approach  could  be  to  adopt  a 
computational modelling approach, as was implemented in Chapter 3.  
 
7.2.2  Adopting  a  computational  approach  to  investigate  factors  influencing 
adolescent (social) decision-making 
In  Chapter  3,  behaviour  in  a  simple  decision-making  task  was  analysed 
computationally to disentangle and test specific hypotheses regarding the influence 
of  discrete  factors  that  may  underlie  behaviour.  This  approach  should  now  be 
applied  more  widely  to  test  hypotheses  regarding  the  development  of  decision-
making  and  social-emotional  influences  in  adolescence.  The  approach  is  more 
flexible than many analytic techniques currently used to investigate behaviour, and 
can be implemented to test specific hypotheses in a focussed manner. The usefulness 
of the computational approach to understanding behaviour is particularly apparent in 
experimental situations in which several intertwined cognitive factors are all thought 
to  influence  a  simple  behavioural  measure  (e.g.  Averbeck  &  Duchaine,  2009). 
Therefore,  this  approach  could  now  be  used  to  test  the  dual-system  model  of 
adolescent  risk-taking,  in  which  emotional  factors  such  as  heightened  sensation-
seeking are suggested to cause an increase in risk-taking between childhood and 
adolescence, but cognitive control factors are thought to contribute to its decline into   187 
adulthood (Casey et  al., 2008; Steinberg, 2008). Another application could be to 
continue to model social influences on behaviour in adolescence as in Chapter 3, 
but using for example a version of the task in Chapter 3 in which the face stimuli 
depict  ‘popular’  same-age  individuals  (rather  than  older-age  Ekman  faces).  An 
interesting extension to this study would be to include a component in the task that 
allows  participants  to  choose  to  act  in  a  risk-seeking  or  in  a  risk-averse/neutral 
manner.  It  would  be  interesting  to  model  computationally  the  impact  of  social 
factors (e.g. popular/attractive vs. unpopular/unattractive faces) on the tendency to 
take risks in a decision-making task. 
 
7.2.3  The  measurement  of  puberty  stage  for  use  in  adolescent  cognitive 
development and cognitive neuroscience research 
As  summarised  in  Chapter  4,  studies  with  non-human  and  human  samples, 
including  normal  and  clinical  samples  (e.g.  with  hormone  abnormalities),  have 
shown that aspects of adolescent neuroanatomical and functional brain development 
are related to the physical and hormonal changes of puberty. In addition, certain 
aspects of social-emotional development are thought to be related to puberty. These 
are hypothesised to occur via effects on the brain, and also by altering the body 
which impacts on social roles and self-image. Therefore, it is important to include 
puberty measures in adolescent cognitive development and cognitive neuroscience 
research, for two distinct reasons: 1) to directly investigate the effects of puberty, 
and 2) to reduce noise and control for possible confounds.  
 
However, puberty is challenging to measure. For a start, puberty is neither a brief 
event nor a unitary phenomenon. Puberty lasts for several years, and comprises a 
number of  distinct, partially independent and incompletely overlapping processes 
(Dorn  et  al.,  2006).  These  processes  include  activation  of  adrenal  and  gonadal 
hormone systems, as well as physical growth, a shift in metabolism, changing social 
roles, and neuroanatomical development. The most appropriate measure of puberty 
will therefore depend in part on the specific research question. 
 
A commonly used measure of puberty is Tanner Stage. Tanner staging categorises 
individuals along an ordinal puberty scale from 1 to 5, on the basis of breast and 
pubic hair development in females, and genital and pubic hair development in males 
(Tanner, 1971; Tanner & Whitehouse, 1976). Tanner staging should be carried out   188 
by a trained clinician. There are limitations to Tanner staging, in that the scale was 
developed  with  reference  to  a  single  ethnic  group  (there  may  be  cross-ethnic 
differences) and in a relatively small sample of 200 children. Overweight girls will 
tend to be inaccurately staged, as breast development will be over-estimated. More 
fundamentally,  Tanner  staging  only  takes  into  account  the  physical  effects  of 
gonadal  hormones,  whereas  in  the  early  stages  of  puberty  adrenal  hormones  are 
particularly  important;  therefore,  Tanner  staging  has  limited  usefulness  in 
distinguishing between the earlier stages of puberty, which may be of most interest 
with regards effects upstream or parallel hormonal effects on the brain. However, 
Tanner  staging  is  currently  the  gold  standard  for  puberty  measurement,  and  is 
favoured by clinicians and researchers (Dorn et al., 2006).  
 
In light of the above concerns, it might be expected that Tanner staging by physical 
examination  could  be  usefully  supplemented  by  hormonal  assays,  since  this  will 
measure  adrenal  and  gonadal  (or  adrenal/gonadal-releasing)  hormones  upstream 
from their external physical effects. However, while hormone assays may be useful 
for  measuring  puberty  stage  in  the  future,  at  the  present  time  it  is  unclear  how 
hormone measurements should be combined with Tanner stages to give a measure of 
puberty  stage.  The  levels  of  different  puberty  hormones  fluctuate  in  monthly, 
circadian and even minute-to-minute cycles, and some hormones (e.g. testosterone) 
have more than one cycle; therefore, experimental control is difficult to establish 
(Cauter, 2001; Dorn et al., 2006). Little research has been done comparing hormone 
levels in different biological samples (saliva, blood, urine) with clinician-assessed 
Tanner stages (see e.g. Dorn et al. 2006), so it is unclear how much weight should be 
given to hormone levels, e.g. if these conflict with clinician-assessed Tanner stage. 
Therefore more research is needed in this area, and at present, hormone assays are 
not a valid alternative to clinician-assessed Tanner stage.  
 
Tanner  staging  by  external  physical  examination  is  not  always  practical  or 
appropriate,  e.g.  when  a  behavioural  study  is  carried  out  in  school.  Unless  the 
research  question  is clinically  urgent,  it  is unlikely  that a  school  will accept the 
inconvenience  of  setting  up  a  physical  examination  procedure  (preparing  the 
children  and  parents,  establishing  the  necessary  ethical  and  legal  procedures). 
Therefore  in  these  situations,  Tanner  stage  can  be  assessed  by  self-report 
questionnaire. A relatively large number of studies, including the study in Chapter   189 
4,  have  assessed  self-rated  (or  parent-rated)  Tanner  stage  using  the  Petersen 
Development Scale (PDS; Petersen et al., 1988). This is a questionnaire that includes 
items assessing hair growth, skin changes and growth spurt, with sex-specific items 
i.e. menarche and breast development in female, and genital growth and facial hair 
in males (see Appendix 4.1 for an adaptation of the female version). As such, the 
PDS measures a composite puberty score that includes the effects of adrenal and 
growth hormones, as well as gonadal hormones. Correlations with clinician-assessed 
Tanner stage are not especially high: one study found correlations between 0.61 and 
0.67  in  11-13  year  old  girls  for  the  self-report  PDS  (Brooks-Gunn  et  al.  1987; 
correlations  are  even  lower  for  parent-report  PDS).  The  extent  to  which  these 
relatively low correlations are due to inaccurate self-rating vs. the distinct effects of 
adrenal/growth vs.  gonadal hormones needs  to  be evaluated.  Therefore, the PDS 
should be used with caution to estimate Tanner stage when a physical examination is 
not possible. However, on a different note, it could be the case that if the research 
question does not concern hormone levels and Tanner stage, but instead relates to 
self-image,  self-consciousness  or  social  awareness  (as  in  Chapter  4),  it  can  be 
argued  that  the  PDS  is  the  most  relevant  measure,  as  it  directly  assesses  self-
perceived puberty stage (see Dorn et al. 2006 for discussion). 
 
In summary, there is much scope for investigating relationships between the brain, 
cognition, behaviour and puberty
15. However, methodological research evaluating 
and  comparing  different  puberty  measures  should  be  conducted  alongside  this 
research. Researchers should consider which aspect of puberty is most relevant to 
their research question and select their measure of puberty accordingly. 
 
7.2.5 Age group differences in functional brain activity: what do they mean? 
A number of developmental fMRI studies of social cognition, including the study 
described in Chapter 5, have shown greater BOLD signal change within adolescent 
relative to adult arMPFC, during mentalising relative to control tasks. There are a 
                                                  
15 The candidate is currently involved in a study investigating relationships 
between functional (fMRI) and structural (VBM) brain measures, and puberty 
stage (assessed using salivary hormone samples, clinician-assessed Tanner stage 
and self-report PDS), in two groups of females matched for age but differing in 
puberty stage. Inverse relationships are predicted between puberty stage and (a) 
cortical grey matter, (b) BOLD signal in arMPFC. It is predicted that some of the 
variability within the adolescent sample in Chapter 5 will be attributable to 
pubertal development.   190 
number of possible (and not mutually exclusive) explanations for this developmental 
finding.  
 
One possibility is that developmental differences in BOLD response arise due to an 
age group difference in the cognitive strategy employed during these tasks, which 
might be associated with differential recruitment of functionally-specialised brain 
regions. For example, in the study in Chapter 5, adolescents may employ a more 
effortful, on-line  mentalising-based strategy  to imagine social  emotion  situations, 
which may recruit ‘mentalising region’ arMPFC more strongly. Adults may employ 
a strategy based more heavily on semantic social knowledge, and thus recruit the 
ATC,  a  region  that  is  thought  to  represent  social  semantic  knowledge.  Similar 
interpretations could be applied to similar studies such as Blakemore et al. (2007).  
 
However, this cognitive interpretation of the fMRI data is at present mere reasoned 
speculation (see Poldrack, 2008) and indeed could be construed as a confound in 
published  developmental  fMRI  studies.  Therefore,  a  more  thorough  cognitive 
characterisation of how adolescents perform social cognition tasks is now needed. 
This  endeavour  should  be  approached  using  appropriate  social  cognition  tasks, 
including those which can be analysed using computational models (7.2.2; Chapter 
3). For example, in order to evaluate the specific cognitive hypothesis proposed in 
the preceding paragraph and in Chapter 5, behavioural studies could be conducted 
testing script usage vs. on-line mentalising in adolescents vs. adults. Computational 
models  could  be  developed  predicting  probable  behaviour  in  such  a  task,  given 
reliance on scripts vs. reliance on on-line mentalising. These could subsequently be 
extended  to  test  the  contributions  of  region-specific  functional  brain  activity  to 
scripts vs. on-line mental state usage (as in Hampton et al., 2008; Behrens et al. 
2009), in addition to other cognitive components of mentalising which are thought to 
develop  during  adolescence  (e.g.  executive-social  interactions,  Dumontheil  et  al. 
2009). In adults, a study could be conducted using transcranial magnetic stimulation 
to assess disruption of mentalising performance when social semantic  processing 
regions  are  targeted.  The  research  could  be  supplemented  where  possible  with 
cognitive profiling of patients who have sustained lesions to different parts of the 
social brain, e.g. ATC vs. arMPFC, during adolescence and adulthood (c.f. Anderson 
et al., 1999). 
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However,  age  group  differences  in  BOLD  response  during  social  cognition  (or 
indeed any) tasks could be elicited in the absence of any differences in cognitive 
competence  or  strategy  (Kuhn,  2006).  Age  group  differences  in  electrical  or 
metabolic responsiveness within task-associated brain regions could give rise to age 
differences  in  BOLD  response.  Given  evidence  for  neuroanatomical  (including 
synaptic) development during adolescence, this factor is likely at least to contribute 
to age group differences in BOLD response, if not entirely account for them. For 
example, the precise time-course and nature of neuronal-vascular coupling (Peppiatt 
et al., 2006) is likely to differ between brain regions, and these regional differences 
may  emerge  at  different  points  during  development.  If  there  are  indeed  region-
specific  trajectories  of  synaptic  pruning  during  adolescence,  as  have  been 
hypothesised,  this  may  lead  to  increased  ‘efficiency’  of  regional  brain  activity 
(Durston  et  al.,  2006;  see  1.4.3.1),  in  terms  of  increases  in  both  information 
processing efficiency (e.g. efficiency to accomplish the same cognitive task), and 
metabolic efficiency (note that the two are likely to be linked; Attwell & Laughlin, 
2001). In addition, global increases in myelination and axon calibre are hypothesised 
to  contribute  to  increased  efficiency  of  network  integration,  including  increased 
precision of temporal encoding (Paus et al., 2008; see Introduction, section 1.4.3.2). 
Further research is needed on developmental changes in region-specific metabolic 
demands  and  information  processing  efficiency,  as  well  as  neuronal-vascular 
coupling, in order to interpret developmental fMRI findings. 
 
7.2.6 Future directions using a multimodal approach to study the development 
of social cognition and its neural basis: Effective connectivity, structural and 
diffusion neuroimaging, behavioural testing 
Chapter 6 showed evidence for an age group difference in effective connectivity 
between components of the mentalising system. This result, pending replication, is 
one step towards demonstrating that age group differences in BOLD signal have 
functional relevance – whether this is due to cognitive development and resultant 
changes  in  the  recruitment  of  functionally  specialised  (social)  brain  regions,  or 
development in metabolic/information processing efficiency due to neuroanatomical 
development in social brain regions, or both. 
 
Studies  should  now  be  conducted  to  investigate  the  development  of  effective 
connectivity  during  social  cognition  tasks,  starting  with  existing  social  fMRI   192 
datasets (e.g. Blakemore et al., 2007). Developmental relationships between regional 
BOLD signal and network function should then be investigated. Subsequently, social 
cognition tasks in which performance can be more accurately quantified than in the 
social  emotion  task  used  in  this  thesis  should  be  used  in  fMRI  to  investigate 
relationships  between  regional  BOLD  signal,  functional  integration,  and  task 
proficiency. 
 
In addition, it would be interesting to conduct the above studies in combination with 
measures of grey and white matter structure and integrity (e.g. VBM, DTI). Similar 
developmental  studies  have  been  conducted  in  non-social  cognitive  domains:  for 
example, Olson et al. (2009) showed that DTI-assessed white matter  integrity  in 
tracts  serving  frontal  lobe  regions  predicted  delay  discounting  behaviour  in 
participants aged nine to 23. Liston et al. (2005) showed that DTI-assessed fronto-
striatal white matter integrity was related to accuracy in performing a go/no-go task. 
It is predicted that proficiency in mentalising tasks will be related to white matter 
integrity within tracts connecting regions of the mentalising system. Proficiency in 
the  mentalising  task  in  Dumontheil  et  al.  (2009),  which  requires  integration  of 
executive functions and visual perspective information, is predicted to correlate with 
the integrity of white matter tracts connecting regions of the mentalising system with 
executive control regions.  
 
Other  studies  have  shown  correlations  between  BOLD  signal  increases  during 
executive  tasks,  and  white  matter  integrity  in  presumed  task-related  tracts  (e.g. 
Olesen et al., 2003). Similar  studies should  now  be  conducted in  the  domain of 
social cognition. This could be conducted alongside DTI studies in adults that have 
begun  to  parcellate  white  matter  connectivity  of  a  number  of  brain  regions 
(Beckmann et al., 2009). 
 
7.3 Wider implications 
This  section  will  discuss  wider  implications  of  developmental  cognitive 
neuroscience  research  and  developmental  psychology  research  in  this  thesis  and 
elsewhere. 
 
7.3.1 Education   193 
Knowledge of brain development, and how this development influences cognition 
and learning could, and indeed does, have an impact on education (see Blakemore & 
Frith, 2005). The understanding of how the brain mechanisms that underlie learning 
and  memory  change  across  age,  and  how  this  impacts  cognition,  is  vital  for 
optimizing education for individuals of different ages. This applies to the various 
stages of adulthood, as well as childhood and adolescence. Lifespan considerations 
on education, including encouraging and optimizing life-long learning, have recently 
been areas for government policy initiatives (e.g. Beyond Current Horizons project, 
see Burnett et al. 2009b). Relatedly, it is important to understand how learning in 
individuals of different ages is influenced by aspects of the environment, including 
its social and emotional context.  
 
Social-emotional  factors  have  been  shown  to  play  an  important  role  in  shaping 
learning and academic performance, as well as vice versa.  It is possible that the 
social, potentially emotionally charged context of many educational environments 
may interfere with the cognitive resources that can be devoted to academic learning. 
For example, a secondary school classroom environment could be overwhelmingly 
social for the less socially-competent, and the reported recent rising incidence of 
face-to-face  and  cyber-bullying  by  schoolchildren  is  likely  to  have  wide  impact. 
However, learning to cope with a complex social environment is an important part of 
development,  and  must  not  be  neglected.  Constructive  avenues  for  future 
educational policy could draw on evidence that adolescence is an important period 
for learning about emotions and opinions of the self and others, and therefore might 
be  a  particularly  fruitful  time  for  educational  programmes  to  focus  on  fostering 
empathy and social support. 
 
Another finding that could have impact is the notion that the brain is still developing 
substantially during adolescence. Previously, early childhood was seen as a major 
opportunity (a ‘sensitive period’) for teaching, due to the brain development which 
was thought to be restricted to this period. Therefore, the finding that parts of the 
brain are reorganized during the teenaged years suggests that this period might be 
seen as part of an extended ‘sensitive period’ for learning. Aspects of learning which 
may be particularly malleable during adolescence, and which education could focus 
on, are those which rely on parts of the brain that undergo protracted anatomical 
development: for example, internal control, multi-tasking and planning – which to   194 
an extent, secondary education already focuses on  – but  also  self-awareness  and 
social cognitive skills, such as perspective-taking and understanding complex social 
emotions.  
 
Finally, it could be fruitful to include in the educational curriculum for adolescents 
some teaching on the changes occurring in the brain during puberty and adolescence. 
Adolescents  might  be  interested  in,  and  could  benefit  from,  learning  about  the 
changes that are going on in their own brains. 
  
7.3.2 Psychiatric disorders  
A better understanding of adolescent brain development and cognition is also vital 
for understanding psychiatric disorders, many of which have their peak age of onset 
during adolescence (Paus et al., 2008; see Figure 7.1). It has been suggested that the 
emergence  of  certain  disorders  in  adolescence  is  directly  linked  to  brain 
development (e.g. schizophrenia, Feinberg, 1982; depression, Davey et al., 2008), 
and  to  the  maturation  of  certain  cognitive  functions  such  as  planning  and 
counterfactual thinking (e.g. depression and social anxiety, Davey et al. 2008). Work 
presented in this thesis is particularly relevant to the emergence of (i) disorders of 
incentive processing, and (ii) disorders of social processing. These will briefly be 
discussed in the next sections. 
 
Figure 7.1 The onset of many psychiatric disorders occurs during adolescence.  Mean age of 
onset of a number of psychiatric disorders in the USA in recent years. Graph from Paus et al. (2008). 
 
 
 
7.3.2.1 Disorders of incentive processing 
Certain disorders of incentive processing commonly arise during adolescence, and 
cognitive neuroscience research will inform the understanding of these disorders. 
This section will focus on addiction as one example, although note that others are 
relevant, e.g. schizophrenia.    195 
 
Heightened  risk-seeking  during  adolescence  is  hypothesised  to  underlie  the  high 
incidence of experimentation with addictive substances (alchohol, tobacco, illegal 
drugs) during adolescence, and in some cases this experimentation develops into 
addiction.  While  it  should  be  noted  that  individuals  who  develop  substance  use 
disorders often show emotional abnormalities prior to adolescence (Maggs et al., 
2008), it has been suggested that certain characteristics of adolescence predispose 
individuals to a risk of developing addiction. Specifically, a  ‘hypo-active’ neural 
incentive processing system (e.g. ventral striatum) is hypothesised to result in a drive 
for more immediate, high risk and powerful rewards (Spear, 2000), while ‘hyper-
activity’  of  the  system  during  reward  consummation  may  mean  that  adolescents 
experience  these  rewards  as  more  intensely  pleasurable  than  do  adults  (Geier  & 
Luna, 2009). In addition, continuing maturation within prefrontal cortex cognitive 
control systems is said to predispose adolescents to act on their reward-seeking urges 
(Casey et al., 2008). More evidence is needed in support of these hypotheses, but 
they are suggestive.  
 
The transition from incentive-seeking and experimentation to full-blown addiction 
may be more rapid and insidious in adolescence. Evidence from a number of non-
human animal studies suggests that adolescents may experience drug effects that are 
more pleasant or benign than those experienced by adults (for a review, see Spear, 
2000). For example, adolescent rodents have been observed to experience reduced 
sensitivity to the motor impairing and sedative consequences of alcohol relative to 
adults  (Hollstedt  et  al.,  1980;  Ernst  et  al.,  1976).  Greater  biological  tolerance  to 
alcohol in adolescence may engender less unpleasant hang-overs per unit of alcohol 
consumed (York & Chan, 1993). Similar  patterns have been reported  with other 
addictive  substances  (Spear,  2000).  These  factors  may  partially  account  for  the 
elevated rate of progression from causal use to substance dependence in adolescence 
(Spear, 2000). More research is needed on the neural and biochemical differences 
between adolescent and adult brains that mediate these differential effects, including 
the factors that mediate the transition from experimentation to addiction, and their 
interaction with environmental and social influences. 
 
7.3.2.2 Social anxiety disorder   196 
A rather different disorder that tends to arise during adolescence is social anxiety 
disorder (SAD), which is characterised by a chronic and exaggerated fear of negative 
social feedback. SAD has its peak incidence and mean age of onset in adolescence 
(with lifetime incidence of 11%; Banerjee, 2008; Beesdo et al., 2007), and results in 
an array of negative life consequences including unfulfilled economic potential (e.g. 
due  to  poor  school  attendance)  and  interference  with  normal  social  development 
(e.g. due to poor peer socialisation). 
 
The cognitive-developmental basis of SAD is poorly understood. There is evidence 
that  socially  anxious  children  have  specific  social  cognitive  difficulties  with 
understanding the links between mental states (Banerjee, 2008). However, mental 
state  processing  ability  also  shows  protracted  development  throughout  healthy 
adolescence (e.g. Dumontheil et al., 2009), and furthermore, a high but sub-clinical 
level of social anxiety may be a normative feature of adolescence (Sebastian et al., 
2009). Research is needed on the cognitive components that differentiate normative 
adolescent social development from its pathological counterparts in SAD, in order 
for individuals at risk to be identified. Could adolescence itself be considered as a 
‘risk factor’ for SAD, or is pathological social processing in SAD fundamentally 
different from typical adolescent self-consciousness and social awareness? 
 
Individuals with SAD, or at risk of developing SAD, also show abnormalities within 
parts of the brain that undergo protracted structural development up to or during 
adolescence, including brain regions that are implicated in social cognition such as 
the  rostral  and  anterior  cingulate  cortex  (including  arMPFC),  the  amygdala,  and 
fronto-amygdalar  white  matter  tracts  (Phan  et  al.,  2009;  Milham  et  al.,  2005; 
Blankenstein et al., 2009). The functional relevance of these abnormalities in SAD, 
and  their  relationship  to  typical  adolescent  neuroanatomical  development,  is  a 
potentially fruitful avenue for future investigation. 
 
7.4 Overall summary  
This  thesis  combines  the  new  and  rapidly  expanding  fields  of  social  cognitive 
neuroscience, and developmental cognitive neuroscience, to present novel evidence 
for  development  during  adolescence  of  aspects  of  decision-making,  emotion 
understanding  and  the  neural  correlates  of  social  cognition.  Much  remains  to  be   197 
done.  Future  research  could  focus  on  (1)  the  mechanisms  by  which  social  and 
emotional  factors  influence  decision-making  during  adolescence,  especially  risky 
decision-making;  (2)  possible  relationships  between  pubertal  development  and 
neuroanatomical/cognitive  development;  (3)  the  extent  to  which  neuroanatomical 
and/or cognitive development underlie changes in functional brain activity during 
adolescence; and (4) relationships to the development of psychiatric disorders.   198 
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Appendix 2.1: Gambling task parameter structure 
x1  and  y1  are the two possible outcomes of  lottery1, p(x1) is  the  probability of 
obtaining x1, outcome1 is the actual outome of lottery1, EV1 is the expected value 
of lottery1 and SD1 is the standard deviation for lottery1. Similarly q(x2), x2, y2, 
outcome2,  EV2  and  SD2  are  the  parameters  for  lottery2.  dEV  and  dSD  are  the 
differences in expected values and standard deviation respectively between the two 
lotteries. 
 
Trial p(x1) x1 y1 outcome1 EV1 SD1 q(y1) x2 y2 outcome1 EV2 SD2 dEV dSD
1 0.2 -50 -200 -200 -170 60 0.2 50 -50 -50 -30 40 -140 20
2 0.5 200 -50 -50 75 125 0.5 200 -200 200 0 200 75 -75
3 0.8 200 -200 200 120 160 0.5 200 50 50 125 75 -5 85
4 0.2 200 50 50 80 60 0.5 50 -200 -200 -75 125 155 -65
5 0.8 50 -200 50 0 100 0.2 50 -50 -50 -30 40 30 60
6 0.5 200 50 50 125 75 0.5 200 -200 200 0 200 125 -125
7 0.5 200 -200 -200 0 200 0.8 200 -50 200 150 100 -150 100
8 0.2 200 -200 200 -120 160 0.5 200 -50 -50 75 125 -195 35
9 0.2 50 -200 -200 -150 100 0.8 50 -50 50 30 40 -180 60
10 0.2 50 -50 -50 -30 40 0.2 50 -200 -200 -150 100 120 -60
11 0.2 200 -50 200 0 100 0.2 200 50 50 80 60 -80 40
12 0.8 200 -50 -50 150 100 0.5 200 -200 200 0 200 150 -100
13 0.8 50 -50 50 30 40 0.5 200 -200 -200 0 200 30 -160
14 0.2 -50 -200 -200 -170 60 0.8 -50 -200 -50 -80 60 -90 0
15 0.5 200 -50 -50 75 125 0.2 200 50 50 80 60 -5 65
16 0.8 200 -200 200 120 160 0.2 200 -50 -50 0 100 120 60
17 0.8 50 -200 50 0 100 0.2 200 -200 200 -120 160 120 -60
18 0.8 -50 -200 -50 -80 60 0.8 50 -200 50 0 100 -80 -40
19 0.5 -50 -200 -50 -125 75 0.2 200 -200 -200 -120 160 -5 -85
20 0.2 200 -200 -200 -120 160 0.8 50 -200 50 0 100 -120 60
21 0.2 200 -200 -200 -120 160 0.8 50 -200 50 0 100 -120 60
22 0.8 200 -50 200 150 100 0.8 200 -200 -200 120 160 30 -60
23 0.5 200 -50 -50 75 125 0.2 200 -200 200 -120 160 195 -35
24 0.5 200 -200 200 0 200 0.8 50 -50 50 30 40 -30 160
25 0.5 50 -200 50 -75 125 0.5 -50 -200 -50 -125 75 50 50
26 0.5 200 50 200 125 75 0.8 200 -50 -50 150 100 -25 -25
27 0.8 -50 -200 -50 -80 60 0.2 50 -200 -200 -150 100 70 -40
28 0.8 200 50 50 170 60 0.8 200 -200 200 120 160 50 -100
29 0.2 -50 -200 -200 -170 60 0.5 -50 -200 -50 -125 75 -45 -15
30 0.5 50 -200 50 -75 125 0.5 -50 -200 -200 -125 75 50 50
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Appendix  3.1: The  pattern  across  blocks  of  percent  correct  choices  (w.r.t.  ideal 
observer  model)  is  highly  similar  between  groups.  This  suggests  that  age  group 
differences in performance are due to stable differences in strategy, not merely due 
to slower learning or familiarisation with the task in adolescents relative to adults. 
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Appendix 4.1: Physical development questionnaire 
Responses  to  this  questionnaire  were  used  to  assign  participants  to  one  of  three 
puberty  groups:  Pre-puberty,  Mid-puberty  and  Post-puberty.  We  assigned 
participants to the Pre-puberty group if they answered ‘no’ to question 6 and also 
circled option ‘a’ in response to questions 3, 7 and 8. We assigned participants to the 
Post-puberty group if they answered ‘yes’ to question 6 and also circled options ‘c’ 
and ‘d’ in response to questions 3, 7 and 8. Participants who did not fit either of 
these criteria were assigned to the Mid-puberty group. 
 
 
Development Questionnaire 
 
This is a standard questionnaire that is used to look at development during childhood 
and adolescence.  
 
This questionnaire may be completed by: 
 
*The parent(s) 
*The parent(s) and pupil 
*The pupil 
 
*Please place a tick against the option chosen. 
 
The questions are about physical changes that normally happen to young people at 
different  ages.  As  we  are  researching  development  during  childhood  and 
adolescence,  it  is  important  for  us  to  know  at  approximately  what  stage  each 
child/young person is in terms of physical development. We would therefore like to 
ask you to do your best to answer these questions carefully.  
 
If you do not understand a question or do not know the answer, try to answer as best 
as you can or leave it blank. If you don't feel comfortable answering a question, 
please just leave it blank and move on to the next one.  
 
1.  What is your date of birth?   231 
 
2.  How tall are you? 
 
3.  How would you describe any recent growth in height? 
a.  I have not yet had a growth spurt (a “spurt” means a sudden increase 
in height) 
b.  A growth spurt seems to have just begun 
c.  I have noticed a definite growth spurt taking place 
d.  I have finished having a growth spurt and have barely grown at all 
recently 
 
4.  How much have you grown in height in the last 6 months? 
 
5.  How much do you weigh? 
 
6.  Have you started having periods yet? 
a.  Yes 
b.  No 
 
If ‘yes’, at what age did they start? 
 
7.  Would you say that your bodily hair (e.g. under your arms): 
a.  Has not yet started growing 
b.  Has only just begun to grow 
c.  Has been increasing for some time 
d.  Is no longer increasing – it seems to have stopped growing 
 
8.  Have  you  noticed  any  skin  changes  on  your  face  or  neck,  especially 
spots? 
a.  I have not noticed any changes 
b.  I have begun to notice small changes 
c.  I am definitely noticing a lot of changes at the moment   232 
d.  The changes seemed to have finished happening 
 
 
9.  Do  you  think  any  changes  in  your  physical  development  have  been 
happening any earlier or later than most other girls your age? 
a.  much earlier 
b.  a little earlier 
c.  at about the same time 
d.  a little later 
e.  much later 
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Appendix 4.2: Scenarios used in the emotion questionnaire 
 
Anger 
1. One day you went to the park. Somebody had hurt a baby bird. 
2. You saw  your  brother  in  your  bedroom. He  took something  of  yours without 
asking. 
3. You asked your friend to hand in your homework. She forgot, and you got into 
trouble. 
4. You were standing in the dinner queue. Someone pushed in front of you. 
5. You got a new CD for your birthday. You lent it to your brother and he broke it. 
6. You saw someone walk by the window. They threw rubbish into your garden. 
7. You told your friend a secret. He told everyone about it. 
8. You tried really hard on a maths test. Your teacher thought you had cheated. 
 
Fear 
1.  You  were  riding  your  bike  down  a  steep  hill.  Suddenly,  your  brakes  stopped 
working. 
2.  You  were  watching  the  news  on  TV.  You  heard  that  a  poisonous  bee  was
invading Britain. 
3. It was a very dark and windy night. Suddenly, all the lights went out in the house.
4. You felt something on your neck. It was a huge spider crawling on you. 
5. You were climbing a very tall tree. You realized the branch you were standing on 
was going to break. 
6. Your mum was driving you to school. The road was very icy and the car kept 
skidding.  
7. Your friend was being bullied at school. The bully threatened to hurt you too. 
8. You were watching TV at night. Suddenly, a loud noise made you jump. 
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Embarrassment 
1.  At  the  dinner  table,  someone  told  a  funny  joke.  While  laughing,  you  burped 
loudly. 
2. You were eating lunch at school. You realised you had food stuck in your teeth. 
3. You ate too many sweets at a party. You threw up in front of your friends. 
4. You were wearing your school jumper inside out. Everyone was laughing at you. 
5. You dressed as a mouse for a fancy dress party. When you got there, no one else 
was dressed up. 
6. You made a joke about your best friend. Then you realized she was standing right 
behind you. 
7. You were nasty about a girl in your class. Your friend said that she was his new 
girlfriend. 
8. While shopping, you broke a cup. You tried to leave quietly, but the manager 
shouted for you to stop. 
 
Guilt 
1. You were running down the corridor at school. You bumped into your friend and 
she fell over. 
2. You were meant to be looking after your little brother but you went out. When 
you got back, he was crying. 
3. You told your friend you would meet her after school, but you forgot. She was 
waiting in the playground by herself. 
4. Your little sister asked you to help tie her shoe laces, but you didn’t. She fell over
and hurt herself. 
5. You took your dog to the park. While you were talking to your friend, your dog 
got lost. 
6. Your Mum bought you a hamster. You didn’t look after it properly and it died. 
7. You were looking at your Mum’s jewellery but you were not careful and you 
broke it. You knew she would be upset.   
8. You were running around the living room. You accidentally knocked over the 
television. 
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Appendix 5.1  
 
fMRI study of social emotion: Sentences used in the scanner 
 
Disgust 
Self 
Someone did a massive sneeze and snot flew in your face.  
You saw a big hairy fly laying eggs on your friend's lunch.  
Your dad told you that the fridge was infested with maggots 
You saw dried green vomit stuck to the inside of your friend's sink.  
You were in your friend's garden and you put your hand in slimy cat poo.   
You saw a pile of rotting guts near the dustbin at your friend's house. 
A dirty child picked its nose with its fingers and wiped it on you.  
You and your friend saw a dead pig's head in an alleyway.  
Someone had left the toilet seat dirty and you sat on it by mistake.  
You saw your friend's dog eating its own vomit in the garden. 
You took a big gulp of your friend's milk but it had gone off. 
You found a sandwich under your friend's bed with ants crawling on it.  
You saw flies and stinking fish in your friend's kitchen bin.  
You were with your friend and you slipped on some wet dog poo.  
Someone on the bus did a big snotty sneeze in your face. 
You saw a big hairy fly crawling all over your friend's lunch.  
Your friend was vomiting next to you and you could smell it.  
You saw a pile of rotten fish guts by the sink in your friend's kitchen. 
 
Other 
Snot flew all over your Mum's face when someone sneezed.  
Your Mum saw a big hairy fly laying eggs on her friend's lunch.  
Your Mum's friend said that the fridge was infested with maggots.  
Your Mum saw dried green vomit stuck inside her friend's sink.  
Your Mum put her hand in slimy cat poo in her friend's garden.   
Your Mum saw a pile of rotting guts near the dustbin at her friend's house. 
A dirty child picked its nose and wiped it on your Mum.  
Your Mum and her friend saw a dead pig's head in an alleyway.  
Someone had left the toilet seat dirty and your Mum sat on it.    236 
Your Mum saw her friend's dog eating its own vomit. 
Your Mum took a big gulp of her friend's milk but it had gone off. 
Your Mum found a sandwich under her friend's bed with ants crawling on it.  
Your Mum saw flies and stinking fish in her friend's kitchen bin.  
Your Mum was with a friend and she slipped on wet dog poo.  
Someone did a big snotty sneeze in your Mum's face. 
Your Mum saw a big hairy fly crawling on her friend's lunch.  
Your Mum's friend was vomiting next to her and she could smell it.  
Your Mum saw some rotten fish guts by the sink in her friend's kitchen. 
 
Fear 
Self 
A strange man's face appeared at your window in the night.  
An angry dog was barking and running towards you and your friend.  
You suddenly woke up as someone screamed by your bed.  
You thought that someone was following you in the dark.  
A man on a motorbike suddenly swerved and almost hit you. 
Your dad slammed on the brakes as a lorry hurtled towards you.  
You were with your friend and a creature ran up your neck.  
A dog was growling and trying to bite you and your friend. 
You and your friend were alone in the dark and there were funny noises.  
You were with your friend and a spider ran across your bare feet.  
Your friend said there was a hairy spider crawling on your neck.  
You were watching horror movies with your friend and a loud noise made you jump.   
You felt something tickling your neck and your friend screamed that it was a huge 
spider. 
The old cupboard door slammed and you and your friend were locked in. 
Your friend screamed that there was a wasp inside your jumper.  
You imagined that a scary face appeared at your window in the night. 
You were about to cross the road when a motorcyclist swerved in front of you. 
You suddenly woke up as a face appeared at your window. 
 
Other 
A face appeared at your Mum's window in the night.  
An angry barking dog was running towards your Mum and her friend.    237 
Your Mum suddenly awoke as someone screamed by her bed.  
Your Mum thought someone was following her in the dark.  
A man on a motorbike swerved and almost hit your Mum. 
Your Mum slammed on the brakes as a lorry driver almost hit her.  
Your Mum was with her friend and a creature ran up her neck.  
An angry dog was trying to bite your Mum and her friend. 
Your mum and her friend were alone in the dark and there were funny noises.  
Your Mum was with her friend and a spider ran across her bare feet.  
Your Mum's friend said there was a hairy spider on her neck.  
Your Mum was watching horror movies with her friend and a loud noise made her 
jump. 
Something  tickled  your  Mum's neck and her  friend  screamed that  it  was  a  huge 
spider. 
The old cupboard door slammed and your Mum and her friend were locked in. 
Someone screamed that there was a wasp inside your Mum's jumper.  
Your Mum imagined a scary face looking into her window at night. 
Your Mum was about to cross the road when a motorcyclist swerved in front of her. 
Your Mum suddenly woke up as a face appeared at her window. 
 
Embarrassment 
Self 
You did a squeaky fart in front of a boy you fancied. 
Your friend said you had a wet patch on your bum all the way home. 
You couldn't stop blushing in front of a boy you liked. 
Your friend told you that you had really bad breath. 
You were quietly picking your nose but your friend saw you.  
You were eating with your friend and spinach got stuck in your teeth. 
You sneezed in front of someone and snot flew out of your nose. 
You fell asleep on the bus with your head on someone's shoulder.  
Food flew out of your mouth while you were eating with your friend.  
You were eating with your friend and you dribbled down your top.  
You tripped over in front of a boy you liked.  
You were at the cinema with your friend and you got loud hiccups.  
You fell asleep on the train and dribbled on the person next to you.  
Your dad started doing rock 'n' roll dances in the supermarket.    238 
You farted loudly in front of your friend's big brother.  
You sneezed on the bus and snot flew onto someone sitting next to you.  
Your friend said you had baked beans down your top all day.  
Your dad was singing loudly in a silly voice in the street. 
 
Other 
Your Mum did a squeaky fart in front of her boss.  
Your Mum's friend said she had a wet patch on her bum all the way home. 
You Mum couldn't stop blushing in front of her work friend. 
Your Mum's friend told her she had really bad breath. 
Your Mum was quietly picking her nose but her friend saw.  
Your Mum was eating with her friend and spinach got stuck in her teeth. 
Your Mum sneezed in front of someone and snot flew from her nose. 
Your Mum fell asleep on the bus with her head on someone's shoulder.  
Food flew from your Mum's mouth while she was eating with her friend.  
Your Mum dribbled down her top while eating with her friend. 
Your Mum tripped in front of her boss at work.  
Your Mum was at the cinema with her friend and got loud hiccups.  
Your Mum fell asleep on the train and dribbled on the person next to her.  
Your Mum's friend started doing a silly dance in the supermarket.  
Your Mum farted loudly in front of her friend's husband.  
Your Mum sneezed on the bus and snot flew onto someone next to her.  
Your Mum's friend said she had baked beans down her top all day.  
Your Mum's friend was singing loudly in a silly voice in the street. 
 
Guilt 
Self 
You laughed at a quiet girl you know and it made her sad.  
You sent a horrible text message to your friend when you were angry. 
You laughed when your friend told you she was feeling really upset. 
You forgot to feed your friend's cat while she was on holiday.  
You got really cross one day and swore at a little child.  
You joined in when people were laughing at your best friend. 
You completely forgot about your best friend's birthday and she was upset.  
You spread gossip about your best friend and she found out.    239 
You pretended to be sick so you didn’t have to go and visit your gran.  
Your gran asked you to post an important letter but you lost it. 
You didn't help your little brother with his work and he was crying with frustration. 
You accidentally laughed when your friend tripped over and hurt herself. 
You found some money in your friend's house and kept it for yourself. 
You forgot to meet your friend and she was waiting in the cold by herself. 
You lied to your dad when you wanted to go out with your friend.  
You kept some money that a little old lady had dropped in the street. 
You wrote a horrible email to your friend when you were angry. 
You joined in when people were gossiping behind your best friend's back. 
 
Other 
Your Mum laughed at a quiet lady at work and it made her sad. 
Your Mum sent a horrible text message to her friend when she was angry. 
Your Mum laughed when her friend said she was feeling upset. 
Your Mum forgot to feed her friend's cat while she was away.  
Your Mum got cross and swore at her friend's baby.  
Your Mum joined in when people laughed at her best friend. 
Your Mum forgot about her best friend's birthday and she was upset. 
Your Mum spread gossip about her best friend and she found out.  
Your Mum pretended to be sick so that she didn’t have to visit her friend.  
Your Mum's friend gave her an important letter to post and she lost it. 
Your Mum didn't help your little brother and he was crying with frustration. 
Your Mum laughed when her friend tripped over and hurt herself.  
Your Mum found some money in her friend's house and kept it. 
Your Mum forgot to meet her friend and she was waiting in the cold. 
Your Mum lied to her friend when she didn't want to see her. 
Your Mum kept some money that an old lady had dropped in the street. 
Your Mum wrote a horrible email to her friend when she was angry. 
Your Mum joined in when people were gossiping about her best friend. 
 
Happy
16 
You finished all of your exams and had a party. 
                                                  
16 Happy sentences were shown at the end of the scanning session in order to 
counteract possible negative emotional carry-over effects from the emotion 
stimuli.   240 
You won an iPod in a competition. 
You were about to go on a summer holiday. 
You won tickets to the cinema for you and your friends. 
You went out for a special meal with your family. 
You were looking forward to your birthday celebrations.   241 
Appendix 5.2  
 
fMRI study of social emotion: Pilot questionnaire 
 
An example questionnaire which was distributed to child pilot participants is shown 
overleaf. There were eight different versions of the questionnaire, with the order of 
the  four  emotions  fully  counterbalanced  and  the  order  of  the  specific  sentences 
reversed within each emotion.   242 
Emotion questionnaire 11 
 
In this questionnaire, you will be answering questions about the emotions 
you feel in different situations. The emotions you will be asked about are:  
   
Disgust: you might feel disgusted if you smell rotting rubbish in the 
street outside your house.   
     
Embarrassment: you might feel embarrassed if you have to go to 
school with food stains down your clothes.  
 
Fear: you might feel afraid if there is an angry dog running towards 
you in the park.    
 
Guilt: you might feel guilty if you forgot about your friend’s birthday 
and she was sad.   
 
Happiness: you might feel happy if you won a pair of cinema tickets 
for you and your friend.   
 
For each sentence you read, you should imagine that the situation described 
is happening to you, and circle one of the numbers from 1 to 4 to show how 
much of the emotion you would feel.  
 
  1 = I would not feel the emotion at all 
  2 = I would feel the emotion a little bit 
  3 = I would feel the emotion quite a bit  
  4 = I would really feel the emotion a lot 
 
Then, circle one of the numbers from 1 to 4 to show how sure you feel about 
this.   
 
1 = I am not at all sure 
  2 = I feel a bit unsure 
  3 = I am quite sure  
  4 = I am definitely sure 
 
For example,  
 
DISGUST 
 
How 
DISGUSTED? 
How sure are 
you  about 
this? 
 
You saw a dustbin spilling its rubbish into the street.  
 
1    2    3    4  
 
1    2    3  4  
 
Thank you! ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺    243 
 
DISGUST 
 
How 
DISGUSTED? 
How sure are 
you about 
this? 
1. You saw flies and stinking fish in your friend's kitchen 
bin.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
2. You saw dried green vomit stuck to the inside of your 
friend's sink.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
3. You saw a big hairy fly laying eggs on your friend's 
lunch.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
4. You were with your friend and you slipped on some 
wet dog poo.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
 
EMBARRASSMENT 
 
How EMBARR
ASSED? 
How sure 
are you 
about this? 
1. You did a squeaky fart when you were with a boy. 
  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
2. Your dad started doing rock 'n' roll dances in the 
supermarket. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
3. Your friend said you had a wet patch on your bum all 
the way home. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
4. You couldn't stop blushing in front of a boy in your 
class. 
 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
 
FEAR 
 
How AFRAID? How sure are 
you about 
this? 
1. You were with your friend and something furry ran 
down your neck.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
2. Someone jumped out at you in the dark.  
  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
3. The old cupboard door slammed and you and your 
friend were locked in.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
4. You were with your friend and a furry creature ran 
across your bare feet.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
 
GUILT 
 
How GUILTY? How sure are 
you about 
this? 
1. Your mum was sad when you completely forgot 
about Mothers' Day. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
2. You spread gossip about your best friend and she 
found out.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
3. You laughed when your friend told you she was 
feeling upset. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
4. Your little sister’s rabbit died because you didn't look 
after it properly. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
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DISGUST 
 
How 
DISGUSTED? 
How sure are 
you about 
this? 
5. You opened your brother's lunchbox and it was full of 
mould 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
6. Your friend was turning her eyelids inside out on the 
bus.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
7. You were in your friend's garden and you put your 
hand in slimy cat poo.   
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
8. You saw a pile of rotting guts near the dustbin at your 
friend's house. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
 
EMBARRASSMENT 
 
How EMBARR
ASSED? 
How sure 
are you 
about this? 
5. Your friend told you that you had really bad breath.  1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
6. You were quietly picking your nose but your friend 
saw you.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
7. You were eating with your friend and spinach was 
stuck in your teeth. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
8. Your dad was singing loudly in a silly voice in the 
street.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
 
FEAR 
 
How AFRAID? How sure are 
you about 
this? 
5. You thought someone was following you in the dark.  1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
6. A man on a motorbike suddenly swerved and almost 
hit you. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3   4  
7. Your friend told you there was a wasp crawling inside 
your jumper.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3   4  
8. You got stuck in your friend's basement and you 
thought you couldn't breathe. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3   4  
 
GUILT 
 
How GUILTY? How sure are 
you about 
this? 
5. You couldn't be bothered to help your friend with her 
work and she failed. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3   4  
6. You found some money in your friend's house and 
kept it for yourself. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3   4  
7. You were messing around with your friend and you 
broke her parents' wedding photos.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3   4  
8. You kept some money that a little old lady had 
dropped in the street. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3   4  
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DISGUST 
 
How 
DISGUSTED? 
How sure are 
you about 
this? 
9. A dirty child picked his nose with his fingers and 
wiped it on you.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
10. You saw your friend's dog eating its own vomit in 
the garden. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
11. You found an old sandwich under your friend's bed 
with ants crawling on it.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
12. Your dad told you to put the bin bags out and they 
were all slimy.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
 
EMBARRASSMENT 
 
How EMBARR
ASSED? 
How sure 
are you 
about this? 
9. Your friend told you that you snore loudly at sleep-
overs.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
10. Your mum made you go and buy loads of loo roll 
from the corner shop. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
11. You sneezed in front of someone and snot flew out 
of your nose. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
12. You fell asleep on the bus with your head on 
someone's shoulder.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
 
FEAR 
 
How AFRAID? How sure are 
you about 
this? 
9. A dog was growling and trying to bite you and your 
friend. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
10. Your friend said there was a hairy spider crawling 
on your neck.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
11. You and your friend were alone in the park at night. 1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
12. There was a huge snake slithering towards you and 
your friend on holiday. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
 
GUILT 
 
How GUILTY? How sure are 
you about 
this? 
9. You forgot to meet your friend and she was waiting in 
the cold by herself. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
10. You lied to your mum about where you went with 
your friends.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
11. You wrote a horrible email to your friend when you 
were angry. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
12. You laughed at your friend’s new haircut and she 
started crying. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
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DISGUST 
 
How 
DISGUSTED? 
How sure are 
you about 
this? 
13. You and your friend saw a dead pig's head in an 
alleyway.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
14. You and your friend walked past a smelly dustbin in 
the street.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
15. Somebody had left the toilet seat dirty and you sat 
on it by mistake.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
16. Somebody did a massive sneeze and snot flew in 
your face.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
 
EMBARRASSMENT 
 
How EMBARR
ASSED? 
How sure 
are you 
about this? 
13. Your friend told you your t-shirt had been inside out 
all day. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
14. Food flew out of your mouth while you were eating 
with your friend.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
15. You were eating with your friend and you dribbled 
down your top.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
16. You had loo roll stuck to your shoe as you left the 
toilets with your friend. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
 
FEAR 
 
How AFRAID? How sure are 
you about 
this? 
13. You and your friend were alone in the dark and 
there were funny noises.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
14. You were in a storm with your friend and there was 
lightning all around. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
15. You were watching a horror movie at night with your 
friend and a loud noise made you jump.   
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
16. You felt something tickling your neck and your friend 
screamed that it was a huge spider. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
 
GUILT 
 
How GUILTY? How sure are 
you about 
this? 
13. You told white lies to your mum to get out of doing 
the housework. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
14. You let people think you did some work that your 
friend had spent ages on. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
15. You pretend to be sick so you don’t have to go and 
visit your gran.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
16. Your gran asked you to post an important letter but 
you lost it. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
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DISGUST 
 
How 
DISGUSTED? 
How sure are 
you about 
this? 
17. Your friend was vomiting and you could smell it. 
 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
18. You and your friend saw a filthy rat with fleas 
jumping on it. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
19. You put something in your friend's bin and flies 
buzzed out in your face.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
20. You took a big gulp of your friend's milk but it had 
gone off. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
   
EMBARRASSMENT 
 
How EMBARR
ASSED? 
How sure 
are you 
about this? 
17. You were doing a pop dance in your room and your 
brother was spying on you. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
18. You tripped over in front of a boy you liked.  
 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
19. You were at the cinema with your friend and you got 
loud hiccups.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
20. You fell asleep on the train and dribbled on the 
person next to you. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
   
FEAR 
 
How AFRAID? How sure are 
you about 
this? 
17. The lift got stuck and you and your friend were 
trapped. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3   4  
18. An angry dog was barking and running towards you 
and your friend.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3   4  
19. Your dad slammed on the brakes as a lorry hurtled 
towards you.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3   4  
20. You imagined someone was creeping up behind 
you in the dark.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3   4  
   
GUILT 
 
How GUILTY? How sure are 
you about 
this? 
17. You didn't help your little brother with his work and 
he was crying with frustration. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3   4  
18. You accidentally laughed when your friend tripped 
over and hurt herself. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3   4  
19. Your best friend was upset because you forgot it 
was her birthday.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3   4  
20. You forgot to feed your friend's cat while she was on 
holiday.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3   4  
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DISGUST 
 
How 
DISGUSTED? 
How sure are 
you about 
this? 
21. You and your friend saw some flies buzzing all over 
a dead rat.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
22. You bit into your friend's brown rotten apple by 
mistake. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
23. Your friend said she saw a fly crawling on your 
lunch.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
24. Your dad told you that the fridge was infested with 
maggots.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
 
GUILT 
 
How GUILTY? How sure are 
you about 
this? 
21. You got really cross and swore at a little child.  
 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3   4  
22. You joined in when people were laughing at your 
best friend. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3   4  
23. You made fun of a quiet girl you know and it made 
her cry.  
1    2    3    4   1    2    3   4  
24. You sent a horrible text message to your friend 
when you were angry. 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3   4  
 
HAPPINESS 
 
How HAPPY?  How sure are 
you about 
this? 
1. You won an iPod in a competition. 
 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
2. You were about to go on your summer holiday. 
 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
3. You thought your cat was lost but it came back. 
 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
4. You got a beautiful new pair of shoes. 
 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
 
HAPPINESS 
 
How HAPPY?  How sure are 
you about 
this? 
5. You went out for a special meal with your family.  
 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
6. You were singing along to your favourite song. 
 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
7. You were looking forward to your birthday 
celebrations. 
 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
8. You finished all of your exams. 
 
1    2    3    4   1    2    3  4  
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Appendix 5.3  
 
Regression analysis: brain regions for which activity to other > self correlates 
with perceived dissimilarity of (m)other to self  
 
Of interest was the effect of perceived self-mother difference (PSMD) on the neural 
processing of emotion sentences from the (m)other perspective. It was predicted that 
participants  with  high  PSMD  scores  (those  who  perceived  their  mother  to  be 
dissimilar to self) would show stronger activity within dorsal MPFC during other > 
self, while participants with low PSMD scores (those who perceived their mother to 
be similar to themselves) would show stronger activity within ventral MPFC other > 
self (e.g. Mitchell et al. 2006), or perhaps no difference (if subjects were simply 
treating self and other as the same).  
 
Linear regression analysis was therefore conducted at the second (group) level in 
SPM,  using  single-subject  PSMD  scores  (from  both  age  groups)  as  a  regressor. 
Brain regions were identified for which activity in other > self correlated with the 
degree of perceived dissimilarity of mother to self.  
 
Results showed that the dorsal MPFC ([6 42 16], P < 0.001 uncorrected; size in 
voxels = 26), left TPJ ([-48 -62 20], P < 0.001 uncorrected; size in voxels =108) and 
right TPJ ([48 -60 16], P < 0.001 uncorrected; size in voxels = 84 with a secondary 
peak at [44 -58 24], P < 0.001) were more active during other > self in participants 
with high PSMD scores, that is, participants who perceived the other (their mother) 
to be more dissimilar to self.  
 
No brain regions showed a negative correlation with PSMD scores during other > 
self, that is, for subjects who perceived the other (their mother) to be similar to self, 
there were no differences in activation between self and other sentences. 
 
Figure 
PSMD-correlated activation in dorsal anterior rostral MPFC [6 42 16] (top), left TPJ 
[-48 -62 20] (bottom left and right) and right TPJ [48 -60 16] (bottom right, right 
hand activation shown without crosshair) during other > self. These brain regions 
were more active during other > self for participants who perceived the other (their   250 
mother) to be more dissimilar to self. Shown at P < 0.001 uncorrected (minimum 
voxel extent = 4). 
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